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Abstract 
 
A personal experience of explosive, yet repressed psychological ferment that arose in 
response to severe trauma was the starting point for both the creative work and the 
dissertation that comprise this thesis. In contrast to other strong emotional conditions, this 
state is characterised by a violent process in which the impulse to scream is turned back in 
on itself becoming a self-destructive force. The neologism scream has been coined in order 
to encapsulate the particular qualities of this traumatic condition and its manifestation in 
the creative work. The scream is both the compulsion behind my creative practice, and its 
central affective state. The dissertation draws from my own traumatic experiences in the 
formulation and development of the scream as a concept, and the elucidation of its broader 
ontological, psychological and aesthetic implications. Although themes of trauma, suffering 
and anguish have been widely explored in Western art, literature, philosophy, and 
psychology, this dissertation advances the scream as a very specific traumatic condition that 
has, so far, remained largely untheorised. The dissertation aims to define the scream 
through a series of case studies from literature, philosophy and art, which exemplify the 
nature of this condition.   
The creative work has undertaken a comprehensive exploration of the scream 
primarily through performance-video. Works have been created through an ongoing and 
constant studio process comprised of numerous performative acts, that are, in most cases, 
directly mediated into video format. Eighteen suites of work have been created for this 
project. These range from raw, visceral performances that focus primarily on the face as 
the site of expression, to highly stylised and aestheticised works involving the use of masks 
and costume to a greater extent. Each suite invokes a different aspect, or symptom of the 
scream, which is played out through a number of different personae or alter egos. 
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Introduction  
 
A particular condition resulting from significant personal trauma led to the contentions of 
this thesis. I experienced an ineffable inner energy comprised of a mixture of rage, anguish, 
resentment, despair and self-revulsion. This energy erupted with violent force but was 
stifled and internalised: turning back in on itself and ravaging me. Through my own 
reckoning, this emotional state was specific enough to necessitate the coinage of the term 
scream. The strikethrough has a number of functions, which represent some of the 
constituent qualities of the scream. The strikethrough symbolises the violent strike of 
traumatic events and their devastating consequences. It also functions as a self-cancelling 
quality that relates to the emotional state expressed as silence: a result of the subject’s 
repression, fear, or anticipation of not being understood. This ‘cancelled scream’ relates to 
something so horrifying it cannot be fully expressed or named. One consequence of 
trauma of this nature is that it causes unwarranted shame and guilt in the subject, leading to 
self-silencing, self-negation and self-recrimination. Ultimately, the strikethrough represents 
the agonising contradiction of this condition: the urge to scream is countered by an equally 
strong suppression of this urge. Accordingly, the scream oscillates between externalised 
expression and concealed emotion. The scream is the compulsive force propelling both the 
creative work and theoretical enquiry of this project.  
In my creative practice, the expression of the scream is both overt and covert: 
variously asserted in raw, wild and primal outbursts, or hidden and veiled through masks, 
artifice and analogy. It is important to note that this is not self- therapy but a rigorous self-
analytical and aesthetic process in which the performing subject (myself) assumes a variety 
of aliases and guises. The theoretical enquiry stems from the hypothesis that there are 
others who share this condition. One of the paths to an easing of my symptoms has been 
through the discovery that I am not alone in my experience. The thesis seeks to define the 
scream, and uses a series of case studies to mobilise and elucidate this concept. Each case 
study has strong affinities with this emotional state as evinced in the studio project.  
The scream is distinct from other emotional states of torment and turmoil, such as 
angst, ennui and psychological crisis. Although it is redolent of these states, it is a separate 
phenomenon that specifically responds to events of a traumatic and violent nature. The 
singular nature of this condition is also due to a number of key attributes that set it apart 
from other forms of strong emotion. Unlike other self-destructive emotional states, this is 
a far more torturous condition that involves self-directed rage and a frenzied drive for self-
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annihilation. Moreover, the scream is a persistent abreaction of the horror and suffering 
that accompanies traumatic events. It particularly recalls the way in which the traumatised 
individual’s ability to physically or vocally resist is quashed and nullified. Nevertheless, the 
individual’s thwarted attempts to cry out remain held in the psyche as a latent force that is 
sustained as the only possible course of resistance.  
The neologism scream borrows from Jacques Derrida’s use of strike-through to 
indicate that the normative meaning of a word is sous rature or ‘under erasure.’ To put a 
word  ‘under erasure’ demonstrates that, although close, the word does not adequately 
represent a particular meaning, but it is impossible to find a more precise word or to fully 
define this meaning.1 For example, the word ‘scream’ is incapable of encapsulating the 
specific condition sought in this project, but it is nevertheless necessary to use it in some 
form due to its proximity in affective meaning. In its common usage, a scream usually 
refers to an instinctive, loud and overwhelming cry uttered in response to a life-threatening 
situation of horror or terror, an experience of extreme physical or emotional pain, or as an 
expression of intense grief, rage and/or despair.2 The scream has similarities with the 
extreme emotional and primal state of a vocal scream, but is distinct. Unlike a literal 
scream, this condition is mute and involves the suppression of vocal screaming and the 
containment of explosive emotion. Moreover, the scream is not a speech act or an 
immediate and reactive outburst; instead it is an ongoing psychic condition. 
The scream can be further differentiated from other extreme emotions because it 
involves a number of different physiological and psychological modalities that are all 
compelled by the same explosive inner energy, but represent the various moods or states of 
mind of this condition. Accordingly, the scream features oscillations in intensity and affect. 
The mercurial nature of this condition is demonstrated in the contrasting personae I 
assume in my performance-video works. This can also be understood through the analogy 
to a split self—a result of the dissociation and fragmentation of subjectivity that may occur 
as a consequence of severe trauma. The moods and states of mind that are inhabited by my 
personae are expressed through a range of disquieting and irrational behaviours, gestures 
and vocalizations which are reminiscent of states of frenzied madness, delirium, hysteria, 
major depression, mania and schizophrenia; as well as forms of non-symbolic 
communication such as repetitive speech patterns, echolalia and acting-out behaviours that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Maggie MacLure, “Deconstruction as a method of research,” in Research Methods in the Social Sciences, ed. 
Bridget Somekh and Cathy Lewin, (London: Sage Publications, 2005), 284 and Jacques Derrida, Of 
Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), xv. Heidegger first initiated the use of 
strikethrough. 
2 Peter Schwenger, “Phenomenology of the Scream,” Critical Inquiry, 40 no. 2 (Winter 2014), 393. 
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are often attributed to individuals with autism.3 However, the scream is distinct and 
separate from any of these states and the artwork does not seek to mimic any of these 
symptoms. Moreover, there has been a progression in my practice from a savage, raw, 
raving manifestation of the scream, to one that is more nuanced and highly theatricalised. 
Over the course of the creative project, I have observed that the different modalities of the 
scream revolve around the following constellation: rage, shame, obscenity, extreme physical 
and mental suffering, silence, and a state that relates specifically to the perspective of a 
daughter and woman. These six modalities are reflected in the structure of the thesis, which 
explores and elucidates the nature of the scream from each of these different perspectives. 
The use of the terms trauma and traumatised subject in this thesis relates 
specifically to recent psychological and psychiatric definitions of psychological trauma and 
traumatic events or situations. Although the focus of this thesis is the scream in its 
expressed form in the realm of the aesthetic, and it therefore does not aim to analyse the 
scream from the perspective of psychology, psychoanalysis or trauma theory, recent 
psychological understandings of trauma are extremely important to elucidating the concept 
of the scream and its symptoms. Overall, contemporary psychological understandings of 
trauma—particularly the delineations of trauma-related disorders such as post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) and complex traumatic stress disorder—corroborate some of the 
main attributes of the scream and its symptoms experienced and observed in the case 
studies examined in the thesis. In contemporary psychology trauma is generally defined as a 
major psychological injury caused by what is called a traumatic stressor: an event, situation 
or experience that the World Health Organisation describes as ‘of an exceptionally 
threatening or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause pervasive distress in almost 
anyone.’4 According to the American Psychiatric Association, a traumatic stressor usually 
‘involves a perceived threat to life (either one’s own life or that of another person) or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Martha Snell, “Using dynamic assessment with learners who communicate nonsymbolically,” Augmentative 
and Alternative Communication, 18 no. 3 (2002):163-176.While these symptoms are often linked to children and 
adolescents with severe learning disabilities, they have also been linked to trauma, and are correspond to 
some of the ways in which the scream is performed in my performance video works.  
4 World Health Organization, The ICD–10 Version 2016, “F43.1 Post-traumatic stress disorder,” Classification 
of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines, (Geneva: WHO; 2016), 
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en#!/F43.1. American Psychiatric Association, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 4th edn. (Washington, DC: APA; 1994); Gaskell, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder: The Management of PTSD in Adults and Children in Primary and Secondary Care. (National 
Collaborating Center for Mental Health: Leicester, 2005) (NICE Clinical Guidelines, No. 26.) Appendix 13., 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK56506/ 
Christine A. Courtois, Julian D. Ford, eds, Treating Complex Traumatic Stress Disorders (Adults): Scientific 
Foundations (New York: Guilford Press, 2009),15. 
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physical integrity, and intense fear, helplessness or horror.’5 Traumatic events and situations 
can either be one-off or chronic and recurring—for example abuse within the domestic 
context. Trauma can also occur in response to severe illness or personal loss.6 Some of the 
symptoms of trauma that have a particular correspondence to the scream include the re-
experiencing and re-living of traumatic events, avoidance, and an oscillation between 
hyperarousal and emotional numbing and severe dissociation.7 Other significant symptoms 
of trauma that are germane to the scream include psychosis, paranoia, depression, self-
blame, extreme anger, feelings of disgust and self-disgust, and extreme introspection.8 
However, the notion of trauma is still insufficient in conveying the particularly catastrophic 
and explosive nature of the scream and its symptoms. It is important to note that the 
scream is not simply a composite or symptom of PTSD and/or complex traumatic stress 
disorder. Instead, the scream is a separate entity that runs parallel to these conditions and is 
imbricated with each of these, but is significantly different with additional and particular 
qualities that go beyond trauma disorders. The scream is differentiated because of its 
specific nature as an explosive and convulsive force that turns back inwardly on the 
individual. The particular energy that constitutes this excruciating movement within the 
psyche, to the best of my knowledge has not been theorised in current psychological and 
psychiatric understandings of trauma. The concept of the scream therefore posits a specific 
response to trauma.  
The methodology underpinning this thesis is endogenous, and takes my direct lived 
experience of trauma as the starting point for the formulation and development the scream 
as a concept, and the elucidation of its broader ontological, psychological and aesthetic 
implications. This process does not assume a fixed or fully knowable traumatised subject, 
but rather one that is radically unknowable because it is in a state of crisis relating to the 
experience of annihilation, loss of integrity and loss of self. Paradoxically, however, in the 
context of the scream, an assertion of individual subjectivity and autonomy, despite the 
subject’s radical instability and crisis, becomes necessary for the individual’s survival in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 American Psychiatric Association,: Gaskell; Susan Rubin Suleiman, “Judith Herman and Contemporary 
Trauma Theory, Women's Studies Quarterly, Vol 36 no 1/2, Witness (Spring - Summer, 2008), 276. 
6 Christine A. Courtois, Julian D. Ford, Treating Complex Traumatic Stress Disorders (Adults): An Evidence Based 
Guide: Scientific Foundations, with a foreword by Judith Herman and afterword by Bessel A. van der Kolk, (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2009), 13-16. 
7 Ibid., 
8 American Psychiatric Association ; Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th ed.; Louis Sass, 
“Relationships between trauma and psychosis: An exploration of cognitive and dissociative factors,”Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 112, 351-359. 
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face of forces of violence and abuse that seek to annihilate the sense of self.9 In this regard, 
the methodology of this thesis, as well as the concept of the scream itself, does not only 
intersect with recent psychological understandings of the effect of trauma on the subject, 
but also has strong links to a lineage of modern Western philosophical and literary 
approaches running from Saint Augustine, through to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Antonin Artaud, that assert personal volition and mobilise strong inner 
emotional states—in particular those that involve suffering- as the basis of ontological 
enquiry and/or creativity. This philosophical and methodological approach is the fil 
conducteur aligning the particular selection of writers, philosophers and artists in this thesis, 
and to a large extent accounts for the largely Eurocentric focus of this thesis.  
Notwithstanding differences in the representation, articulation, or dissolution of 
subjectivity undertaken, the case studies are linked by two broad themes that relate strongly 
to this philosophical approach: firstly the demonstration and/or representation of either a 
struggle to assert subjectivity and autonomy, or an exploration of subjectivity under crisis 
or destruction, and secondly the imbrication of their life and work. The Confessions of Saint 
Augustine of Hippo is the first text to advance a modern concept of subjectivity -one that is 
focussed on lived experience and individual will. Moreover, Augustine’s depiction of an 
inner self that is private, tormented, shameful and alienated, as well as the importance he 
ascribes to personal memory, is an important precedent to the interiority and self-
excoriation that is engaged with in this project.10 In the pre-Romantic period, Augustine’s 
introspection is carried forward by Rousseau, for whom self-excoriation becomes key to 
philosophical enquiry: subjectivity is in flux, tormented, and the sense of self and autonomy 
draws upon the sensorial and emotional.11 This approach was taken to an even greater 
extreme by Nietzsche, who emphasises the importance of primal instincts, madness, illness 
and states of intoxication and profound destructive suffering to philosophical thinking and 
subjectivity.12 Nietzsche’s affirmation of suffering is further advanced by Artaud for whom 
physical and mental suffering is asserted as necessary for the experience of autonomy and 
metaphysical subjectivity itself.  In the case of The Iliad, like most other literary works of 
antiquity, extreme emotions are not linked to subjective experience of the author, but are 
typically deployed in an avatar such as an heroic figure or god or goddess. Nevertheless, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nick Mansfield, Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2000), 8-9, 52; 
Kim Atkins ed., Self and Subjectivity, with a commentary by Kim Atkins, (Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2005), 2. 
10 Atkins, 7: Phillip Cary, Augustine's Invention of the Inner Self : The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 1- 5. 
11 Atkins, 7 see also Slavoj Žižek, The ticklish subject: the Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso 
Books, 1999), 2. 
12 Atkins, 71. 
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Iliad is aligned to the other examples, because the primacy given to Achilles’ rage as the 
driving force in the narrative prefigures the modern subjective emphasis on inner states of 
strong emotion demonstrated in the other texts. Moreover, the themes of Achilles’s 
frustrated will, his desire for autonomy and the assertion of his individuality, and his 
alienation and exile within the context of the Iliad, are aligned with the specific approach to 
subjectivity underpinning this project.13  
While the approaches to the subject outlined above reveal the ontological 
foundation, genesis, standpoint and positioning of the scream and the methodology of this 
thesis, from which the scream emerges, the scream also engages with feminist, queer and 
gender philosophical approaches to subjectivity. Although there is a predominantly male 
focus of the case studies in this thesis, this is because the scream is not a gender-specific 
condition, and exists as an instinctive emotional state independent of biological sex or 
sexuality; moreover the examples have been chosen based on their capacity to exemplify 
the scream irrespective of the sex of their authors. Nevertheless, this project 
intersects/aligns with feminist, gender and queer philosophy and theory. The artwork, for 
example, plays with the construction of gender: most of my performance video works 
feature a slippage, blurring or exaggeration of categories/stereotypes of gender enacted 
through a variety of masks and personae and masquerade. But in this project the 
performative ‘play’ of androgyny, femininity and masculinity is not just about the 
exploration of identity, gender and sexuality but also enables the theaticalisation and 
abreaction of past traumas through inhabiting the roles of both the abuser and abused. 
Moreover this performative role-play is also driven by the condition of the scream itself 
which features a severe and violent discomfort with the performance of one’s prescribed 
gender and sexuality and a disgust and self-revulsion at the signs, symptoms and physicality 
of one’s own biological sex. This is a significant component of the scream and is another 
common thread running through the case studies in this thesis. Accordingly, the artwork 
and the project could be further related in other theoretical directions for example, queer 
theory, feminist theory, as well as the concepts of the mask, marionette, and the doll; mime 
and the legacy of the commedia dell’arte; drag, cross-dressing, and queer and gendered 
performance, as well as self-representation in pop culture. These areas were initially 
embarked upon during the writing and theoretical research of this project, but in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ahuvia Kahane, Homer: A Guide for the Perplexed, (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 117; “Achilles as Vagabond: 
The Culture of Autonomy in the Iliad,” The Classical World, 90 (1997): 363-464; Gregory Nagy, The Ancient 
Greek Hero in 24 Hours, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013), 47. 
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interests of focus and precision, and because of the strong emotive engagement my work 
reflects, the principal focus of this project has been the scream as an emotional state.   
Due to the extreme affective states and behaviours evinced in the artwork, the 
scream might have been considered from the perspective of the abject as established in 
Bulgarian-French philosopher and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror: An Essay 
on Abjection. There is some resonance between Kristeva’s notion of the abject and the 
scream and its symptoms—particularly in terms of the self-revulsion that is a component 
part of this condition. However, in Powers of Horror, Kristeva establishes the notion of the 
abject as a feeling of revulsion and horror over what is filthy or nauseating, or what 
disturbs the boundaries within the body and/or psyche and thus causes a loss of boundary 
between self and other, and thus a breakdown of meaning.14 The scream, by contrast is a 
specific response to severe trauma: unlike abjection the scream is not based in revulsion 
and repudiation of an abject object. As will be revealed in this dissertation, the self-
revulsion that is contained within the scream is an explosive response against the traumatic 
experience and the way in which it lingers in the body and psyche in of the subject leading 
to self-directed rage and a compulsive drive for self-annihilation. Moreover, self-revulsion 
is only one component of the scream which also involves resentment, anguish and despair.  
There may be variance to the central notion of the scream if it could be called a 
non-concept: i.e. based on subjective, inner experience that cannot be objectively 
measured, quantified or verified. To this objection the argument would be that the term 
scream is a cipher for certain extreme forms of anguish, rage, resentment, despair and self-
revulsion that cannot be fully articulated or expressed due to their origin in severe 
traumatic experiences. Trauma is by definition unable to be fully known or identified, and 
as such, the scream, which is a traumatic condition in itself, is likewise unable to be fully 
defined. Trauma resides in the subject, and there is a gap between traumatic symptoms and 
the originary traumatic experiences, which remain unlocatable, unrepresentable and elude 
full or complete memory. Thus the scream could indeed be regarded as a non-concept—a 
point that is embraced in this thesis. Moreover, the accusation of a ‘non-concept’ could be 
said of any affect. Immanuel Kant’s notions of beauty and the contemplation of the 
sublime—which are famously non-concepts—are a case in point here. It is important to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Julia Kristeva, Powers of horror: an Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press), 1, 2-4, 141, 148, 208, Hal Foster “Obscene, Abject, Traumatic,” October, 78 : (1996), 114. 
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note that in the case of beauty for example, its status as a ‘non-concept’ does not preclude 
its value as a topic of philosophical and theoretical enquiry. 15 
 
* 
A large body of scholarship exists which examines the expression of strong 
emotional states related to trauma and suffering in visual art, literature and philosophy. 
However, the scream—to the best of my knowledge—is a distinctive entity that remains 
largely untheorised. Nevertheless certain theorists and writers explore emotional conditions 
that approach the intensity of the scream or discuss similarly fraught psychological states 
resulting from trauma. These studies are across a range of fields and modes of enquiry: 
from literary and critical theory, to self-analysis, trauma theory and art theory. 
Within literary criticism and comparative literature a number of studies focus on 
strong affective states that have an affinity with the scream, and also share a similar 
methodology to this thesis in their use of close readings of texts in order to elucidate these 
states. In Romantic Agony (1933), Mario Praz identifies what he describes as a particular 
‘erotic sensibility’ within late nineteenth century Romantic literature. This is characterised 
by morbid obsessions, a sense of beauty and erotic pleasure derived from horror, disease 
and suffering, and a preoccupation with sadomasochistic and sadistic themes as 
exemplified by Charles Baudelaire and the Marquis de Sade respectively.16 While Praz’s text 
is valuable to this study due to way in which it defines a similarly tumultuous state, the co-
mingling of death and pleasure or ‘delicious death agony’ described by Praz diverges 
considerably from the scream, from which no aesthetic or erotic pleasure is derived.17  
Winfried Menninghaus’s Disgust: The Theory and History of a Strong Sensation (2003) takes a 
genealogical approach, tracing disgust in relation to philosophy, psychology, literature and 
art.18 Mennighaus’s study discusses certain types of disgust that have a similarity with the 
scream, such as the profound, existential ennui that came to the fore in nineteenth century 
French literature. Mennighaus characterises this kind of ennui as an intense ‘disgust at 
one’s own existence.’19 Overall, however, the kinds of disgust that Mennighaus focuses on 
relate to the principal understanding of disgust established in modern, Western theoretical 
thought—an individual’s revulsion in the face of something/someone considered abject 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Christopher Janaway, “Disinterestedness and objectivity: Nietzsche on Schopenhauer and Kant,” Studia 
Kantiana, Vol 4 no. 1 (2002): 28-29. 
16 Mario Praz, Romantic Agony, 2nd Edition, trans. Angus Davidson, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
17 Praz, 377,381-382. 
18 Winfried Menninghaus, Disgust: The Theory and History of a Strong Sensation, trans. Howard Eiland and Joel 
Golb, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). 
19 Menninghaus, 119, 147-148, 358.  
	   9	  
and disgusting, which paradoxically can also be a source of attraction.20 This is distinct 
from the severe self-disgust and self-revulsion that is a component part of the scream. 
Another study of a strong psychological state, but in this case specifically related to 
modernity is John Farrell’s Paranoia and Modernity: Cervantes to Rousseau, (2006). Farrell traces 
paranoia both as an expression of psychological illness and as an intellectual, and 
philosophical construction in key texts of modernity until the late eighteenth century. 
Similar to this thesis, Farrell develops his argument through a series of case studies on the 
lives and writings of Rousseau, Nietzsche, and others. While Farrell does explore paranoia 
in relation to madness, shame and suffering, his primary purpose is to demonstrate how 
paranoia became a central theme in modern and post-modern Western culture and thought 
due to what he views as a loss of agency that occurs with the onset of modernity.21 Unlike 
Farrell’s study, while this thesis aims to show the ways in which others share the scream, it 
does not argue that it is a ubiquitous or central theme within contemporary Western 
thought. 
In the history of emotions field, a number of authors have undertaken rigorous 
investigations of emotional states through analyses of historical, literary, philosophical and 
medical texts.22 Within this field there is a conflict between theorists who view emotions as 
products of cultural, historical, and social contexts and power structures, and those who 
view emotions as innate, natural and universal.23 This thesis does not claim the scream is 
universal, but it does consider it to be an instinctive and primal entity that takes on 
different forms in different historical contexts. A number of studies on emotions in 
Antiquity are especially relevant, especially those that trace now neglected emotions such as 
thumos, which has a relationship to the scream and is discussed in the first chapter of this 
thesis. Barbara Koziak’s article “Homeric Thumos: The Early History of Gender, Emotion, 
and Politics,” (1999) has been particularly instructive in this regard. 24  Ancient Anger: 
Perspectives from Homer to Galen (2004), edited by Susanna Braund and Glenn W. Most,25 
provides a comprehensive overview of the ways in which explosive emotion has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Menninghaus, 6, 147-148. 
21 John Farrell, Paranoia and Modernity: Cervantes to Rousseau, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), 6-9.	  
22 Peter Goldie, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).	  
23 Jan Plamper, The History of Emotions: An Introduction, trans. Keith Tribe,  (Oxford: Oxford University press, 
2015), 5-11); Susan J. Matt, Peter N. Stearns eds. Doing Emotions History (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
2014); Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: Aristotle's Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 4-6.	  
24 Barbara Koziak, “Homeric Thumos: The Early History of Gender, Emotion, and Politics, ” The Journal of 
Politics, 61 no. 4 (1999), 1068-109.  
25 Susanna Braund, Glenn W. Most eds., Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen,(Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 
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discussed in antiquity,	  while William V. Harris’s Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control 
in Classical Antiquity (2009) has been valuable in showing the way in which heated emotions 
such as rage and fury have been subjugated, and suppressed since antiquity—especially as a 
result of Stoic philosophy.26 Overall, however studies such as these take ethnographic and 
historical approaches to emotion through discussing culturally and/or historically specific 
emotions that are already named—rather than seeking to identify or describe so far 
untheorised psychological conditions. 
The drive to understand my personal experience—which I feel to be unnamed and 
unsatisfactorily addressed within the literature—led to the self-analysis that underpins this 
thesis. William Styron’s searching self-analysis in Darkness Visible: A Memoir of Madness 
(1990) is driven by a similar compulsion to comprehend his severe depressive illness.27 
Although depression is distinct to the scream, what is particularly apposite to my project is 
the importance Styron places in defining and naming his condition in order to overcome 
what he views as lack of adequate literature on the nature of depression.28 For Styron the 
word ‘depression’ itself is misleading and does not evoke the pain and horror of his 
experience: it prevents ‘by its very insipidity, a general awareness of the horrible intensity of 
the disease when out of control.’29 In the 1990s a number of other depression memoirs 
followed Styron’s lead and likewise aimed to enlighten their readers about the illness. 
Clinical psychologist Kay Redfield Jamison recounts her lifelong manic-depression in An 
Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness (1995).30 Lewis Wolpert’s Malignant Sadness: The 
Anatomy of Depression, (1999) proceeds from self-analysis, but broadens his discussion to an 
appraisal of various psychiatric and psychological approaches to the illness.31 A major 
distinction between these depression memoirs and this thesis is that although they are 
valuable for the way in which they rework and clarify existing definitions and 
understandings of mental illness, they do not seek to identify or theorise a distinct 
condition, but instead work within the rubric of established medical and psychiatric 
conditions.  
Walter Benjamin’s essays, ‘Central Park’, ‘Baudelaire’, and ‘The Paris of the Second 
Empire in Baudelaire’ (1938-39), develop a theory of shock and trauma from an analysis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2009) 
27 William Styron, Darkness Visible: A memoir of Madness, (New York: Random House, 1990) Kindle edition. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Kay Redfield Jamison, An Unquiet Mind: A Memoir of Moods and Madness, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1995). 
31 Lewis Wolpert, Malignant Sadness: The Anatomy of Depression, (London: Faber and Faber,1999). 
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Charles Baudelaire’s poetry. Benjamin’s work provides an important precedent for this 
thesis due to his elucidation of the way in which trauma and shock are embedded in the 
fabric, content and style of Baudelaire’s texts. For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s concept of spleen 
(used by Baudelaire to refer to a combination of ennui, depression, disgust, despair, frenzy 
and melancholy) is caused by a series of shocks that the individual experiences as a result of 
living within the modern city.32 Moreover, Benjamin establishes a correspondence between 
Freud’s theory of traumatic shock and the shock Baudelaire evokes in his poetry.33 In 
Benjamin’s writings, traumatic shock is not limited to warfare, or sexual trauma but it is in 
fact a paradigm of modernity itself. Baudelaire is the exemplary poet of the modern 
condition: a ‘traumatophile’ who ‘made it his business to parry the shocks [of modern 
life]…with his spiritual and physical self.’34 For Benjamin, Baudelaire’s writing exemplifies 
modern art’s struggle to deal with situations of shock and trauma, and leads to what he 
describes as the deterioration of the aura of art.35 Overall Benjamin ushers in concepts 
central to trauma theory, such as the equation of modernity with trauma, and the notion 
that modernity itself inaugurates a ‘crisis of representation.’36   
Contemporary trauma theory brings together Benjamin’s notion of shock as a crisis 
in representation, Freudian psychoanalysis, and also incorporates strategies of analysis 
taken from deconstruction. Trauma theory initially grew out of studies on the Holocaust, 
and the crisis in representation evinced in the fragmentary nature of modernist and avant-
garde works of literature and art. More recently, trauma theory has begun to encompass the 
trauma of non-Western genocides, the trauma of colonisation and slavery, AIDS, as well as 
other events such as terrorism, political violence, war, and domestic violence and sexual 
abuse.37 At this point, it is necessary to establish that within trauma theory, distinctions are 
drawn between interpersonal trauma, (occurring for example within domestic abuse), 
historical trauma (which occurs to large groups, for example, war and genocide), and 
structural or primal trauma (which according to Freudian psychoanalysis is experienced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Miche ̀le Lowrie, “Spleen and the Monumentum: Memory in Horace and Baudelaire,” Comparative Literature, 
49 no. 1 (Winter 1997), 56; Michael Jennings, introduction to The Writer of Modern life: Essays on Charles 
Baudelaire, by Walter Benjamin (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2006), 15; Walter Benjamin, The writer of 
modern life, 94 184-185, 180. 
33 Ibid.,176-178. 
34 Ibid., 178-180; Seamus O'Malley, Making History New: Modernism and Historical Narrative, (Oxford: Oxford 
university Press, 2015), 155-156; Debarati Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity: Baudelaire, Irony, and the Politics of 
Form, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins university Press, 2006), 20. 
35 Benjamin, 178. 
36 Sanyal, The Violence of Modernity, 2; Carlo Salzani, “The atrophy of experience” in Essays on Boredom and 
Modernity, edited by Barbara Dalle Pezze and Carlo Salzani (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), 138. Benjamin, The 
Writer of Modern Life, 94, 99, 149, 169, 185.  
37 Gert Buelens, Sam Durrant and Robert Eaglestone eds., The Future of Trauma Theory: Contemporary Literary 
and Cultural Criticism, (London Routledge: 2014), 2-5.  
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during the normal course of life in an individuals’ early developmental stage, and 
encompasses things such as separation from the mother.)  This thesis studies a condition 
related to interpersonal trauma, however it intersects with some of the theories and 
methodologies surrounding other forms of trauma.  
Trauma has become a ubiquitous theoretical category, but few texts discern or 
attempt to analyse a specific quality of emotion or traumatic condition that is not 
melancholic in nature. Within trauma theory, the focus is usually on four main areas: the 
notion of traumatic memory, the conflict between the unrepresentable nature of trauma 
and the subject’s compulsion to express trauma, melancholic responses to trauma, and 
processes and practices of mourning and healing. Extended discussions of anger or other 
explosive emotional states produced by trauma are rare. 
Holocaust trauma is only mentioned in passing in this thesis, due to the status of 
the Holocaust as a specific historical ‘limit-event’ and genocide, and my ethical imperative 
not to assume a right to speak about this kind of trauma.38 Despite this, a number of texts 
dealing with Holocaust trauma are important to the methodology of this thesis because of 
their use of psychoanalysis and deconstruction to elucidate the communication of trauma 
in works of literature, art and film. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s Testimony: Crises of 
Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (1992) explores the complex relationships 
between witness testimony and literary texts about the Holocaust, through a combination 
of clinical psychoanalytical and critical theory perspectives. 39  In Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative, and History (1996) Cathy Caruth draws from Freudian and Lacanian 
understandings of trauma as well as more recent neurobiological studies in order to 
illuminate the relationship between repressed traumatic memory and repetitive flashbacks 
that cause the subject to re-live traumatic events.40  Caruth argues that trauma is an 
‘unclaimed experience’ that the subject is unable to be fully process or comprehend during 
its occurrence, but returns later to the subject in the form of flashbacks and other intrusive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 As Dominick LaCapra states ‘Historical trauma is specific, and not everyone is subject to it or entitled to 
the subject position associated with it. It is dubious to identify with the victim to the point of making oneself 
a surrogate victim who has a right to the victim’s voice or subject position.’ Dominick LaCapra, Writing history, 
Writing Trauma, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 63; Within post-second world war 
historical scholarship, the Holocaust is referred to as a ‘limit event’ see LaCapra, 63, 73, 138, 161; Simone 
Gigliotti defines a ‘limit event’ as an event or practice of such magnitude and profound violence that its 
effects rupture the otherwise normative foundations of legitimacy and so-called civilising tendencies that 
underlie the constitution of political and moral community.’ Simone Gigliotti,“Unspeakable Pasts as Limit 
Events: The Holocaust, Genocide, and the Stolen Generations, ”Australian Journal of Politics & History, 49 no. 
2, (2003): 164. 
39 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History, (New 
York: Routledge, 1992).	  
40	  Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996).	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memories. For Caruth, this is a ‘belatedness’ that leads to an aporia—an epistemic dead-
end—of representation as the subject struggles to represent what is unprepresentable 
because it is not fully known.41 Caruth’s notion that trauma is an aporia in representation is 
one of the pervasive tenets of trauma theory.42 Caruth’s work is valuable to this thesis in 
terms of understanding the relationship of present experiences to past traumas, and the 
impossibilities of complete or linear representation.43 Caruth’s methodology is also relevant 
to this thesis due to her application of techniques of deconstruction derived from Paul de 
Man and Jacques Derrida to literary and philosophical texts and film, in order to elucidate 
the way in which the impossibility of representing trauma is inscribed in language.44 De 
Man’s analyses of allegory and figurative language, which reveal the process of memory and 
writing as unstable and aporetic, are an important model for Caruth.45 Deconstruction is 
used by Caruth in her work to elucidate the way in which trauma, traumatic memory, and 
the accompanying struggle to comprehend a reality that can’t be fully grasped is embedded 
in the very fabric of the text itself. Caruth develops her argument through extended 
analyses of case studies such as Sigmund Freud’s essay “Moses and Monotheism,” and the 
film Hiroshima mon amour (1959) written by Marguerite Duras and directed by Alan 
Resnais.46 Caruth’s more recent text, Literature in the Ashes of History (2013) focuses on 
literature as a locus for the elucidation of traumatic memory, and the retrieval of repressed, 
forgotten and disappearing traumatic histories. Caruth develops these ideas through case 
studies that include Honoré de Balzac’s novel Colonel Chabert, Ariel Dorfman’s play Death 
and the Maiden, and Hannah Arendt’s essays on history and politics.47 This thesis takes an 
approach that has some similarities to Caruth’s methodology: for example de Man and 
Derrida’s work on literary tropes in the work of Rousseau are engaged with in the second 
chapter. However Caruth’s focus is on the aporia of representation itself, and the 
traumatised subject’s struggle to recover and communicate repressed and/or unclear and 
fragmented memories, rather than the emotional states experienced by the subject as a 
result of traumatic experience. 
In texts such as Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma, History and Memory 
after Auschwitz and Writing history, Writing Trauma Dominick LaCapra’s expands Caruth’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Ibid., 4-7, 92. 
42 Roger Luckhurst, The Trauma Question, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 4-12, 81-84, 89. 
43 Caruth. 
44	  Caruth, 73-74,90; Luckhurst, 4-6, 82-83.	  
45 Paul de Man, Allegories of reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979); Luckhurst, 82-83. 
46 Caruth.  
47 Cathy Caruth, Literature in the Ashes of History, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
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approach to trauma theory into a more historiographical framework in order to elucidate 
canonical historic and literary representations of trauma and their ethical implications. 
LaCapra is interested not only in the victim and survivor’s testimony, but also the vexed 
issue of perpetrators and bystanders.48 LaCapra’s arguments involve the analysis of case 
studies such as Albert Camus’ The Fall, Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoa, and Art Spiegelman’s 
Maus. LaCapra is particularly pertinent to this thesis and creative project because he argues 
that works such as these do not merely narrate or represent trauma but engage in a process, 
which in itself is symptomatic of trauma, and reflect the psychological processes of either 
‘acting out’ or ‘working-through’ trauma. 49  These ideas are derived from Freudian 
psychoanalysis, however LaCapra extends them to the literary and aesthetic sphere. 
LaCapra’s distinction between ‘acting out’ and ‘working through’ is important in terms of 
the methodology of the creative and theoretical aspects of this PhD project which contains 
elements of both ‘acting out’ and ‘working through’ in the sense LaCapra defines. LaCapra 
describes ‘acting out’ as a process which ‘involves a compulsive repetition of traumatic 
symptoms and behaviours’ and further that ‘the past is performatively regenerated or 
relived as if it were fully present rather than represented in memory and inscription, and it 
hauntingly returns as the repressed.’50 For LaCapra, ‘working through’ involves processes 
of ‘self-questioning’ and reflection such as ‘mourning and modes of critical thought and 
practice.’51  
The connection between trauma, loss, mourning and melancholia is a pervasive 
theme within trauma studies. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (1989), Julia Kristeva 
argues that traumatic grief leads to melancholia and depression.52 Applying psychoanalysis 
to works of literature and visual art that evoke depression and melancholia, Kristeva aims 
to show that art has a therapeutic quality.53 Taking a more global and political perspective is 
Panic and Mourning: The Cultural Work of Trauma edited by Daniela Agostino, Elisa Antz and 
Cátia Ferreira (2013).54 Similarly, Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory at 
Century's End (2000), edited by Peter Homans, contains a collection of essays dealing with 
the relationship between personal and collective mourning, and the memorial of trauma in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 LaCapra, Writing history, Writing Trauma, 111-136. 
49 Ibid., 42, 106-110. 
50 Ibid., 58, 106-110. 
51 Ibid., 29. 
52 Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). 
53 Ibid., 22-25. 
54 Daniela Agostino, Elisa Antz, Cátia Ferreira, eds., Panic and Mourning: The Cultural Work of Trauma (Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2013).	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cultural artefacts such as monuments.55 Esther Dreifuss-Kattan’s Art and Mourning: The Role 
of Creativity in Healing Trauma and Loss (2016), echoes Kristeva in arguing that art is 
therapeutic due to the way in which it can ‘embody’ a traumatic loss and assist the process 
of mourning.56 Although traumatic loss and grief is a component of the scream, this 
condition does not involve mourning and melancholia. Instead, the case of the scream is a 
raging and explosive response to personal trauma, pain and loss. This is in contrast to 
reactions of melancholia and mourning, which are more widely accepted, understood and 
even tacitly assumed within trauma scholarship.57 Overall, within the field of trauma theory, 
relatively little attention is given to more violent emotional states of survivors such as rage, 
frenzy and desire for revenge.  
One exception to this gap in the literature is Susan Derwin’s Rage is the Subtext: 
Readings in Holocaust Literature in film (2012), which has a particular resonance with this thesis 
as it explores repressed and unarticulated forms of rage.58  Through a psychoanalytic 
examination of key works by Holocaust survivors including Saul Friedländer, Primo Levi 
and Imre Kertész, Derwin argues that rage and other volatile emotions are veiled, and held 
back, whilst other reactions to their experiences are foregrounded. For Derwin, bearing 
witness to trauma through testimony can be ‘understood as a procedure of holding, in a 
double sense: as a protective holding-back of volatile emotion and as the creation of a 
holding space within which these emotions are submitted to symbolic transfiguration.’59 
For Derwin the protective holding-back refers to what she sees as ‘a shield that protects 
both the survivor and the community from an upsurge of nonprocessable emotion.’60 
Derwin claims that the act of literary or artistic narrative allows rage and other volatile 
emotions to be diffused, and moreover that this curtailing of rage is necessary for the 
survivors’ ability to re-adjust to life within a community.61 While Derwin’s text is valuable 
for its discussion of the concealed rage and other strong emotions of survivors, Derwin’s 
suggestion that explosive emotional states of the survivor need to be restrained is 
problematic, as it suggests that there is no place for volatile emotion in ‘normal’ life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Peter Homans, ed., Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory at the Century's End, (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2000). 
56 Esther Dreifuss-Kattan, Art and Mourning: The Role of Creativity in Healing Trauma and Loss, (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 2-5. 
57 Melanie Steiner Sherwood, “Jean Améry and Wolfgang Hildesheimer: Ressentiments, Melancholia, and the 
West German Public Sphere in the 1960s and 1970s,”  (PhD Diss., Cornell University, 2011). 
58 Susan Derwin, Rage is the Subtext: Readings in Holocaust Literature and film, (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 2012). 
59 Ibid., 11-12. 
60 Ibid.,,11. 
61 Ibid., 4-9, 11, 15. 
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Moreover, despite some discussion of Sean Améry’s notion of resentment, Derwin does 
not entertain the possibility that maintaining rage and refusing to forgive in the manner 
asserted by Améry might have ethical value. In contrast, my thesis argues that the feeling of 
explosive rage does not necessarily entail destructive violence towards others, but can be 
maintained internally as a strategy of autonomy and resistance.  
By the late 1990s the application of trauma theory specifically to works of visual art 
became widespread. Most scholarship in this area follows Caruth’s argument that trauma 
represents an aporia in representation and share her focus on issues of traumatic memory. 
For example, Lisa Saltzman and Eric M. Rosenberg’s Trauma & Visuality in Modernity (2006) 
is comprised of a series of essays that focus themes such as the memory of trauma and its 
transience, and the elusive qualities of trauma as it manifests in artworks, films and 
monuments.62 Some scholars do, however, place emotion and affect at the centre of their 
analysis. 
In Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory (1997) 
Ernst van Alphen coins the term Holocaust ‘effects’ to describe the way in which viewers 
of an artwork ‘experience directly a certain aspect of the Holocaust or of Nazism… In 
such moments the Holocaust is not re-presented, but rather presented or re-enacted.’63 
Holocaust ‘effects’ are conveyed through works of art and literature that do not directly 
represent traumatic events, but instead re-create or evoke the sensations and emotions 
experienced during these events.64 Van Alphen studies the traumatic effects produced the 
work of artists such as Christian Boltanski, Armando, Charlotte Salomon and Anselm 
Kiefer. However, although van Alphen’s discussion is in the realm of emotion and affect, 
explosive emotions are not discussed. 
Jill Bennett’s Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art (2005) puts 
forward a similar perspective on trauma and art as van Alphen. In Empathic Vision, Bennett 
posits affect and sensation as central to the way in which traumatic experiences are 
communicated—and as essential for empathy.65 Bennett aims to describe:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Lisa Saltzman, Eric M. Rosenberg eds., Trauma & Visuality in Modernity, (New Hampshire: University 
Press of New England, 2006) ,x. 
63 Ernst van Alphen, Caught by History: Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997), 10. 
64 Ibid.	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…art that, by virtue of its specific affective capacities, is able to exploit forms of 
embodied perception in order to promote forms of critical inquiry. This 
conjunction of affect and critical awareness may be understood to constitute the 
basis of an empathy grounded not in affinity (feeling for another insofar as we can 
imagine being that other) but on a feeling for another that entails an encounter with 
something irreducible and different, often inaccessible.66  
 
For Bennett, the sensation of artwork is significant because it leads not only to the 
sensation of empathy but also to a broader political engagement. In this regard, Bennett’s 
arguments draw from Deleuze’s theories on ethics and aesthetics, especially his work in the 
areas of sensation, and politics. Bennett discusses the intersection of trauma, affect and 
politics within postcolonial and post 9/11 contexts through a selection of artists who deal 
with specific events of historical and political trauma and violence in Australia, Columbia, 
Northern Ireland and South Africa.67 While there is a similarity in Bennett’s focus on affect, 
and affective states, with the study undertaken in this thesis, Bennett takes a different 
approach, focusing on the sensorial relationship between the viewer and the artwork which 
produces a shock which forces the viewer into a cognitive state leading to a political 
engagement. For Bennett ‘visual art presents trauma as a political rather than subjective 
phenomenon.’68 In contrast, this thesis posits the scream as a subjective condition that 
intersects more with philosophical, ontological and psychological concerns, rather than the 
global political realm.  
Griselda Pollock shares Bennett’s concern with affect, however, unlike Bennett, 
Pollock takes a specifically feminist and psychoanalytical approach. In After-affects/After-
images: Trauma and Aesthetic Transformation in the Virtual Feminist Museum, (2013) Pollock uses 
a series of case studies on predominately female artists revolving around personal and 
historical trauma including the Holocaust. 69  Pollock also edited Visual Politics of 
Psychoanalysis: Art and the Image in Post-traumatic Cultures in 2013.70 In this collection, Pollock 
and other writers study the psychoanalytical notion of affect in the transference and 
communication of trauma in the aesthetic realm.71 In contrast to earlier trauma theorists, 
Pollock does not see contemporary works that deal with trauma as therapeutic or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid.,10. 
67 Ibid.,16-18. 
68 Ibid., 12. 
69 Griselda Pollock, After-affects/After-images: Trauma and Aesthetic Transformation in the Virtual Feminist Museum,  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013). 
70 Griselda Pollock ed., Visual Politics of Psychoanalysis, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013). 
71 Ibid., 9. 
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testimonial. Instead she argues that ‘art in a post-traumatic era is not testimony to the 
trauma; it becomes an affective process of deconstructive interpretation of its traces, 
allowing some movement, never a cure.’72 Pollock’s interpretation is echoed in this thesis, 
which does not view the case studies (or my artwork) as testimonial or as providing a cure 
for traumatic pain, but rather as manifestations of an explosive traumatic condition. 
Kristine Stiles’ Concerning consequences: studies in art, destruction, and trauma (2016), posits 
performance art as an exemplary form of traumatic expression. 73  Stiles studies the 
expression of trauma through destructive and violent forms of performance art and views 
‘trauma as an underlying condition in almost every artist who used destruction and violence 
in his or her art.’74 Concerning consequences features a series of essays discussing the various 
ways in which artists such as Yoko Ono, Franz West, Chris Burden, Orlan and John 
Duncan ‘translated pain into art’ through destructive, violent and/or self-harming 
practices.75  Stiles develops the concept of ‘destruction art,’ derived from the destructive 
performance practices of Gustav Metzger and Rafael Montañez Ortiz, to denote works 
that foreground the body as a site through which issues relating to trauma—in particular 
the destruction and survival of human life are confronted.76 Stiles argues that ‘destruction 
art’ not only responds to personal trauma but is also a way of confronting political and 
historical violence, in contrast to processes of lamentation and melancholy. 77  Stiles’ 
argument has a correlation with my creative work because of her demonstration that 
actions of destruction and violence within the aesthetic realm can be ethically and 
personally valuable for the performer. For Stiles, these actions of destruction are 
paradoxically an assertion of subjectivity and survival amidst the threat of annihilation from 
external forces.78 However, while Stiles focuses on destructive art as a reaction against 
external threats or traumas, my artwork and thesis deal with a different quality of 
destructive behaviour, which is driven by rage against the self and the desire for self-
punishment. 
* 
This thesis is structured as a series of case studies, each of which is used to 
explicate one of the six different modalities that constitute the scream as a whole. With the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Griselda Pollock, introduction to Visual Politics of Psychoanalysis, 12. 
73 Kristine Stiles Concerning Consequences: studies in art, destruction, and trauma, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2016). 
74 Ibid., 20-21. 
75 Ibid., 23. 
76 Ibid., 29-31, Gustav Metzger developed the term ‘Auto-Destructive Art’ to describe his practice. 
77 Ibid., 22-45. 
78 Ibid., 29-31. 
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exception of the first chapter, a dialectical pairing of exemplars within each chapter is used 
to examine the various, and at times divergent, ways this condition may manifest in the 
aesthetic realm. For the sake of simplicity, the organisation of the chapters roughly follows 
a chronological order. The rage of Achilles, the hero of Homer’s epic poem The Iliad is the 
focus of the first chapter. Achilles’ expressions of rage exemplify the dual nature of the 
scream: on the one hand he unleashes uninhibited fury, yet on the other hand, he also 
demonstrates a seething rage held in abeyance. Chapter Two looks at what happens when 
this type of explosive rage turns against the self. The particular type of pathological shame 
and self-disgust that characterises the scream is illustrated through a comparison of The 
Confessions of Saint Augustine of Hippo and The Confessions of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The 
obscene scream discussed in Chapter Three is a state beyond self-disgust in which the 
subject experiences herself or himself as bursting with uncontainable obscenity and horror. 
An examination of extreme obscenity and excess in a selection of writings by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Georges Bataille is used to illuminate this state, whilst at the same time a 
link between the obscene scream and Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian is established.  
The next chapter discusses the performative expression of traumatic suffering as 
exemplified in the dream plays of August Strindberg, and the performance and writings of 
Antonin Artaud. This chapter also highlights the significance of schizophrenia and 
madness to the communication of suffering in the work of both dramatists. Chapter Five 
explores the silent dimension of the scream. Beginning with reflections on silence in post-
holocaust poetry and silence in relation to the post-traumatic subject, the chapter then 
discusses the ways in which Edvard Munch’s The Scream and Francis Bacon’s Study after 
Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X correspond to the scream of silence. The final chapter 
deals with the scream from a woman’s perspective. Sylvia Plath’s novel The Bell Jar is 
considered alongside Elfriede Jelinek’s novel The Piano Teacher in order to elucidate the 
complexities of this condition as it relates to the physicality and sexuality of the female 
body, and the fraught roles of daughter, wife and mother. 
Each chapter engages with philosophical, aesthetic and literary contours, in order 
to elucidate a different perspective on the scream and its symptoms, and to show its 
broader relevance beyond autobiographical concerns. Overall, the thesis attempts to attest 
to the significance of the scream not only as a psychological condition, but also as an 
aesthetic phenomenon.  
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Chapter One: The Raging Scream 
 
The scream in its most enraged, savage and raw form is characterised by a violent revolt 
within the psyche against significant personal trauma. It is a condition of inexorable rage 
and resentment that involves an overwhelming, yet unattainable, desire to destroy the 
perpetrator(s) of trauma. The raging scream is therefore a frustrated scream that is 
experienced as an agonising duality of two opposing inner forces: an outward moving force 
that seeks external expression in extreme violence, and an inward moving force that 
disallows physical violence and instead maintains rage as an internalised resistance. The 
central point of enquiry into this condition is the figure of Achilles, the hero of Homer’s 
Iliad. The significance of Achilles to an understanding of the raging scream, and its 
symptoms, which I have experienced myself, is that Achilles is a fictional avatar for the 
revenge I would like to enact, but cannot. The outward moving force of the raging scream 
seeks retribution in the most horrific form: the slaughter and complete defilement of the 
perpetrator’s body. It is the wish to tear this person, or persons to pieces. But unlike 
Achilles, the subject experiencing the condition of the scream cannot enact this savage 
violence due to a combination of disempowerment and fear. Moreover, their personal 
experience of violence and its traumatic affects precludes action: as result of their horror of 
becoming like their abuser(s), their own longing for violence profoundly disturbs them and 
is thwarted. Although actual physical violence is withheld, the desire for violence remains 
extreme, causing intense anguish in the subject. Unable to express itself in reality, violence 
becomes a secret fantasy that is repeatedly rehearsed in the imagination. The raging scream 
is internalised as a seething inner energy that is maintained as a form of persistent 
psychological defiance. It is an unseen and private strategy of resistance held by a subject 
that refuses victimisation. Ultimately, the upholding of rage and resentment in this manner 
can be of great psychological value because in in the face of severe trauma it may be the 
only form of resistance and assertion of individual subjectivity possible. 
Achilles is widely renowned as a character inhabited by extreme rage and 
resentment; however, the emphasis of this chapter is not on the obvious demonstrations of 
Achilles’ rage such as his violent prowess in battle or the persistence of his anger 
throughout the narrative. Instead, the emphasis is on two episodes in the poem in which 
qualities germane to the raging scream are exhibited in Achilles’ behaviour. In these 
instances, Achilles’ emotional state transcends normative understandings of rage and anger 
and evinces the raging scream, which is distinct from other forms of rage. The two 
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episodes under discussion represent the internalised and externalised forms of the raging 
scream respectively. They also demonstrate the way in which this condition allows Achilles 
to preserve his autonomy and express defiance in the face of serious grievance. The 
internalised raging scream occurs during Achilles’ argument with Agamemnon when he is 
forced to restrain his desire for violence, but does not let go of his rage, instead 
maintaining it as a seething inner fury. Here, Achilles exhibits the anguish and alienation 
that accompanies the raging scream when it cannot be externalised, as well as the potential 
of this condition for passive resistance. The externalised raging scream occurs during 
Achilles’ brutal murder and mutilation of the Trojan hero, Hector. Through his savagery, 
Achilles enacts the horrific and obscene fantasy of violence that is inherent in the raging 
scream and usually prohibited. Achilles’ treatment of Hector realises the most disquieting 
potential of the raging scream: the actual release of this uncontrollable, raging force 
through the horrific defilement of another individual’s body. 
 
Rage is necessary  
The raging mode of the scream is a necessary and beneficial condition for the 
traumatised subject. Although the externalised screaming rage demonstrated by Achilles is 
an impossible mode of expression for most individuals who have experienced severe 
trauma, the spirit of rage and resentment represented by the figure of Achilles can be 
harnessed as a positive force. This process is essential for survival during trauma and its 
aftermath. The raging scream is a complete refusal to forget or to forgive. However, the 
persistence of rage and resentment particular to the raging scream is a state of mind that is 
not generally accepted or advocated in contemporary Western culture where rage is 
discouraged and forgiveness is encouraged. Extremely volatile emotions such as rage and 
anger have been regarded as harmful and destructive for in Western thought since the 
confluence of the ideas of Stoic philosophy and Christianity in in the first century AD, and 
a negative view of these emotions has largely continued into modernity.79 However, the 
negative opinion of rage that is pervasive in contemporary times was not the norm in 
Ancient Greece. The Iliad, for example, offers a far more sympathetic perspective on these 
emotions. This was a sentiment shared by Aristotle who emphasises the merits of anger 
and rage for individuals within the polis and in the context of warfare.80 He argues that rage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 See for example Lucius Annaeus Seneca: “To Novatus on Anger,” in Seneca: Moral and Political Essays, ed. 
and trans. John M. Cooper and J.F.Procopé, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 17-116. 
80 Aristotle, Politics, Book VII and VIII trans. with commentary, Richard Kraut, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 51. 
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is in fact a necessary emotion:  ‘Rage is necessary. Nothing can be achieved without it. 
Nothing can be achieved when it does not fulfil the soul and animate courage.’81 The 
notion that rage provides the essential impetus for courageous action is in evidence in the 
Iliad. At the same time, however, Aristotle qualifies his support of rage by arguing that its 
benefits are felt only when it is justified and moderated by reason. 82  Subsequent 
philosophers in antiquity and beyond denigrated Aristotle’s affirmative opinion of rage. 
German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk has recently advanced an alternate view of 
rage. In Rage and Time: A Psychopolitical Investigation, Sloterdijk argues for the recuperation of 
rage as a positive force in contemporary personal and political life. The notion that the 
condition of rage and resentment intrinsic to the raging scream could be a vital force for an 
individual, rather than a damaging and negative force, runs counter to a now entrenched 
system of moral and philosophical values that seek to censure and restrain rage. Although 
Sloterdijk’s argument has broader applications for rage as a global political force to be 
harnessed for progressive change that are beyond the scope of this chapter, his contentions 
give substantial support to the claim asserted here: that the raging mode of the scream is of 
positive psychological value.83 Sloterdijk takes the ancient Greek word, thumos as a starting 
point from which to establish what he views as the positive attributes of rage: spiritedness, 
assertion of autonomy, and the desire for recognition.84 In the Iliad, thumos designates the 
organ of feeling, spirit and emotion. It is the source of a range of passionate emotions 
including but not limited to anger.85 However, the usage of thumos has changed over time: 
Plato and Aristotle viewed it as both the quality of spiritedness and the spirited part of the 
soul.86 In contemporary political theory, it has come to be associated primarily with anger, 
spiritedness and the desire for recognition.87 It is this modern interpretation of the word 
thumos that Sloterdijk advocates.88 Sighting Plato and Aristotle, who advocated certain 
forms of restrained and justified anger as well as thumos in political life, Sloterdijk 
demonstrates that these emotions are likewise beneficial in a contemporary life. According 	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to Sloterdijk, rage is essential for maintaining critical consciousness and the ability to resist 
oppression. He argues that since Antiquity thumos has been suppressed in the Western 
psyche due to two historical factors. Firstly the growth and institutionalisation of Christian 
ideology suppressed and discouraged thumos and its related emotions such as egoism, rage 
and pride.  Secondly, the pervasive influence of psychoanalysis, which focused on the 
libido as the primary driving force of individual actions, overlooked the thumos as a possible 
source of motivation.89 Sloterdijk argues that the loss of thumos has caused individuals 
become disempowered and apathetic in the face of injustice. He urges contemporary 
individuals ‘to regain a psychology of self-confidence and self-assertion’ through the 
acceptance and communication of feelings of resentment and rage.90 Achilles’ rage to a 
large extent exhibits and exemplifies the positive qualities of rage advanced by Sloterdijk, 
notwithstanding the destructive affects of the physical actualisation of his feelings. 
Drawing from Sloterdijk’s positive evaluation of rage and thumos, the raging scream 
can be viewed as a condition of empowerment and strident refutation of the silencing that 
can be a result of substantial trauma. The two episodes from the Iliad to be examined in 
this chapter support this perspective because they demonstrate how Achilles uses rage to 
assert his subjectivity in the face of suppression, trauma and grief. The adverse outcomes 
of Achilles’ behaviour are balanced by the intentions of self-preservation and the individual 
pursuit of justice that lie behind his actions. If Achilles restrained his rage he would endure 
shame and dishonour at the hands of Agamemnon and Patroclus’ death would remain un-
avenged. Whatever the cost, he will not compromise his identity or his heroic status. Thus 
from Achilles’ perspective, persistent rage and resentment is the only way to retain self-
respect, achieve justice and maintain his honour as a war hero. Achilles’ refusal to be silent 
and submissive not only corresponds to the raging scream, but is also the attribute that 
Homer ascribes to Achilles’ exceptional and tragic form of heroism. Achilles’ heroic status 
is a paradox in the context of the Iliad: his rage-fuelled behaviour is transgressive and 
destructive but it is precisely these actions that constitute his very identity as a hero.91 His 
tenacious desire for revenge alienates him from the rest of his army, but at the same time 
warrants him immortality as the ultimate hero of the Iliad.92 Achilles’ extreme rage does not 
preclude, but rather ensures, his immortal glory. Through the causal link established in the 	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Iliad between Achilles’ particular rage and his heroism, the poem provides an exemplar of 
the raging scream as an essential attribute of human subjectivity.  
 
The internalised raging scream: Achilles’ argument with Agamemnon 
Achilles’ rage is initially provoked by the unjust and demeaning treatment he 
receives from Agamemnon, the king and leader of the Achaean army, during the campaign 
against Troy. Agamemnon is forced to give up his war ‘trophy’, a priest’s daughter, in order 
to avert a curse. Feeling cheated, he takes Briseis, Achilles’ war ‘trophy’ and lover, as 
recompense, a measure that Achilles sees as a serious humiliation and injustice. 
Agamemnon’s actions represent a violation to Achilles’ honour and rights as a war hero 
within the social context of the Iliad. Achilles’ emotional state during his confrontation with 
Agamemnon corresponds to the anguished duality of the raging scream because he 
experiences the intense desire to physically destroy Agamemnon, but this desire is 
frustrated: 
 
…anguish gripped Achilles. 
The heart in his rugged chest was pounding, torn… 
Should he draw the long sharp sword slung at his hip,  
Thrust through the ranks and kill Agamemnon now? 
Or check his rage and beat his fury down?  
As his racing spirit veered back and forth…93 
 
This passage illustrates the way in which Achilles’ agonising deliberation over whether or 
not to carry out violence paralyzes his ability to act. The description of his spirit frantically 
veering ‘back and forth’ is evocative of the struggle between the two opposing forces 
operating within the raging scream, and the way in which this struggle torments the subject.  
Achilles’ hesitation here is caused in part by Achilles’ social status within the Greek army. 
Although Achilles is its preeminent hero, he must to a certain extent defer to the other 
warlords, in particular Agamemnon, whose status as the leader of the Achaean army to a 
large extent precludes the possibility of violence against him. Achilles and Agamemnon are 
not equals: Achilles has lower status and is disempowered in the confrontation with 
Agamemnon. Finally, Achilles begins to draw his sword but is stopped by the intervention 
of the Goddess Athena who orders Achilles to show restraint and promises him gifts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Homer, The Iliad, trans Robert Fagles, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), (1.188-193). 
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compensation. Achilles concedes, but only because as a mortal it is not permissible for him 
to challenge a Goddess. It is extremely difficult for Achilles to hold his rage in abeyance, 
and he protests to Athena:  ‘Goddess, a man submits though his heart breaks with fury.’94 
For Achilles, this forced internalisation of rage is not just frustrating; it is a heart-breaking 
and unbearable feeling. Despite Athena’s censure of physical violence, Achilles’ fury 
remains unabated and he continues to verbally express his anger and resistance towards 
Agamemnon. Homer describes Achilles at this point as ‘not relaxing his anger for a 
moment.’95 This comment reveals an additional aspect to Achilles’ rage: it is maintained at a 
consistently high level irrespective of his ability to enact physical violence. Achilles’ rage, 
like the condition of the raging scream is not determined by physical externalisation: it is an 
emotional state that exists even without action.  
  In situations where the externalised expression of the raging scream is repressed, it 
is often transmuted into a silent or inactive gesture. This is a form of passive resistance and 
passive-aggression. Achilles, for example, seeks retribution against Agamemnon by refusing 
to fight in battle. Achilles knows that Agamemnon’s campaign against Troy will be 
grievously disadvantaged without him because he is their greatest war hero. In order to 
further prove his indispensability as a fighter, Achilles entreats his mother, the Goddess 
Thetis, to ask Zeus to bring destruction on the Achaean army while he is not fighting. 
During his retirement, Achilles is described as ‘raging on’ privately alone: his extreme rage 
is maintained as a personal and sequestered intensity:96  
 
…Achilles raged apart…. 
…off in his beaked seagoing ships he lay, 
raging away at Atrides Agamemnon, king of armies97 
 
This excerpt illustrates the alienating affects of the internalised raging scream: through 
‘raging apart’ from the rest of the army, Achilles engages in a self-enforced exile in order to 
assert an individual and autonomous form of resistance. The consequence of Achilles’ 
passive resistance is disastrous loses suffered by the Greek army including the death of 
Patroclus, Achilles’ best friend and companion. Tragically, Achilles’ internalised rage 
creates the very conditions for the death of Patroclus. Refusing to fight himself, but 	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96 Ibid., (1.488-493). 
97 Ibid., (2.771-75). 
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wanting to intimidate the Trojans, Achilles instructs Patroclus to wear his own armour. 
Patroclus is mistaken for Achilles on the battlefield and subsequently killed by Hector. This 
event causes Achilles to experience tremendous grief, pain and additional rage. Achilles’ 
rage can no longer be contained, and reaches its apotheosis during his murder and 
subsequent mutilation of Hector’s body. 
 
The externalised raging scream: the murder of Hector  
Achilles’ murder of Hector and subsequent mutilation of his body is the only time 
the raging scream is fully unleashed and physicalised in the Iliad. In contradistinction to 
Achilles’ disempowerment in his confrontation with Agamemnon, Achilles is empowered 
in the confrontation with Hector. Achilles is the stronger fighter, and this time the 
Goddess Athena supports Achilles’ desire for murder.98 Furthermore, the context of heroic 
battle in the Iliad allows Achilles to destroy Hector with a degree of impunity, because his 
actions take place within the greater scene of war in which revenge against an enemy was 
an expected mode of behaviour.99 Nevertheless, Achilles’ destruction and mutilation of 
Hector is an enactment of uninhibited and barbaric violence that is extreme even within 
this context.100 It is important to note that Achilles’ previous demonstrations of rage on the 
battlefield are distinct to the rage he displays in his treatment of Hector. During battle 
scenes in the Iliad, Achilles is described as a superhuman figure noted for his 
‘overwhelming fury’ and likened to gods, predatory animals and overpowering natural 
elements such as wind, fire and water.101 However, these terms are not specific to the 
depiction of Achilles and are commonly ascribed to the other heroes. Achilles’ rage in 
battle can be accounted for as the behaviour of a war hero doing what is expected of him 
in his pursuit of immortal glory on the battlefield. Within the Iliad, and in Ancient Greek 
thought more broadly, immortal glory meant everlasting recognition, praise and prestige- 
including the retelling and celebration of one’s heroic acts for eternity.102 Heroes, such as 
Achilles, strive for immortal glory through distinction in battle.103 Achilles’ battle violence is 
a generalised rage that does not have a specific individual as its object. This is in contrast to 
Achilles’ purposeful and single-minded pursuit of Hector. In this case, Achilles literally 	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inflicts his intense feelings of revenge on and through the body of Hector, graphically 
realising the raging scream’s fantasy of violence.  
A heightened and obscene desire for violence propels the externalisation of the 
raging scream and is exhibited in Achilles’ overwhelming lust for violence prior to, and 
during, his duel with Hector. For Achilles, this is an all-consuming passion that eclipses 
everyday human needs including food and drink. Achilles refuses all food offered to him, 
exclaiming ‘what I really crave is slaughter and blood and the choking groans of men!’104 
His hunger can only be satisfied through violence. Achilles’ cannibalistic desire comes to 
the fore in combat with Hector, when he expresses his wish to devour Hector’s raw, live 
flesh: ‘Would to God my rage, my fury would drive me now to hack away and eat you raw- 
such agonies you have caused me!’105 This sentence is very important in elucidating the 
notion of the raging form of the scream that is explored in this chapter. Here Achilles 
explicitly voices what is at the core of the raging scream: the traumatised subject’s wish to 
hack, maim, bite, devour and tear the flesh of the person(s) who severely damaged and 
abused them to pieces. This desire is usually kept hidden and unspoken by the subject as a 
dark secret, but the Iliad depicts, through the figure of Achilles, a rare individual who is 
able to voice and act upon this desire with liberty. The contemporary traumatised subject 
(myself) absolutely identifies with this forbidden desire for violence expressed by Achilles. 
This identification of a shared psychological condition, coupled with the way in which 
Homer does not denigrate Achilles’ desire or actions, but shows them to be a valid mode 
of being in the context of the Iliad, offers a significant path to an acceptance and 
understanding of a post-traumatic state of explosive and internal rage. 
It was a convention of the war depicted in the Iliad, and in other Ancient Greek 
texts, that the death of a family member or friend was to be redressed by the murder of the 
responsible party and the mutilation of their body. If this person was already dead, their 
closest relations were targeted.106 However, Achilles transcends these conventions and 
enters into the realm of the raging scream because the excessive repetition and 
exceptionally savage quality of his treatment of Hector goes beyond what was normally 
acceptable as retribution. Hector pleads for Achilles to show mercy on his body, but 
Achilles refuses.107 The condition of the raging scream precludes forgiveness or any sense 
of respect for Hector’s body. Murdering Hector is not enough in itself, and Achilles goes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Ibid., (19. 215-217). 
105 Ibid., (22. 346-348). 
106 Bassett, 47-48, 54. 
107 Ibid., (22. 336-343) 
	   28	  
on to commit a sacrilegious debasement of Hector’s body. After killing Hector and 
stripping and mutilating his body, Achilles pierces his tendons at the ankle and lashes the 
corpse to his chariot, dragging the head in the ground, removing the body from Troy. 
However, Achilles’ sense of rage and vengeance is not satisfied, nor does his anger over the 
death of Patroclus subside. Rather, Hector’s corpse provides a canvas for the repeated 
histrionic and performative expression of rage. For Achilles, revenge requires the repeated 
desecration and shaming of Hector’s body beyond recognition. As a daily act of ritualistic 
violence, Achilles lashes Hector’s dead body behind a chariot and drags it around 
Patroclus’ tomb.108Achilles’ repeated dragging of Hector’s body through the dirt is a 
particularly potent and symbolic form of humiliation and debasement that aims to literally 
tear Hector’s body apart. 109 Achilles’ unrelenting need to defile what he has already 
destroyed reveals an interminable and inexhaustible quality of rage.  
Hector’s body becomes a kind of punching bag, from which Achilles gains a degree 
of sadomasochistic satisfaction. Achilles’ abuse of Hector’s body is presented as universally 
abhorrent in the Iliad, shocking both gods and mortals. Homer demonstrates that Achilles 
has overstepped the bounds of acceptable behaviour by reporting that his actions have 
incensed the gods, including Zeus.110 The god Apollo, in particular deplores the savagery of 
Achilles’ actions, accusing him of outraging even ‘the senseless clay in all his fury!’111 
Achilles’ repeated defilement of Hector’s body comes to an end only when the Gods 
decide to intervene. Thus the horror that is contained in Achilles’ physical expression of 
the raging scream is finally prohibited by the symbolic order of Gods and humans in the 
Iliad. 
The raging scream is a more complex and savage condition then any normative 
form of revenge or retribution. As this chapter has demonstrated, it is an incessant desire 
for extreme and horrific violence against one’s adversary that is usually suppressed, 
restricted and not acted upon. This particular form of rage and resentment seeks 
destruction, and if destruction is not possible, maintains its rage internally as an 
indispensible mechanism of resistance and survival. The anguish that is accumulated as a 
result of internalising this raging form of resistance over a long period of time can be an 
unbearable burden for the subject. Because Achilles is able to finally unleash its potential, 
the long-term ramifications of withholding the raging scream are not addressed in the Iliad. 	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The question is whether, in reality, this condition can be sustained without eventual 
recourse to a violence that is now directed back on the self. Over a long period of time, the 
repeated internalisation of rage becomes a paralyzing state from which the psyche 
eventually demands an outlet. The individual experiencing the condition of the raging 
scream cannot communicate rage and resentment to its object without destroying their 
object, and in lieu of that, they begin to destroy themselves. Rage then becomes converted 
into a self-destructive mixture of inordinate shame, anguish and extreme suffering - themes 
that will be addressed in subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
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Chapter Two: The Shameful Scream 
 
The shameful scream is an internalised paroxysm of self-blame and self-disgust, in which 
the traumatised subject rages against herself or himself in an attempt to expunge an 
unbearable feeling of shame. In contrast to the raging scream, which seeks violent physical 
revenge on the perpetrator(s) of the trauma, the shameful scream is a condition of 
internalised aggression in which the subject psychologically tears themselves to pieces from 
within. Within this state, the subject experiences intense self-revulsion, particularly in 
regard to their body, which is acutely experienced as a source of shame because the shame, 
horror and memory of trauma feels impregnated in the skin and entrenched in the psyche. 
The dialectical pairing of The Confession of Saint-Augustine of Hippo and The Confessions of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau mobilises the concept of the shameful scream by elucidating the complex 
nature of this condition and its symptoms. Each confession performs an extended 
paroxysm of self-revolt and shame that corresponds to the shameful scream. The 
significance of Augustine and Rousseau’s respective Confessions to this enquiry lies in their 
revelation of profound shame and self-disgust, as well as the projection of rage back onto 
themselves. Moreover, the comparison of these two works reveals two contrasting ways 
the shameful scream can be experienced and enacted. Augustine’s confession is an 
impassioned and at times histrionic lamentation of profound shame and self-loathing, 
which involves the attempt to purge himself from shame through a process of self-torture. 
This is in contradistinction to Rousseau, who undertakes a veiled expression of shame and 
self-directed rage through a frequently ironic and humorous process of self-abasement and 
self-humiliation and the adoption of a symbolic mask as a means to deflect and hide shame. 
Within the condition of the shameful scream, the contemporary traumatised 
subject takes on unwarranted responsibility for the trauma that she/he suffered at the 
hands of another and engages in violent self-punishment. Similarly, in the case of 
Augustine and Rousseau, their Confessions stem from an inordinate burden of guilt. In this 
state, self-directed blame is a consequence of the severity of the trauma endured: the 
subject suffers an irrevocable loss of innocence that undermines their sense of subjectivity 
and causes a very particular form of extreme shame to become ingrained in their psyche. 
For them, shame is experienced as an innate and inescapable burden, which consequently 
causes profound self-hatred and self-disgust, and the desire for self-annihilation. As a result 
of such intense shame and self-disgust, the subject at first attempts to repress the memory 
of the traumatic events(s): she or he is terrified by the prospect of an unwanted exposure 
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of shame and engages in a process of self-silencing and self-abnegation. Eventually, 
however, the burden of guilt compels the subject to try to purge their shame through an 
open disclosure of their shameful selves. This disclosure is confessional in nature: the act 
of confession itself is apposite to the shameful scream because it is a process through 
which a truth is revealed, made or forced, either from personal compulsion, religious ritual 
or through torture.112 However, the shameful scream engages in a very particular form of 
confession that aims not only to extract truth and confirm guilt, but also to publically 
expose oneself as reprehensible in nature, and engage in self-abuse and self-vilification. 
Ultimately the aim to purge oneself of shame fails. This extreme form of confession, and 
its failure, is demonstrated in the Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau. 
 
Pathological shame and self-disgust in the Confess ions  of Augustine and Rousseau 
The excruciating admixture of pathological shame and self-disgust that pertains to 
the shameful scream is exhibited by Augustine and Rousseau in their exposure of 
themselves as sinful, shameful and corrupt. Their expression of self-disgust and self-
revulsion has similarities to the state of abjection theorised by Julia Kristeva in Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection, because it involves a sensation comparable to what Kristeva 
describes as ‘one of those violent, dark revolts of being.’113 However, in the case of the 
shameful scream, as demonstrated by Augustine and Rousseau, the process of self-revolt 
works in a different way. Unlike abjection, the shameful scream is not a feeling of hatred 
and horror over what is filthy or nauseating, or what disturbs the boundaries within the 
body and/or psyche.114 The stimulus for the self-revolt inherent in the shameful scream is 
an unrelenting hatred for traumatic event(s), and the mistaken belief that one is to blame 
for these events. The traumatic events that Augustine and Rousseau identify as the catalyst 
for each of their respective Confessions cause shame and self-disgust to become entrenched 
as a negatively transformative force within their psyche. Each writer accepts responsibility 
for these events and engages in excessive self-blame. Augustine confesses to the theft of 
some pears, which occurs concurrently with a descent into sexual licentiousness in his 
sixteenth year. Rousseau confesses to stealing a ribbon and then telling a lie in order to 
extricate himself from blame. He also confesses to the onset of a humiliating chronic 	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illness in his infancy. For Rousseau, ill health is a recurring experience, and the 
disproportionate shame he expresses over it is commensurate to the scream of shame. As a 
result of these early traumatic occurrences, pathological shame and self-hatred is imbued 
within the core of each writer’s being and is experienced as innate in the formation of their 
ego.  
In their respective analyses of the Confessions of each writer, Jacques Derrida and 
Paul De Man demonstrate that each confession involves the staging of guilt and culpability. 
The thefts are allegorical, representing the fall of Adam and each writer’s initial loss of 
innocence and propensity for sin. However, what is most pertinent to the discussion of the 
shameful scream here, is not the allegorical fall into sin itself, but the agonising shame and 
self-disgust that emerges from it. Derrida and De Man have provided the insight that 
shame fuels the recursive reference to the thefts and the repetition, and re-staging of guilt 
in each act of confession. 115  Derrida and De Man show that shame is not only 
psychologically transformative but also transforms the very structure and content of each 
confession. Derrida further argues that the acts of theft in each confession operate 
structurally and symbolically as ‘a determining event, a structuring theft, a wound, a trauma, 
an endless scarring, the repeated access to the experience of guilt…’116 Although Derrida’s 
argument is more focussed on the parallel complex structural and figurative linguistic 
processes at work within each confession, his analysis is important to this investigation 
because it reveals the way in which the extraordinary guilt each writer expresses over their 
respective thefts compels them to re-live and sustain the pain of guilt and shame 
throughout each confession in an attempt for atonement.117 Each confession enacts the 
internalised paroxysm of shame inherent in the condition of the shameful scream through 
repeatedly reliving, referencing and evoking the original trauma. 
Augustine conveys shame over a number of subjects, such as his remorse over his 
delayed conversion to Christianity, his misguided following of Manichaeism, his pride, and 
what he describes as ‘lust of the eyes’—a weakness for sensorial experience. However, it is 	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only his sexual concupiscence that causes him the extreme self-revulsion that is germane to 
the shameful scream.118 Augustine’s account of his first sexual experiences and his theft of 
pears are symbolically conflated in the text: both occur in his sixteenth year and are 
confessed in Book II of his Confessions. He confesses both sins almost simultaneously to 
form a strong condemnation of what he describes as his ‘past foulness’ and ‘carnal 
corruptions of his soul.’119 The act of theft symbolises Augustine’s submission to the 
temptation of sin and the beginning of his carnal concupiscence - the fundamental cause of 
Augustine’s pathological shame and self-hatred.120 Augustine confesses to engaging in 
fornication and expresses profound disgust that his enjoyment of this act was enhanced by 
very knowledge it was sinful in the Christian faith.121 During his narration of the theft of 
pears, Augustine uses language that alludes to sexual desire in order to expose his moral 
depravity and his inability to resist sexual temptation. For example, he confesses that he 
stole purely because he ‘lusted to thieve…’ and ‘joyed in the theft and sin itself, ’ and that 
he did not even eat the pears, but only tasted them, afterwards ‘flinging them to the 
hogs.’ 122  The discarding of the pears in this way is particularly redolent of sexual 
promiscuity.  
Augustine’s regards his sexual desire as profoundly revolting. He describes it either 
as a form of sickness, calling it ‘the disease of my soul’ or as a form of insanity—describing 
it as his ‘madness of lust.’123 This corresponds directly to the condition of the shameful 
scream, in which shame feels like a toxin or disease within the body, and also like a 
madness of the psyche. Moreover, Augustine demonstrates horror and revulsion over the 
belief that he is infected with shame, and that like a disease or madness, shame is imbued in 
his very being and is beyond his conscious control. For example, he describes the sensation 
of being overcome and overwhelmed by sexual desire as a kind of fever or delirium: ‘I was 
tossed about, and wasted, and dissipated, and I boiled over in my fornications.’124 For 
Augustine, sexual desire is profoundly revolting because it represents an overflowing of the 
sinful corporal reality of his existence and an obscene exposure of his shameful desire for 
the fleshy love which is at odds with the divine nature of God’s love. 
Augustine believed the sexual act is always sinful in the eyes of God, even if strictly 	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for the purposes of procreation, and consequently adopted celibacy after his conversion.125 
Hence, his sexual desire causes him extreme inner torment because it is the singular 
element within his psyche that is not only anathema to his Christian beliefs, but is the most 
difficult to control. It is for this reason that Augustine portrays the emergence of his 
sexuality during his sixteenth year as an insurmountable trauma from which he does not 
recover, and repeatedly recalls and re-experiences its pain throughout the Confessions. This is 
evident in the unrelenting self- denunciation and anguished lament over his sexuality that 
occurs throughout Augustine’s Confessions. He also shamefully recounts his on-going 
struggles to contain his sexual desires through, for example, circumcision and attempted 
abstinence.126 As a whole, Augustine’s Confessions forms an extended lamentation and cry of 
contrition to God, but this lament is at its strongest and most anguished in relation to his 
sexuality. For example, the narration of his sexual indiscretions is punctuated with 
declamatory cries of contrition and self disgust such as ‘Woe is me!’, ‘Wretched man!’, and 
‘O rottenness’. 127  Cries such as these extend across the narrative of Augustine’s 
Confessions and reveal the persistence and intensity of Augustine’s paroxysms of shame. 
Whereas Augustine is ashamed and repulsed by his lack of control over his sexual 
desires, Rousseau is ashamed and disgusted by his sexual inadequacies and perversions. He 
presents himself as abnormal in terms of both the nature of his sexual desires and his 
physical functioning. Whereas Augustine experiences his shame symbolically as a disease, 
Rousseau is ashamed by actual physical illness and a rejects his physical body as a source of 
constant humiliation and abjection.128 Thus, in contrast to Augustine, Rousseau’s self-revolt 
occurs on two fronts: he expresses pathological shame and self-disgust over his sexual 
inadequacy and over his chronic sickness.  
Rousseau engages in the recollection of many shameful incidents throughout the 
his Confessions, but the theft of the ribbon and his blame of a servant girl named Marion, is 
the only event that he describes as a ‘terrible deed on my conscience.’129 Rousseau admits 
that ‘the burden, therefore, has rested till this day on my conscience without any relief’ and 
it ‘greatly contributed to’ his decision to write the confessions.130 The enormity of shame 
and self-blame Rousseau expresses over this incident corresponds to the shameful scream 
in its conveyance of an overwhelming sense of guilt and horror. Rousseau’s theft and its 	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accompanying lie cause a traumatic loss of innocence: Rousseau is horrified by his desire to 
thieve and his readiness to accuse an innocent girl in order to extricate himself from blame 
and public shame. The dire consequence of his theft and lie fills Rousseau with a severe 
guilt that prevents him from speaking about the episode until his Confessions. Marion was 
sacked; thus Rousseau indirectly ruins her reputation and possibility of future 
employment.131 Throughout the Confessions, Rousseau recounts repeated failures in his 
pursuit of intimacy—sexual and otherwise—with women. This pattern of behaviour can be 
ascribed to the episode involving Marion, in which he fails spectacularly in his pursuit of 
her: he had intended to give her the ribbon as a token of his affection. This originary 
failure is symbolic of his further relations with women, which account for some of the 
most profoundly humiliating and painful episodes in the text.  
These episodes are characterised by failure and impotence. Rousseau expresses 
shame and self-disgust that the majority of his sexual experiences are either thwarted or 
failed encounters, fantasies, or perversions such as masturbation or indecent public 
exposure. 132  His open disclosure of the sordid details of his sexual inadequacies, 
dysfunctions and perversions is at times darkly comedic, pervading his Confessions with a 
self-deprecating and scatological humour. It is through his cruel and masochistic humour 
that Rousseau performs self-revolt through the public exposure of his body and sexuality 
as shameful. Here, Rousseau engages in tragicomedy; his shame is offset, but also increased 
in its pathos through his ironic self-ridicule and acerbic humour. 133  This aspect of 
Rousseau’s Confessions offers another perspective on the shameful scream by revealing the 
way in which the self-revulsion inherent to this condition can be expressed through comic 
means. Rousseau demonstrates the way in which humour can express self-loathing and 
self-disgust just as powerfully as Augustine’s histrionic lamentation and earnest self- 
torment. Rousseau revels in the comic description of the embarrassing and scandalous 
nature of his sexual experiences; however, these comic anecdotal episodes have the 
damning effect of exposing him as sexually perverted and infantile.134 Rousseau reveals his 
most secret sexual desire is somewhat ridiculous: a proclivity for spanking that is the result 
of a childhood punishment.135 The confession of this desire is comic, but Rousseau is 
serious about the shame it has caused him: he asserts that he has  ‘never dared’ to confess 	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this secret desire until the writing of The Confessions.136 Rousseau reveals his masochistic 
desire for spanking is the catalyst for what he describes as his ‘extravagant’ practice of 
exposing his buttocks to women in public.137 This is recounted in a comedic, absurd 
episode in which Rousseau is discovered in a state of indecency by some girls and is 
promptly ‘caught and seized’ by a ‘man with a large sword.’ In his embarrassment and 
shame, Rousseau attempts to extricate himself from punishment by pretending to be a 
prince.138 Rousseau’s self-loathing is veiled in this comedy, through which he actually 
exposes himself as sadly ridiculous exhibitionist who shirks taking responsibility for his 
actions. At the same time, however, there is also a hint of self-adulation, as Rousseau seems 
to take delight in narrating this misdemeanour. 
Even Rousseau’s confession of serious moments of intimacy as an adult typically 
combines a sense of the absurd with the revelation of tragic shame. This occurs, for 
example, in his description of his intimacy with Mme de Warens, whom he calls ‘Mama’ 
and who takes him in under her care as a young man. The absurd and bizarre nature of this 
situation is that Mme de Warens is a surrogate maternal figure for Rousseau, and she 
initiates their sexual encounter ostensibly as part of Rousseau’s education.139 The tragic side 
of this episode is that Rousseau is considerably disturbed by this event: although he 
experiences pleasure, he is overcome with ‘invincible sadness’ and declares ‘I felt as if I had 
committed incest.’140 In linking this experience with an obscene taboo, this statement 
discloses the deep revulsion Rousseau experiences in regard to his physical body, intimacy 
and sexuality. 
Rousseau divulges that his shameful sexual perversions and failures are exacerbated 
by his chronic illness, which cause him further discomfort, public humiliation and social 
alienation. Consequently he experiences extreme bodily self-disgust and enacts a revolt 
against his body, which persists throughout the narrative.141 Rousseau reveals symptoms of 
an extensive range of physical ailments including a weak heart, kidney problems, tinnitus, 
fatigue, vapours (sudden fits of nervousness or depression), and shortness of breath, bouts 
of melancholy, lethargy and a chronic urinary condition. 142  Rousseau suffered a 
malformation or infection of his urinary tract which caused him painful retention of urine, 	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alternating with frequent and urgent need for urination, and incontinence. It also interfered 
with his sexual functioning.143 Rousseau’s urinary tract condition is his primary ailment, the 
one he suffers most from, and its effects and symptoms are the most detailed in the text. 
His depiction of this condition is important to this enquiry because it elucidates an 
important element of the shameful scream: the desire to hide one’s shameful secret. 
Rousseau demonstrates on-going anguish over the containment and maintenance of this 
condition, and paranoia over the threat of its unwanted exposure in public. For Rousseau, 
this ailment is a source of abject horror and potential public debasement because it pertains 
to the ridiculous and obscene: the private and hidden dysfunction of his urogenital system 
and his inability to control basic functions. In middle age Rousseau’s condition worsened 
and he was compelled to continually carry around his medical equipment and wear 
Armenian style clothing, consisting of a flowing gown, to facilitate his frequent use of 
probes and catheters. Unfortunately Rousseau’s extraordinary appearance became a public 
source of ridicule, only exacerbating his experience of shame.144 
The nature of this disorder often restricted Rousseau to his room and caused 
significant social anxiety and agoraphobia, as related in the following excerpt:  
 
This ailment was the principal cause that kept me away from society and prevented 
me from staying in a room with ladies when the doors were closed. The mere 
thought of the situation into which my need might put me was capable of 
producing such an attack of it that I would either faint or make a scene- and I 
would have rather have died than that. Only people who know this state can 
understand my horror of running the risk of it.145 
 
Here Rousseau conveys extreme fear over his inability to control his bodily functions in 
public. Rousseau regards his ailment as a source of shame and disgust that must be 
concealed and carefully maintained in public in order to avoid humiliation and scandal: he 
is afraid he will lose control and inadvertently expose his hidden physical inadequacy.146 
From the perspective of the shameful scream, the accidental physical leaking of body fluids 
or waste is synonymous with the unwanted exposure of one’s secret shame and the 
disgusting, revolting and nature of the self. The significance of this quote and the point of 	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identification with the contemporary traumatised subject, is that it precisely conveys the 
way in which the condition of the shameful scream causes the subject to perpetually fear 
this kind of unwanted public exposure. The potential to physically and symbolically 
explode must therefore be curtailed at all costs, leading to the self-enforced social 
alienation and avoidance of intimate situations that is demonstrated so clearly in Rousseau’s 
Confessions.  
 
Raging against the self in Augustine and Rousseau 
The Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau exemplify the way in which the extreme 
form of shame germane to the shameful scream causes a brutal rage against the self. 
Overcome with self-hatred and revulsion, the subject engages in behaviours of self-
destruction, self-mutilation and self-vilification. These behaviours are evident in the 
Confessions of both writers, however, the way in which they are expressed is very different 
and reveals that the self-directed rage can take both overt and covert forms. Augustine 
enacts an overt form of self-directed violence, whereas Rousseau enacts a more covert 
form of rage against the self; Augustine explicitly and directly rages at himself, whereas 
Rousseau’s rage is implicit and conveyed through allusion and textual detail. These two 
different modes of violent self-directed rage are significant to this investigation because 
they reveal the complex and dual nature of internalised rage and self-destruction. 
Augustine enacts self-directed rage through recurring cries of self-condemnation. 
Augustine’s cries of rage are violent, symbolic acts of self-harm and self-flagellation: 
Augustine calls himself ‘vile’, ‘corrupt’, ‘foul’, ‘filth,’ as well as a range of other terms that 
enact a violent verbal form of self-punishment. Augustine denounces his soul for its 
tumultuous and anguished nature, describing it as dirty, offensive, ‘wretched’ and 
containing ‘dark corners.’147 He derides himself for his human weaknesses through the use 
of language of self-negation declaring for example, ‘I despise myself and account myself 
dust and ashes.’148 Augustine also reproaches himself for the ‘carnal corruptions’ of his 
soul, claiming that he ‘lost himself,’ and ‘stank’ in God’s eyes.149 The intensity of his self-
directed rage is particularly evident in the melodramatic self-punishment he engages in in 
regards to his youthful concupiscence:  
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It was foul, and I loved it; I loved to perish, I loved mine own fault, not that for 
which I was faulty, but my fault itself. Foul soul, falling from Thy firmament to 
utter destruction; not seeking aught through the shame, but the shame itself! 150 
 
Augustine’s use of language, his phraseology, and repetition of certain words such as ‘foul’ 
and ‘fault’ in this excerpt have a particularly punitive quality. Moreover its declamatory and 
rhetorical nature gives the impression that Augustine is literally screaming at himself.  
In contrast to Augustine, Rousseau does not openly scream at himself. Instead he 
rages against himself through a process of self-excoriation and self-exposure, in which 
sordid and abject details of an intimate nature are revealed. He takes a masochistic pleasure 
in hiding, and then revealing details of his scandalous physical and moral shame. 
Rousseau’s oscillation between hiding and revealing illuminates further characteristics of 
the shameful scream: the alternation between the desire to hide, and the desire to publically 
expose and punish oneself. It also demonstrates the tension between taking pleasure in 
self-punishment, and the desire to truly harm oneself. Rousseau’s account of his 
experiences with a prostitute in Venice is exemplary of his masochistic self-excoriation and 
self-exposure. In recounting his experience after seeing the prostitute, Rousseau performs a 
brutal form of self-emasculation that is both ridiculous and obscene.  Fearing that he has 
contracted syphilis, Rousseau visits a physician who allays his concerns by explaining to 
him that a physical malformation or abnormality in his genitalia greatly diminishes his 
likelihood of infection.151 What is significant here is that through literally and symbolically 
exposing his genitalia as abnormal to the reader in the form of a medical examination he 
enacts a covert form of rage against himself. He publically reveals his most private, 
degrading and humiliating physical secret:  he is physically abnormal, or in his words so 
‘particularly made’ that he struggles with sexual dysfunction and impotence.152 Through his 
exposure of a medical verified deformity Rousseau performs a symbolic violence against 
himself.  
Another perspective on this revelation is discussed by Swiss literary theorist Jean 
Starobinski who suggests that this self-enacted rage aims to in fact deflect public 
accusations that Rousseau was sexually degenerate and had contracted syphilis. 153 
Starobinski states that ‘Rather than be suspected of doing wrong, he prefers to mutilate 	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himself symbolically and pass himself off as an inadequate lover.’ 154 Starobinski’s argument 
is important to an understanding of this aspect of Rousseau’s shameful scream because it 
elucidates the way in which drawing attention to one shameful aspect of oneself through 
violent self-accusation may actually veil a deeper shame. Rousseau’s pubic self-mutilation 
and abasement of that which is most private—his genitalia—is so earnestly exaggerated 
that it paradoxically becomes an implicit indictment of what Rousseau will not reveal: the 
greater horror of sexual degeneracy, immorality and disease. This point is of particular 
importance to the shameful scream because it elucidates the way in which the violent strike 
against the self that the subject enacts in this condition can have the unintended result of 
betraying an even greater shame and horror about which the subject refuses to speak. 
 
The failure of confession 
The Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau demonstrate the failure of confession 
that is symptomatic of the shameful scream: both writers fail to alleviate their burden of 
shame and self-disgust. For the subject experiencing the condition of the shameful scream, 
the act of confession ultimately fails, because, within this condition, shame can never be 
completely expressed and purged from the subject despite the subject’s desperate efforts. 
Agonisingly, the subject finds her or himself in a perpetual cycle of anguished confession 
and self-directed rage. Even self-destruction offers no escape or relief from this 
interminable shame. Both Augustine and Rousseau attempt, and fail, to escape this cycle of 
shame over the course of their confessions. A comparison of their Confessions reveals two 
very different attempts at overcoming shame, one internalised and one externalised. 
Augustine undertakes a torturous process of self-interrogation, through which he seeks to 
overcome his shame by discovering its source. Rousseau, in contrast, attempts to deflect 
and conceal shame through the adoption of a mask. 
An examination of Augustine’s fraught self-examination elucidates a characteristic 
symptom of the shameful scream: a self- destructive attempt to purge oneself from shame 
by completely uncovering it, and thus confronting it. However, Augustine’s Confessions 
reveal that it is impossible to uncover, confront or purge shame. Augustine believes that 
through self-excoriation and self-torture he can find the kernel of his sin. But as he engages 
in self-interrogation he describes himself as becoming increasingly incapacitated: his vision 
is increasingly thwarted by what he describes as a ‘darkness’ that obscures any self- 
knowledge. He ultimately feels more tormented and ashamed by his failure to understand 	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himself: revealing that he has ‘become a problem’ to himself. 155  Augustine’s self-
interrogation involves an unrelenting series of questions that recur throughout the 
narrative. Akin to the use of torture to extract confession, Augustine enacts a verbal form 
of self-torture in an anguished attempt draw out his own shameful truth. He accuses 
himself of being innately sinful and demands to know why he sins and why he loves sin. 
For example, reflecting on his theft of the pears, Augustine interrogates himself using 
repeated phrases such as ‘What then did I love in that theft?’156 and, ‘What then was this 
feeling?…. Who can understand his errors?’157 Augustine makes desperate attempts to 
locate the source of evil and sin within himself asking ‘Whence is evil? Where is evil then, 
and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed?’158 Like the 
victim of torture, Augustine cannot answer these questions despite his anguished attempts. 
Augustine’s symbolic association of evil as a seed that grows in the self, corresponds to the 
experience inherent to the shameful scream whereby the subject feels that shame and 
horror has taken root and grown in the psyche, and hence cannot be removed. Augustine’s 
process of self-interrogation also elucidates the painful feeling of being trapped within 
shame that is symptomatic of this condition. At many points in his confession Augustine 
expresses anguish over his experience of shame as a darkness that binds him.159 He seeks to 
extricate himself from this feeling asking ‘Who can disentangle that twisted and intricate 
knottiness?’160 Although this sentence is addressed to God, and reveals Augustine’s belief in 
a God who will disentangle him and thus alleviate his suffering, it lucidly evokes what the 
sensation of extreme traumatic shame feels like: a ‘twisted and intricate knottiness’ or 
oppressive net from which there is no escape.  
In contradistinction to Augustine, who tortures himself for his sins, Rousseau seeks 
to overcome shame through the assertion that he is fundamentally an honourable man.161 
Throughout his Confessions, moments of inner torment and shame are offset by moments of 
self-aggrandizement; this oscillation between self-glorification and self-excoriation is often 
interpreted as ushering in a new Romantic and modern sensibility, however, what is most 
important to this investigation is the way in which Rousseau takes on a mask or alter-ego in 
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these moments of self-affirmation.162 This offers a further insight into the shameful scream 
by demonstrating the way in which, within this condition, the public adoption of a mask or 
persona can be used in an attempt to overcome an inner reality of extreme shame and self-
disgust. However, Rousseau’s Confessions also demonstrate the ultimate failure of this mask, 
because it paradoxically reveals shame, and the desire to hide shame to a greater degree. 
For example, Rousseau’s declarations of his own virtuousness are made in an overstated 
pontificating tone, on the first page of his Confessions he draws on God as his witness in an 
appeal for fair judgement by his readers:  
 
I have bared my secret soul as Thou thyself hast seen it, Eternal Being! So let the 
numberless legion of my fellow men gather round me, and hear my confessions. 
Let them groan at my depravities, and blush for my misdeeds. But….may any man 
who dares, say ‘I was a better man than he’.163  
 
For Rousseau, such statements project an alternate self-image: a mask of overstated 
respectability to the reader, through which he inadvertently implicates himself as shameful. 
If he truly felt innocent, he would not need to prove it so vehemently here, and throughout 
his confessions. Rousseau’s assertion of his innocence through the use of a mask is not 
only an attempt to extricate himself from his personal burden of shame and self-disgust, 
but is also an important strategy for deflecting public accusations of degeneracy. Rousseau 
was the victim of public lampooning and harsh criticism, and during the writing of his 
confessions he becomes convinced that he is the victim of a conspiracy threatening to ruin 
his reputation and silence his writings.164 Throughout his Confessions Rousseau aims to seek 
fair judgement from his readers by presenting an alternate and honourable vision of 
himself, an aim that ultimately fails in his lifetime due to public outrage over his Confessions, 
the censorship of his writings and persecution from the French and Swiss governments.165  
 The shameful scream is a condition in which the subject experiences a form of 
shame that is beyond the extreme limit of the bearable. It involves a process of tearing 
oneself apart in a futile attempt to overcome and destroy shame, which, horrifically for the 
subject, is discovered to be embedded in their very selves. This realisation causes sheer 	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panic and an anguished inner revolt: a heightened physical and psychical sensation that 
feels like a violent painful explosion within the self.  The comparative study of the 
Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau undertaken in this chapter has highlighted the 
explosive inner tumult that occurs within this condition, by revealing their respective agony 
of shame and rage in relation to sin, sexuality and sickness. One of the significant 
outcomes of this comparison has been the elucidation that the subject can attempt to 
express and overcome the symptoms of this condition either through anguished 
lamentation and self-torture in the case of Augustine, or through detached humour and the 
use of a mask in the case of Rousseau. For the contemporary traumatised subject, the 
condition of the shameful scream, if experienced over a significant period of time, causes a 
schizophrenic oscillation between these two modes of articulation. The ultimate failure of 
either strategy in overcoming the symptoms of inordinate shame, as demonstrated in the 
Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau, is experienced as a devastating reality for the 
contemporary traumatised subject. 
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Chapter 3: The obscene scream 
 
Unlike the internalisation of extreme self-disgust that occurs in the condition of the 
shameful scream, the obscene scream is an externalised outburst of excessive obscenity. 
This state is the outward embodiment and physicalisation of an intense feeling of 
repugnance and horror that is embedded within the subject as a result of a traumatic 
experience of extreme obscenity, violence and horror. The obscene scream is a condition 
of total revulsion against, and rejection of, traumatic and obscene experience(s). Ultimately, 
through the explosive outburst of obscenity, the obscene scream exposes the profound 
horror of violence and the obscene nature of its effects. The central point of enquiry into 
this condition is the use of obscenity in the literary and philosophical writings of Nietzsche 
and Bataille. In a number of writings, Nietzsche and Bataille embrace states of obscenity 
and excess, a phenomenon that is often interpreted as a strategy that resists rationalist and 
conventional modes of philosophical thinking.166 However, this chapter instead focuses on 
two aspects of the use of obscenity in the work of Nietzsche and Bataille which are 
particular to the obscene scream: firstly, their identification of the wound as an obscene 
and traumatic orifice, and secondly, their exploration of the destruction and obscenity that 
occurs as a result of extreme physical and psychological suffering. The term obscene is 
usually defined as what is indecent, perverse, offensive, immoral, repugnant, disgusting and 
abject especially pertaining to the scatological and the sexual. It is also associated with an 
event that takes place off-stage; something which cannot be viewed or represented, and 
remains out of sight.167 However, this chapter expands upon standard definitions of this 
term and posits extreme forms of interpersonal violence and abuse as fundamentally 
obscene—an interpretation that draws upon my own personal experiences and is 
supported by the portrayal of violence as obscene in the writings of Nietzsche and Bataille. 
In the condition of the obscene scream, the traumatised subject experiences her or 
himself as obscene, and is overwhelmed by a sensation of nauseating inner tumult that 
seeps or bursts out of their body- a feeling that is analogous to the excretions from a 
seething, festering wound. They may attempt to contain and hide this seething obscenity, 
but this is impossible due to the irrepressible nature of this condition. Subsequently, the 	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subject either experiences an involuntary failure of her or his body and psyche to contain 
this inner toxicity and obscenity, or, on the other hand, consciously chooses to purge 
herself or himself in a violent release which can involve self-harm and self-mutilation. 
Thus, the obscene outburst inherent to the obscene scream can take two different forms; 
firstly in the form of a wound or laceration to the subject through which horror is 
communicated, and secondly through extreme states of physical sickness, psychological 
suffering and/or madness in which the subject experiences a loss of control which triggers 
an overflow of obscenity, abjection and horror. In a significant parallel to the obscene 
scream, Nietzsche and Bataille’s respective writings demonstrate the way in which inner 
obscenity and horror erupts either through a wound, or through the physiological 
breakdown that occurs during physical and/or mental illness.  
The particular insights into the obscene scream provided by each writer is to 
confirm the explosive nature of this condition as necessary to the subject’s communication 
of inner horror and pain, and also to articulate the positive nature of this condition as a 
process through which the obscenely traumatic experience may be transformed into 
something of philosophical and spiritual value. Nietzsche attests to a process of self-
overcoming and greater health achieved through embracing destructive states of obscene ill 
health, madness and suffering. Bataille, on the other hand, seeks a state of transcendent 
ecstasy and self-determination through embracing states of obscene violence, madness and 
perversion, and engaging in the erotic and scatological obscene. The spirit of the 
Dionysian, as developed and embodied by Nietzsche and subsequently followed by 
Bataille, facilitates the outburst of obscenity that is germane to the obscene scream in the 
work and life of both writers. Both writers adopt the Dionysian spirit in order to access 
and embrace the excessive and obscene aspects of their being. For Nietzsche, the 
destructive, explosive and obscene impulse inherent to the Dionysian spirit compels new 
creation and renewal; whereas Bataille takes the notion of the Dionysian to an extreme in 
the literal explosion of obscenity and horror in his writings, in particular embracing a state 
of intoxication in order to enable the sublimation of lived experiences of trauma and 
violence into obscene and surreal auto-fiction. The raw outburst inherent to the obscene 
scream is parallel to the savage and wild release that occurs within the Dionysian frenzy.  
 
The obscenity of violence and abuse 
Interpersonal violence involving physical, emotional and sexual abuse, is one of 
most horrific manifestations of obscenity because it is comprised of a reprehensible 
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mixture of brutal force, inhumanity, perversity, abjection, cruelty and immorality. It also 
involves an obscene misuse of power to elicit terror and subjugation. Furthermore, extreme 
forms of violence enact obscenity that is so horrific and unspeakable, that it usually occurs 
literally off-stage: in private, hidden out of sight, or alternatively, the victim is quickly 
silenced and any evidence of the event is obfuscated.  There is an important distinction to 
be made between the obscenity of violence that the subject has endured and experienced, 
and the traumatised subject’s subsequent explosive reaction to this experience in an 
outburst of obscenity. The former is defined here as the fundamental and real obscene. 
The latter is the obscene scream, which is not real obscenity itself; rather, through its 
obscene nature it exposes the horror and obscenity of the traumatic experience. 
Nietzsche’s texts and Bataille’s writings elucidate this phenomenon in the way that they 
demonstrate how an outburst of obscenity is a vital means of communicating, exposing 
and resisting the horror of obscene violence. 
 The notion that extreme violence and abuse is obscene can be elucidated with 
reference to Italian film director Pier Paolo Passolini’s film Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom 
(1975), based on the novel by the Marquis de Sade. Set in Mussolini’s Italy, the film is an 
allegory of violence and its profound obscenity. Four fascist captors kidnap a group of 
youths and subject them to on-going physical, mental and sexual abuse including ritualised 
rapes and enforced coprophagia (eating faeces). A scene of particular obscenity involves 
one of the captors defecating on the floor, and then forcing one of the young women to 
strip naked and eat his shit. The film culminates in an orgy of barbaric violence and torture 
which involves the burning of genitals, cutting out of tongues and murder. In Salò, the 
violence of fascism, and the violent execution of its ideology are exposed as the ultimate 
obscenity. For example Salò is pertinent to this enquiry because it reveals the 
interdependence of obscenity, horror and violence, and the inability to disentangle one 
from the other. The obscenity of violence itself, as portrayed in Salò is, mutatis mutandis, 
what the obscene scream resists and exposes. Moreover, Salò demonstrates that it is only 
through the performance and dramatisation of obscenity and horror, that the utterly 
repugnant and obscene nature of real violence itself, as it occurs in life, can be 
communicated. Bataille and Nietzsche similarly use of the tropes of the obscene, including 
the embrace of obscene personae in the case of Nietzsche, and the pornographic and the 
scatological in the case of Bataille to expose external forces of violence as obscene and 
horrific.  
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In	  Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, contemporary Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek 
differentiates three major forms of violence: ‘symbolic violence’ which is imbued in 
language and its use, ‘systemic violence’ which occurs in the large scale abuses of power 
that occur through political and economic structures, and ‘subjective violence’ which is 
‘performed by a clearly identifiable agent’ and includes interpersonal violence and abuse.168 
While the obscene scream reacts primarily to interpersonal violence and abuse, Nietzsche 
and Bataille demonstrate that other forms of violence can elicit a similarly explosive and 
obscene reaction. This point suggests the broader significance of this condition, beyond the 
personal traumatic experience, as an important method of exposing violence as obscene in 
a larger, societal context.  
Nietzsche’s obscene scream is primarily voiced through the mad and obscene 
personae of Dionysus and Zarathustra- a strategy that will be discussed in further detail 
later in this chapter.  Nietzsche aims to expose and overcome the obscenity in the form of 
symbolic and systemic violence he experiences in his external environment, as well as the 
obscenity he feels lies at the core of humanity itself. Organised religions, such as 
Catholicism, Lutheranism and Protestantism for example, are for Nietzsche the pre-
eminent systems of cruelty and violence.169 For Nietzsche, Dionysus and Zarathustra 
represent the destructive and obscene force necessary to destroy these forms of violence, 
facilitating new creation, and a renewal of culture can be gained. Nietzsche viewed the 
forces of church and state in Germany as powers of brutal domination and repression of 
the subject through the dumbing-down and suppression of genuine thought. 170  For 
example he regarded Martin Luther as enforcing conformity and the suppression of reason 
and critique.171 Nietzsche decried this process as cultural degeneration and his use of 
obscenity in his writings aims to expose this phenomenon as obscene and violent.  German 
nationalism and anti-Semitism are symptomatic of this cultural degeneracy, and 
representative of a brutal violence that stultified and suppressed the individual: the 
antithesis of what is represented by the figures of Zarathustra and Dionysus.172 At the same 
time, Nietzsche views humanity as essentially obscene and expresses, through Zarathustra, 	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a ‘great disgust’ over the ‘all too human’ and ‘small’ nature of ‘even the greatest man.’173 In 
the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche laments: 
 
Alas for this crazy, pathetic beast man! What ideas he has, what perversity, what 
hysterical nonsense, what bestiality of thought immediately erupts, the moment he 
is prevented, if only gently, from being a beast in deed!... There is so much in man 
that is horrifying!’174  
 
Nietzsche aims through his own outbursts of obscenity and madness, to communicate the 
truth of the horror and violence that constitutes humanity.175 
In contrast to Nietzsche’s work, the obscene scream in Bataille’s literary writings is 
not facilitated through the use of masks or personae, but is openly expressed through a 
proliferation of obscene imagery pertaining to, for example, the scatological, the 
pornographic and the sexually violent. Bataille’s explosive outbursts of obscenity expose 
and resist the systemic, symbolic and subjective violence in the form of fascism, and the 
subjective violence he endured in his personal life. Writing from his own experiences of the 
rise of fascism and Nazism, Bataille describes fascism as a force of ‘brutality that destroys 
with rage everything it lacks the power to captivate.’176 Bataille makes use of graphic 
depictions of the obscene wound and obscene, destructive forms of suffering because, for 
Bataille, it is precisely this kind of violent imagery that which resists repression and abuse 
due to its explosive nature and transgressive potential.177 Bataille’s use of obscene imagery 
and graphic violence in his literary work, exposes fascism as truly obscene and violent, and 
aims to symbolically destroy the kind of thinking that promotes and reinforces the violence 
of fascism and fascist thinking. In response to the subjective violence that Bataille himself 
endured and its subsequent psychological symptoms he experiences, Bataille unleashes 
obscene outbursts that correspond to the obscene scream predominantly in the form of 
shocking allegorical narratives. These expose his personal experiences of violent personal 
trauma and suffering as fundamentally obscene.  
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The relationship of the Dionysian spirit to the expression of the obscene scream in 
Nietzsche and Bataille 
The attributes of Dionysus are not only adopted by Nietzsche to facilitate his 
obscene scream, but are also appropriated by Bataille in his own recourse to obscenity. 
Two major aspects of Nietzsche and Bataille’s use of obscenity are germane to the obscene 
scream: the identification of the wound as traumatic orifice from which obscenity erupts, 
and the exploration of the explosion of obscenity in states of extreme suffering and 
destruction are underscored by what is characterised here as the Dionysian spirit or 
attitude. The significance of the Dionysian spirit to the obscene scream is that many of its 
constituent elements correspond to the obscene scream and its symptoms. The Dionysian 
spirit, as developed and advocated by Nietzsche, embraces suffering, immorality, 
formlessness, destruction and excess. This is in contrast to Apollonian order, rationality 
and morality. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche describes the Dionysian as a ‘drive’ of 
intoxication, associated with the ‘imageless art of music’ in contrast to its opposing drive, 
the Apollonian- associated with the ‘art of the image-maker or sculptor’ and which 
represents form, beauty and harmony.178 Ancient Greek tragedy emerges from the conflict 
and eventual balance of Dionysian and the Apollonian forces: the Apollonian tames and 
tempers the wild obscenity of the Dionysian in order to create art.179 The focus here is not, 
however, on the conflict of these two drives and their relationship to the development of 
art and culture as set out in The Birth of Tragedy, but is on the relationship of the Dionysian 
spirit to the expression and release of horror and obscenity. The notion of obscene scream 
is an extrapolation of these savage impulses explored by Nietzsche and Bataille in a mad, 
sick and explosive release of obscenity in reaction to trauma. 
The obscene scream can be understood as an emotional state that not only 
corresponds with the Dionysian spirit or drive, but also emerges from an individual who 
has either capitulated to, or embraced, the uninhibited obscenity inherent to the savage and 
mad Dionysian flux.180 This uninhibited and excessive state is most evident in the rituals 
carried out by an ancient people Nietzsche names the Dionysiac Barbarians. According to 
Nietzsche, these rituals represent a ‘grotesque manifestation of the Dionysiac:’ an unbridled 
and raw Dionysian impulse untempered by Apollonian restraint, in contrast to the more 	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restrained rituals of the Dionysian Greeks.181 Nietzsche explains that the rituals of the 
Dionysiac Barbarians involve the release of innermost primal, destructive and savage 
instincts, eventuating in explosive outbursts of obscene behaviour in the form of spiritual 
and physical frenzy, sexual debauchery and orgiastic excess, as well as an embrace of the 
unconscious and a rejection of form and order. 182 The release of raw, wild, savage, 
horrifying and obscene elements from within the psyche that occurs during uninhibited 
Dionysian ritual and intoxication is particularly germane to the obscene scream and its 
explosion of obscenity and filth.  
 Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian is foundational to Bataille’s philosophical 
thought and literary works, in particular his expression of obscenity and his development 
of the concept of eroticism. 183  While Nietzsche writes about the Dionysian as a 
phenomenon and expresses it through the masks of Dionysus and Zarathustra, Bataille 
directly adopts and performs its obscene spirit. It is through inhabiting the barbaric, wild 
form of Dionysian spirit and taking its obscene and savage impulse to its extreme, that 
Bataille is able to voice his obscene scream. The elements of Bataille’s writing that are 
considered obscene such as the exploration of sexual violence, the embrace of the 
scatological and pornographic, the depiction of horror and as well as his interest in states 
of madness, intoxication, ecstasy and religious sacrifice can be attributed to his adoption of 
the Dionysian spirit. However, it is Bataille’s particularly intense expression of the most 
obscene, explosive and destructive elements of barbaric form of the Dionysian spirit, as 
symbolised in his use of visual imagery of destructive and horrific wounds from which 
obscenity is excreted, the explosions of obscenity that erupt in moments of physical and/or 
sexual violence and the traumatic loss of bodily control leading to an outburst of 
excrement or other bodily filth that is inherent to the condition of obscene scream and is a 
literary manifestation of its obscene and horrifying character.  
Bataille’s use of the Dionysian spirit extends the ritualistic orgiastic and sexual 
debauchery of Nietzsche’s interpretation to an extreme level—horror, sensuality, violence, 
death, ecstasy and the erotic are all linked in one explosive, convulsive experience, which 
he describes as eroticism. 184  Bataille’s concept of eroticism has some important 
correspondences with the obscene scream as well as to the Dionysian spirit. Through his 	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concept of eroticism Bataille explores the interconnection of violence, obscenity and 
desire—defined by Bataille as the intangible yet powerful connection ‘between excreta, 
decay and sexuality.’185 Bataille’s notion of eroticism can be understood as an extension of 
the savage orgiastic frenzy and wild intoxication of the barbaric Dionysian ritual and is of 
significance to this chapter because it underpins particular elements in his writings that are 
germane to the obscene scream and its symptoms. The explosive intensity and 
combination of perversity and horror inherent to Bataille’s notion of eroticism is in many 
ways redolent of the obscenity and horror conveyed by the obscene scream, and also 
suggests that inhabiting this condition of excess and obscenity may offer an unexpected 
perverse pleasure or jouissance for the subject.186	  
Bataille views an immersion in states of mind and obscenity comparable to the 
Dionysian flux as revealing something deeper within the psyche; a deeper horror and a 
deeper reality. For Bataille, the exposure, through the obscene and erotic outburst reveals 
the horrific force of the reality and horror of death, which is, for Bataille, an ecstatic 
revelation, just as much as it is traumatic.187  The parallel with the condition of the obscene 
scream here is that through obscene outbursts, the traumatised subject often inadvertently 
exposes the horror and sensation of festering revulsion lying within themselves. This is a 
physical manifestation of the reality and horror of a severe traumatic event, or series of 
events, which for the traumatised subject may not be an ecstatic revelation, but it is a 
revelation that attests to their experience and most importantly, asserts and affirms their 
survival.  	  
 
Communication through the wound- the wound as conduit for the obscene scream 
in Nietzsche and Bataille 
 Central to the condition of the obscene scream is the explosive release of 
obscenity and horror. An important insight into this is provided in the writings of 
Nietzsche and Bataille who demonstrate that one of the primary ways that this explosive 
release occurs is through a physical and/or psychological wound, which allows the subject 
to communicate pain and horror. This concept resonates particularly with the experience 
of the contemporary traumatised subject, who experiences a profound physical and 
psychological wound that occurs initially during the moment/act of trauma or violence. 	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This wound lingers as a festering, perpetually excreting entity, which finds a variety of 
outlets in the form of orifices in the subjects body which form symbolic/visualised 
manifestations of the hidden wound of the initial trauma and enable the communication of 
revulsion and horror. For example, a spontaneous and raw reaction to trauma and horror 
may take the form of a panicked, uncontrollable outburst of excrement or vomit, in which 
the orifice of the mouth or anus becomes the literal site of the traumatic wound (or the 
unwanted phsycialisation of the psychological event); or, a literal scream and/or 
vocalization of obscenity and frenzied non-linguistic utterances in which the mouth, in its 
over-extended and fraught state itself becomes a symbolic wound through which 
something pertaining to the horror of traumatic experience is communicated. 188  The 
wound can also take the form of self inflicted cuts, or mutilation, through which the 
subject’s own blood is let in a desperate attempt to purge the obscenity felt inside. This 
kind of wound relates strongly to the strike-through in the term scream: the self-inflicted 
strike on the subject in the horrified and revolted aftermath of trauma creates a wound that 
reveals something so horrifying and obscene that it cannot be communicated in any other 
way by the subject.  
The foundation for the explosive release of obscenity through the wound or self-
inflicted strike on the subject, as developed in the writings of Nietzsche and Bataille is the 
myth of the laceration of the god Dionysus.189 In this myth, the child Dionysus is brutally 
torn into pieces by the Titans, who lacerate his heart and then proceed to cook him and eat 
him. However, the Goddess Athena preserves Dionysus’s heart, and he is later 
resurrected.190 The laceration and dismemberment of Dionysus, and his subsequent re-birth 
not only influences the important process of destruction through traumatic destruction and 
wounding and its potential for renewal that is explored in the work of Nietzsche and 
Bataille, but it is also germane to the obscene scream and implies the possibility of 
overcoming the violence of the traumatic event, through a process of the subjects complete 
breakdown and re-creation.  
Nietzsche draws upon this myth in his advocacy of an explosive process of 
breaking apart and complete annihilation, akin to the tearing apart of Dionysus. This is 
described by Nietzsche as ‘Dionysiac suffering’ and involves ‘the breaking-asunder of the 
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individual and its becoming one with the primal being itself.’191 Nietzsche views the 
suffering that occurs during this process of rupture and destruction, as a life-affirming 
experience for the subject that is accompanied by states of ecstasy, exuberance and 
renewed creativity. 192 The ‘primal being’ Nietzsche refers to is a primal, instinctive flux: a 
primordial unity at the core of existence characterised by contradiction, suffering and pain. 
Entering this state offers an opportunity for renewal and re-creation.193 For Nietzsche, 
Dionysian laceration and suffering is opposed to other forms of suffering, such as that 
found in Christianity and the conventional psychology of his day.194 Dionysian suffering 
does not involve any resolution or false justification of pain and suffering that may be 
offered by Christianity or psychology, instead, the release of obscenity and savagery that 
occurs as a result of the subject’s destruction is, paradoxically, an embrace of pain and a 
joyful affirmation of life in the face of death. Akin to Dionysus’ own rebirth, joyful re-
creation is the outcome of Dionysian suffering.195 For the contemporary traumatized 
subject, a similar loss and destruction of subjectivity and a sensation of tearing apart is 
experienced, however, rather then becoming ‘one with the primal being’, primal, wild, raw 
and obscene reactions against the experience of horror and trauma are released. The 
importance of Nietzsche’s conception of Dionysian suffering for the obscene scream is 
that it outlines a process of the subject’s self-affirmation and renewal through the 
wounding. Moreover, Nietzsche’s insight into suffering indicates that the subject has a 
choice of how to suffer from the traumatic experience:  either the subject self-destructs in 
violent obscenity and wallows in this horror, or on the other hand, the subject can adopt a 
Dionysian approach to suffering in which horror is sublimated into an affirmative embrace 
of obscenity through the communication of pain in the explosive phenomenon of the 
obscene scream. 
The explosive and destructive nature of the Dionysian laceration and suffering as 
formulated by Nietzsche underpins the use of the recurring allegorical image of the 
explosive and obscene wound in Batailles’ fictional and philosophical works such as Mouth, 
The Solar Anus, The Pineal Eye, The Jesuve, The Story of the Eye, and Sacrifices. In these works, 
Bataille’s obscene wound appears as the literary visualisation of the obscene scream in the 
form of lacerated, dismembered and exploding bodies; the rupturing and swelling of 
orifices such as mouths and genitals; the explosive excretion of faeces, urine, blood, 	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excrement, semen and other bodily fluids; and the complete annihilation of the body 
though catastrophic trauma.196 For Bataille, the uninhibited exposure and outburst of filth 
and pain that occurs during the subject’s wounding necessitates the release of what he 
designates the ‘scream of lacerated existence.’197 The mouth is often depicted as a wound 
and obscene orifice through which Bataille’s scream erupts, ‘as if explosive impulses were 
to spurt directly out of the body through the mouth, in the form of screams.’198 Bataille’s 
description of  ‘explosive impulses’ that spurt from the mouth corresponds to the obscene 
scream, as it depicts a pscyho-somatic impulse that causes a bursting of obscenity through 
the orifice of the mouth.199 Bataille’s ‘scream of lacerated existence’ is a significant point of 
identification with my concept of the obscene scream because it provides a vivid literary 
image of this condition and its symptoms in the form of an obscene and horrific rupture 
through which obscene horror is expressed. For Bataille, the ‘scream of lacerated existence’ 
occurs when filth and an excess of obscenity is violently ejected from the self at the very 
moment when the subject is on the verge of the total catastrophic rupture constituted by 
violent death.200 For Bataille, this rupture provides an insight into what he describes as the 
abyss of death: an infinite void of obscenity, horror, and extreme violence.201 Although this 
seemingly differs from the obscene scream, in which what is revealed in the subjects 
rupture is not death itself, but the horror and obscenity of an experience of trauma and its 
aftermath, the profoundly devastating and repugnant nature of what is revealed is akin to 
the admixture of obscenity, horror and extreme violence that characterises Bataille’s abyss. 
 The communication of profound pain, horror and obscenity through the obscene 
wound and its accompanying scream is most strikingly articulated by Bataille in his 
discussion of photographs of a form of Chinese torture known as ‘the hundred pieces.’ In 
these photographs a young man’s body is literally exploding, subjected to violent obscenity 
in the form of a horrific dismemberment.202 Bataille describes the defilement of the young 
man’s body as follows: ‘his chest flayed, arms and legs cut off at the elbows and at the 
knees.’203 This scene of torture has a striking parallel to the laceration of Dionysus: it 
represents an actual embodiment of the obscene horror of bodily dissolution at the core of 
this myth. This reference cannot be overlooked in the part it plays the significance of these 	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images for Bataille: the photographs of this tortured Chinese man are a visualisation of his 
own ‘scream of lacerated existence.’ Bataille explains that one of the most important and 
influential elements of this image on his philosophy is the way in which the victim 
‘communicated his pain to me or perhaps the excessive nature of his pain, and it was 
precisely that which I was seeking…’204 The literal wounding of the torture victim’s body is 
identified as the conduit for the profound communication of an extremity of pain and 
horror theorised in Bataille’s writing, particularly through the concept of the ‘scream of 
lacerated existence.’ 205 
The horrific wound that these photographs depict is emblematic of Bataille’s 
notion of eroticism.206 For Bataille, the catastrophically wounded or exploding subject, at 
the moment before death both communicates and experiences an erotic intoxication; not 
only horror and obscenity of death is communicated, but also a sensation of ecstasy caused 
by a paradoxical affirmation of life through an acceptance of pain and suffering.207 Bataille 
notes that he was moved by the victim’s communication of pain to a state beyond horror 
and pain: he is moved to the point of ecstasy. This aspect of Bataille’s thought provides an 
insight into another important aspect of the obscene scream: its relationship to the death of 
the subject. The obscene scream responds to a traumatic event or event(s) in which the 
subject felt terrifyingly close to annihilation and death, and believed that they were going to 
die. The obscene excretions from the literal or symbolic wound of the traumatised subject 
that occurs during these terrifying moments are confirmation of the living tissue that 
suffered and is still suffering, and as such asserts the materiality of the subject in resistance 
to the negation and suffocation of life which occurs during the event of trauma. Moreover, 
during the eruption of the obscene scream itself, the subject fears that they will literally 
explode and be destroyed through the overwhelming intensity and power of this outburst. 
In my own experience of this phenomenon, due to this feeling of being on the edge of 
death, I felt an element of extreme terror, combined with a surreal displacement from 
reality and a feeling of a heightened state of arousal and intensity of being. Although 
painful, the complex mixture of these feelings has similarities to the heightened state of 
anguish and ecstasy discussed by Bataille. Whilst this is not a state of pleasurable ecstasy, it 
is an overwhelming and unspeakable feeling redolent of the state of ecstasy Bataille 
describes.  	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The obscene scream as sickness and madness in Bataille and Nietzsche 
The outpouring of obscenity and horror inherent to the obscene scream does not 
only occur through a traumatic symbolic or literal wound. For the traumatised subject, this 
outburst also occurs through profound psychological suffering and physical and mental 
illness, including madness and/or the fear of madness. The physical and psychological 
sickness that may occur as a result of severe trauma represents the involuntary form of the 
obscene scream due to the subject’s loss of control over their physical and psychological 
boundaries. Unlike Rousseau, who attempts to hide his sickness from others and maintain 
his illness through medical devices, the sickness of the obscene scream cannot be 
contained or veiled. This leads to the subsequent explosive emission of obscenity in the 
form of bodily excretions of waste and toxins such as vomit, shit, pus or mad, insane and 
offensive verbal utterances, expressions, or performative actions which are of an obscene 
nature. The subject experiences self-revulsion over their loss of control as well as horror at 
the devastating nature of what this state reveals about the obscenity of violence 
experienced. Nietzsche and Bataille endure sickness, psychological illness and in the case of 
Nietzsche eventual madness. Their respective conditions are a constant source of suffering 
and deliver a real, lived experience of physical and psychological obscenity that is germane 
to the obscene scream in its involuntary form. However, Nietzsche and Bataille embrace 
their own experiences of suffering physical and psychological obscenity from a Dionysian 
perspective, viewing the destruction and obscenity that occurs within the condition of 
infirmity as equivalent to the intoxicated and destructive nature of the Dionysian spirit and 
hence a stimulus for creativity.208 As such, Nietzsche and Bataille consciously harness and 
engage the loss of control and obscenity that occurs within physical and mental suffering 
for philosophical and creative gains. Nietzsche argues that the destructive nature of illness 
and madness must be harnessed for the survival of the subject and their subsequent 
renewal.209 He claims that extreme suffering causes a profound breakdown of the subject 
which necessitates symbolic rebirth. This rebirth is essential for the creativity of the thinker 
and the artist. 210  
Bataille holds a similar attitude. For Bataille, destructive and obscene forms of 
suffering push the subject to what he describes as the ‘extreme limit’ of pain, and it is only 	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at this point of crisis when the subject is on the verge of irrevocable annihilation that, 
paradoxically, the individual’s subjectivity and autonomy is confirmed.211 The positive 
relationship to suffering ascribed to in the work of Nietzsche and Bataille is significant to 
the notion of the obscene scream, because it provides the important insight that a choice 
of response to physical and psychological illness, and its subsequent obscene outburst(s) is 
possible. The subject can either succumb to sickness or madness, and be annihilated and 
overwhelmed by the unrestrained excretion of obscenity, or, as Nietzsche and Bataille 
demonstrate, the subject can seek to overcome this suffering through exploiting the 
obscene and violent power of their condition as a compulsion for creative expression. For 
the contemporary traumatised subject this may lead to an overcoming of the obscenity and 
horror that lurks within the painful mass of traumatic memory, as well as a form of 
empowerment that occurs as a result of taking control of, and using their condition for 
some form of intellectual or creative advantage. It has been my own personal experience 
that at times I have been able to sublimate obscene and unspeakable suffering and the 
overwhelming force of the obscene scream into the creation of artworks.  
For Nietzsche, the overcoming of suffering and pain is an imperative he lives by. 
The urgency with which he endeavours to transform the experience of suffering into 
something of value is revealed a letter written after a traumatic series of events that 
culminated in the breakdown in his relationships with the Russian-born writer Lou 
Andreas-Salomé and German philosopher Paul Reé. Nietzsche states, ‘If I do not discover 
the alchemists’ trick of turning even this—filth into gold, I am lost.’212 The resolution to 
‘turn filth into gold’ characterises Nietzsche’s overall approach to his own suffering. 
Nietzsche suffered from severe chronic illness and mental instability, and was accustomed 
to enduring almost unbearable levels of pain as well as obscenity in the form of the 
humiliation and degradation of physical and mental breakdown and a loss of control. He 
describes recurring episodes in which he is completely incapacitated, spending ‘about 
thirty-six hours in bed, in real torment’ every two or three weeks.213 Nietzsche experienced 
a range of serious ailments including severe migraine headaches, recurring blindness, 
symptoms of bi-polar disorder or mania, severe digestive problems, and episodes of 
madness that culminated in his final breakdown in 1889.214 It is particularly significant to 
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the experience of the obscene scream, that Nietzsche not only describes symptoms 
germane to the involuntary physical and psychologically destabilised form of this condition, 
but also labels them using terms of such as ‘filth’, ‘torment’ and an ‘excess of suffering’ 
which indicate he regards his experiences of suffering as a form of obscenity. 
Nietzsche’s experiences of mental instability and madness are channelled into the 
personae of Dionysus and Zarathustra. These ciphers are obscene figures in the context of 
his contemporary cultural and societal context. Dionysus and Zarathustra are used by 
Nietzsche to repudiate what he views as the moral and cultural degeneracy of late 
nineteenth-century German culture and Christianity. They are intended to shock the 
Christian reader of Nietzsche’s time with their obscenity and immorality in order to expose 
Christian moral values as a dangerous force of decay.215 For Nietzsche Dionysus, the 
Ancient Greek God who inspired intoxication, destruction and madness and obscenity in 
wild, ritualistic states of being represented an antithesis to the stultifying attitude to life 
inherent in Christianity.216 Within Nietzsche’s Christian context, Dionysus is fundamentally 
obscene because in Nietzsche’s writing he represents the antichrist. 217 The cipher of 
Dionysus pervades Nietzsche’s thought, for example in Ecce Homo Nietzsche states ‘I obey 
my Dionysian nature… I am the first immoralist, and in this sense I am essentially the 
annihilator.’218 The immorality and annihilation represented by Dionysus is adopted by 
Nietzsche as a cipher in his life and pervades his thought fostering his use of obscenity. 
Zarathustra, on the other hand is a wondering philosopher – a godlike and spiritual figure 
who embraces states of madness and speaks in allegory and parable.219 The embrace of 
extreme states of madness and obscenity and advocacy of suffering represented by 
Zarathustra/Nietzsche in Thus Spake Zarathustra is a persistent trope throughout 
Nietzsche’s wirings. Zarathustra is obscene in the context of Christian morality because he 
represents, like Dionysus an overcoming of morality itself in the form of allegorical 
madness and immorality. 220  
Nietzsche relates that it is through the horror of existence experienced during 
extreme suffering that profound insights into his own existence are communicated to 
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him.221 Through states of physical and mental incapacitation, Nietzsche experiences what 
he describes as the revelation of his inner, ‘entombed’ self.222 Nietzsche describes the way 
in which 
That nethermost self, which was, as it were, entombed, and which had grown 
dumb…slowly awakened; …at last it spoke again. Never have I rejoiced more over 
my condition than during the sickest and most painful moments of my life...this 
“return to myself”…in itself was the highest kind of recovery.223  
 
The re-awakening and emergence of the hidden depths of the psyche, and the reclamation 
of its previously silenced inner voice is redolent of the repressed, shameful, hidden and 
obscene self that is finally awakened, exposed and voiced through the obscene scream in its 
condition of sickness and madness. This state can communicate the repressed horror and 
memory of traumatic experience to the subject, and provide an unwarranted insight into 
one’s own psychology. Nietzsche’s discussion of a similar process suggests that this 
repressed and silenced inner self, can only be exposed and voiced through the obscene 
process of destruction that occurs in physical and/or mental breakdown, hence the 
ultimately positive value of this condition. For Nietzsche, this awakening is not, however, a 
traumatic awakening involving the devastating knowledge and full comprehension of 
experiences of horror, which is often the case for the contemporary traumatised subject. 
Rather, it is an awakening that ultimately facilitates the subject’s clarity and freedom of 
thinking.224  
Drawing from his own experiences, Nietzsche argues that destructive suffering 
facilitates philosophical and artistic creation and what he describes as human ‘greatness.’225 
For example, he attests that ‘In the midst of the agony of a headache which lasted three 
days, accompanied by violent nausea, I was possessed of most singular dialectical 
clearness…’226 This account of intellectual clarity emerging from a state of sickness and 
deterioration is typical of Nietzsche’s life which was dominated by a repetitive cycle of 
periods of extreme sickness followed by prolific episodes of creation.227 For Nietzsche, the 
renewed clarity that accompanied his episodes of illness and incapacitation is the very 	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compulsion for his philosophical work, and his self-proclaimed greatness. According to 
Nietzsche, intellectual and creative greatness can only be achieved after the experience of 
extreme suffering and psychological torment,  and he provides examples such as Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, Ludwig van Beethoven and William Shakespeare to support his 
claims. At the same time, Nietzsche views all human beings as essentially obscene and 
filthy in nature, but credits individuals with the ability to overcome their human condition, 
and re-create themselves through embracing suffering, and, if necessary, engaging in brutal 
self-destruction.228Although many commentators discuss the concept of destruction as the 
force of creation and self-renewal in Nietzsche’s work, it is has been largely overlooked 
that the particular type of suffering and destruction he identifies as necessary for creation is 
an obscene, monstrous and violent force he identifies as ‘great suffering’ and ‘great 
destruction.’229 It is this particular overwhelming and monstrous type of suffering and 
destruction that is relevant to the obscene scream and its symptoms, and is also later 
advocated by Bataille.  
Nietzsche elucidates the horrific force of this kind of suffering and destruction, and 
its necessity for the subject, in the following excerpt:  
 
The tension of the soul in unhappiness, which cultivates its strength; its horror at 
the sight of the great destruction; its inventiveness and bravery in bearing, enduring 
interpreting, exploiting unhappiness, and whatever in the way of depth, mystery, 
mask, spirit, cleverness, greatness the heart has been granted- has it not been 
granted them through suffering..? [the human being must be] formed, broken, 
forged, torn, burned, annealed, purified- that which necessarily has to suffer and 
should suffer? 230 
 
‘Great destruction’ and suffering is described as an overwhelming and torturous force; 
nevertheless, the subject only acquires greatness and strength through enduring horror, 
unhappiness, and the violent and obscene defilement enacted on the body and psyche in 
the form of being literally and symbolically ‘broken’, ‘torn’ and ‘burned’. This process is 
parallel to the long-term destruction of the psyche that occurs on a number of 
psychological and physiological levels as a result of severe forms of trauma, and which 
necessitates and compels the obscene scream and its destructive and explosive outburst(s).  	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It is through the complete dissolution of the subject that occurs when enduring the horror 
and destruction of traumatic events and the intense psychological and physical suffering 
that ensues, that the subject enters into a state of being equivalent to the ‘great destruction’ 
and ‘great suffering’ that Nietzsche describes.  Nietzsche argues that it is only through 
enduring and overcoming intensely painful experiences, which cause a critical dissolution 
or breakdown of subjectivity that the subject is purified and can be symbolically re-born in 
a stronger, healthier, and greater form.231 Without advocating the traumatic experience for 
the contemporary subject, what can be drawn from Nietzsche’s advocacy of great 
destruction and suffering, is that the subject can only survive and overcome the effects of 
trauma by at first enduring and then as soon as possible finding a way to move through 
their experience of suffering psychological and physical obscenity. In a manner similar to 
that encouraged by Nietzsche, this involves confronting and expressing suffering, rather 
then repressing its symptoms. Consequently, the subject may eventually overcome the 
effects of trauma and in doing so become stronger and positively changed; a process that 
can feel like a painful, yet rewarding rebirth. 
Bataille, following Nietzsche, also attests to the value of an extreme form of 
suffering and destruction, crying out to his reader that there is ‘not enough! Not enough 
anguish, suffering!’232 For Bataille, the level of suffering, anguish and destruction must 
always be increased until its absolute limit-death. Bataille conceives of an infinite form of 
suffering redolent of the great suffering and great destruction advanced by Nietzsche. 
However, it is described in even more violent and catastrophic terms, and is more 
noticeably obscene in nature. While Nietzsche saw great suffering and destruction as a 
cause of human greatness, Bataille views it as a gift, albeit a disastrous and obscene gift: 
 
I imagine the gift of an infinite suffering, of blood and open bodies, in the image of 
an ejaculation cutting down the one it jolts and abandoning him to an exhaustion 
charged with nausea. I imagine the earth projected in space, like a woman 
screaming, her head in flames. 233 
 
The imagery used here of graphic violence and trauma, ‘blood and open bodies,’ a 
fatal, violent ejaculation and an apocalyptic vision of a woman screaming with her head in 
flames is parallel to the intensity and obscenity of suffering that is experienced by the 	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traumatised subject in sickness and mad form. It is an externalised and symbolic literary 
manifestation of the explosive symptoms of the obscene scream and its inherent 
unbearable and obscene pain. From Bataille’s perspective, this ‘infinite suffering’ is brought 
about by the trauma of war, torture and/or human sacrifice: events which either lead to the 
subject’s actual death, or states of physical and psychological suffering and pain very close 
to death.234  
The notion that this kind of horrific suffering and trauma can be a gift seems 
contrdictory. However, Bataille argues that the very proximity to death that occurs during 
extreme states of suffering is a gift, because at this moment the subject reaches what he 
describes as ‘extreme limit:’ a state of being he believed could bring about an form of 
ecstasy and freedom.235 Bataille embraces his own states of heightened suffering, anguish, 
abjection, and pain, and seeks to propagate these states within himself in order to lead to 
what he describes as the ‘extreme limit’ of existence, which for Bataille is the very moment 
approaching death or the point at which pain can no longer be endured.236 This is also a 
moment of overwhelming and bursting obscenity akin to the feeling of the traumatised 
subject at the moment when their body and/or mind breaks the boundaries of physical 
control or rational thought.237 For Bataille this moment offers a valuable, yet intangible and 
impossible state of being that he defines in Inner Experience as an inner autonomous state of 
‘ecstasy, of rapture, at least of mediated emotion.’238 Bataille notes that although this state 
of being is similar to mystical experience, it is not an experience inspired or induced by 
religious belief or ritual, but is brought upon by extreme physical and/or psychological 
suffering and despair.239  It is through this state of being and through embracing the state 
of destruction and dissolution that the subject gains a sensation similar to freedom within 
her or himself.240 Suffering to the extreme limit not only allows the individual to achieve a 
state of ecstasy, but it allows them to experience an elusive state of freedom in which they 
are not subjected or submissive to any restraints. 241 Bataille’s argument that a kind of 
freedom is experienced during an extremity of suffering offers a significant insight into the 
obscene scream, and one that is commensurate to my own experience. In the moment of 
the obscene outburst of physical excretion or psychological loss of control there is a 	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sensation of something horrific being freed or released from the previously silenced and 
repressed traumatised psyche. Whilst this does not mean that the traumatised subject is 
necessarily freer in this moment, Bataille suggests that a form of empowerment may be 
achieved if the subject can learn to embrace and control her or his outbursts of suffering. 
He writes, ‘To experience the slow pleasure, the decisive rigor of firm despair, to be hard, 
and guarantor of death rather than victim.’ 242   Whilst it may seem difficult for the 
traumatised subject to find any pleasure and control in the outburst of sickness and 
madness which feel uncontrollable, involuntarily, and terrifying, Bataille demonstrates that 
an element of control, pleasure and consciousness in suffering can be achieved and must 
be strived for. For Bataille, this is the critical point at which ecstatic insight and an 
overcoming of pain is achieved; for the traumatised subject it is an important way in which 
she or he can seek to reverse the disempowering status of victimisation and powerlessness 
that occurs as a result of severe trauma.  
Unlike Nietzsche, who experiences enhanced creativity and clarity as a kind of 
release after and through episodes of severe illness and/or psychological suffering, Bataille 
experiences a more sustained form of suffering that compels him to write and permeates 
the content and the intensity of many of his works. Bataille experienced on-going 
psychological anguish, episodes of depression and fear of madness, symptoms that can be 
attributed to a number of traumatic experiences in his childhood and adolescence.243 He 
suffered from severe obsessive tendencies and emotional hyper-reactivity and at one stage 
undertook psychoanalysis as treatment. 244  He states that his on-going psychological 
torment necessitates his anguished and obscene writing. 245  
The obscene violence personally endured, and the profound psychological suffering 
it caused him is most explicitly disclosed in his short story Dream, where he reveals he 
suffered sexual abuse at the hands of his syphilitic father. In this story, this abuse is 
identified as the fundamental violent and obscene experience: ‘I see him spread his obscene 
hands over me with a bitter and blind smile. This memory seems to be the most terrible of 
all.’246 The terror and horror and obscenity that Bataille recalls is parallel to the horror and 
obscenity experienced by the traumatised subject. For Bataille, this originary and ‘most 
terrible’ memory of all is repeatedly expressed and exposed in more oblique ways 
throughout his oeuvre. This process is germane to the obscene scream, particularly in the 	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way in which Bataille converts memories pertaining to this and other traumatic episodes in 
his life into literary outbursts of graphic obscenity and violence. As such, aside from Dream, 
the link between the use of obscenity in Bataille’s work and his lived experience of real 
horror, obscenity and violence is complex and indirect. In ‘Coincidences,’ the epilogue to 
The Story of the Eye, Bataille attests to an indirect and problematic relationship that is 
germane to the obscene scream and resonates with my own experiences of this condition. 
Bataille states that it was only after the completion of The Story of the Eye that some of the 
personal experiences and events that propelled the text and its obscenity become evident:  
 
I never linger over such memories, for they have long since lost any emotional 
significance for me. There was no way I could restore them to life except by 
transforming them unrecognizable, at first glance, to my eyes, solely because during 
that deformation they acquired the lewdest of meanings.247  
 
Bataille describes the unconscious transformation of actual memory into something new, 
different and obscene, which nevertheless, retrospectively and indirectly recalls the event 
itself. The involuntary and indirect revelation of a real experience of horror and obscenity 
through the artistic expression of obscenity that Bataille identifies here is akin to the 
involuntary outpouring of filth that occurs within the obscene scream, and strongly 
corresponds to my own experience. In particular it corresponds to this condition as a state 
in which the repression and deformation of the exact or intact memory of traumatic events 
induces the outburst of the obscene feelings associated with these events instead. For 
example, a number of artworks I have created for this project involve outpourings of 
obscenity and horror, but it was only after I had made them that I realised they related to a 
real experience that I had not consciously attempted to evoke during the time of making.  
Bataille writes in a nearly perpetual state of anguish, torment and obscene 
degradation, claiming for example he is a ‘pig in the eyes of Christians.’248 At the same time, 
however, he sought to maintain a state of suffering and obscenity, and also to openly 
accept, engage and express it. He exploits and perpetuates his propensity for anguish and 
suffering in order to reach his own, desired, ‘extreme limit.’249 In Bataille’s striving for his 
‘extreme limit,’ inner anguish, suffering and obscenity literary bursts out in the form of 	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scatological, anguished and at times seemingly schizophrenic or fragmentary texts. This 
creative and literary outburst corresponds to the obscene scream in that they are a literary 
manifestation of obscenity and horror and share the unstructured and formless nature of 
this release. Within the condition of the obscene scream the building of an inner sensation 
of obscenity and horror becomes an unbearably painful tension which ultimately fuels mad 
or mentally unstable outbursts. Bataille’s anguished writing, demonstrates that this kind of 
outburst can alternatively find release in formless and seemingly obscene forms of literature 
and art.  
Bataille notes that it is not only the experience of something bursting inside, or a 
building intensity that compels him to write, but it is also a paranoid fear of madness and 
insanity. He states, ‘I write, I suppose, out of fear of going mad. I suffer from a fiery, 
painful yearning, which persists, like desire unslaked, within me. My tension is, in a sense, 
like that of a mad impulse to laughter…’ 250 The fear of madness and its accompanying 
tension is also symptomatic with the obscene scream, in which the explosive feeling of 
inner obscenity and horror, can seem so surreal and destabilising that the subject genuinely 
fears that they are going mad. One of the compulsions behind the obscene scream is the 
necessity to purge and express one’s inner obscenity and horror in order to avoid madness. 
There is a terrifying feeling that if the sensation of inner obscenity and horror lingers 
inside, one’s whole being will be devoured by insanity. Fundamental to the condition of the 
obscene scream is the frequently-arriving need and desire to explode, to self-immolate in 
order to get all the filth inside out. There is a feeling, also shared by Bataille that unless one 
gets all the shit out, one will go mad, numb or loose one’s subjectivity in complete oblivion.  
 An exploration of certain aspects of obscenity in the work of Nietzsche and Bataille 
has elucidated the obscene scream as a powerful and volatile condition, in which an inner 
revulsion and horror, caused by a traumatic event or series of events bursts out from the 
subject’s entire being in the form of screaming obscenity. Nietzsche and Bataille’s 
development of the tropes of the catastrophic wound and great, destructive sickness and 
suffering in relation to obscenity and violence are to a large extent commensurate with the 
condition of the obscene scream and its symptoms. Nietzsche and Bataille demonstrate 
that raw and uninhibited eruption of revulsion and horror has a value and meaning far 
beyond being merely a reactive outburst to abuse, or a cathartic outpouring of emotion. On 
the contrary, these outbursts, if embraced and harnessed by the subject have the potential 
to assist the subject in overcoming the symptoms of trauma in a number of ways. The 	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obscene scream can provide the subject with an opportunity to experience a sensation of 
resistance and autonomy. It can also facilitate the profound and meaningful 
communication of inner obscenity, pain and horror.  
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Chapter 4: The Scream of Suffering  
 
The scream of suffering is the fraught communication of extreme physical and 
psychological pain. It is characterised by a struggle to overcome the forces of abuse and 
violence that silence the communication of suffering. This state is distinguished from other 
forms of distress discussed in this thesis because it specifically refers to an externalised 
embodiment of pain in performative action. Pain is conveyed to others through a range of 
disquieting behaviours including self-harm. This condition can be elucidated through an 
examination of the performance of suffering in the theatrical and literary works of August 
Strindberg and Antonin Artaud. Extreme suffering is a dominant trope in the work of each 
writer, and the intensity and compulsion with which it is evoked corresponds to the scream 
of suffering. This is particularly evident in two attributes that are common to both 
Strindberg and Artaud: the performance of madness as an expression of suffering, and the 
self-perpetuation of suffering through self-punishment. Strindberg’s suffering is staged 
primarily through the use of masks and alter egos. In his theatrical works, madness and 
self-punishment are projected onto characters that are often veiled ciphers for Strindberg 
himself. Artaud, on the other hand, attempts a more direct presentation of himself as a 
suffering individual in crisis. He does this through engaging in two interrelated processes: 
the performative embodiment of the schizophrenic illness he suffers from, and the 
theatrical incarnation of the savage and self-destructive Dionysian frenzy discussed in 
chapter three. For Strindberg, the locus of suffering is primarily the domestic sphere, which 
is portrayed as a hell on earth that drives the individual to madness and self-punishment. 
This is in contrast to Artaud, for whom suffering is predominantly focused within the body 
of the performer, and thus in a more decontextualised space. These contrasts provide the 
insight that the scream of suffering can be embodied both through masks and overt 
theatricalisation, and also through an unmediated outburst enacted through the performer’s 
body. At the same time, a significant overlap and tension between these two strategies is 
revealed. 
 
Madness, schizophrenia and the expression of suffering  
Postwar German philosopher and critic Theodor W. Adorno argues in Aesthetic 
Theory that extreme suffering precludes direct communication in language, realism or 
rational form, and that any attempt to conceptualise suffering ultimately fails. For Adorno, 
suffering can only be fully addressed through irrationality, madness, ugliness and 
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formlessness.251 The trauma, horror and repression of Fascist Germany, for example, has 
its logical expression in forms of modernist art which reject conventional structure, 
language, beauty and logic.252 According to Adorno, suffering is communicated by artworks 
that are mimetic of the catastrophic experience of suffering and horror itself.253 Mutatis 
mutandis a similar formula applies to the scream of suffering in which ineffable suffering 
finds expression in actions, gestures and vocalizations that are seemingly mad or irrational. 
In my performance-video works, for example, a desire to communicate suffering leads to 
the embodiment of extreme behaviours that are redolent of madness. These are 
theatricalised versions of inner symptoms and states of mind that can only be safely 
enacted in the context of a performative art practice. A corresponding phenomenon is 
evident in the theatrical works of Strindberg and Artaud in which suffering compels the 
performance of madness. For each dramatist, madness is the primary outlet for his pain. 
Moreover as their respective experiences of suffering are caused primarily by the condition 
of schizophrenia, the madness staged in their work is a mimetic exposure of their 
symptoms.  
Although Adorno assists in illuminating the causal link between suffering and 
madness as it occurs in Artaud and Strindberg, their theatrical work shares distinctive 
qualities that are not encompassed by his theory. For example, both dramatists engage in 
perpetuating their own suffering through staging self-punishment. The duality of an 
outward expression of suffering that at the same time inflicts self–punishment in their 
work is characteristic of the convulsive state inherent to the scream of suffering—hence 
the particular significance of Strindberg and Artaud to the elucidation of this condition. 
Furthermore, it is important to emphasise the significance of the performance of 
schizophrenia that is staged in the works of both Strindberg and Artaud as distinct from 
any generalised or non-specific madness or irrationality. Although the scream is distinct 
from schizophrenia, there are two major points of correspondence with this disorder that 
are evident in the works and writings of Strindberg and Artaud. Firstly, the experience of a 
deep and agonising rupture that fragments the self, and secondly, a conflicting sensation of 
numbness or loss of feeling. The paradoxical oscillation between the states of extreme pain 
and numbness is particularly germane to the condition of the scream in which the 	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Ethical Validity of the Aesthetic,” in The Marriage of Aesthetics and Ethics, ed. Stéphane Symons, (Leiden: Brill, 
2015), 194-195. 
252 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 25. 
253 Adorno, 24-25; Tonon, ‘Adorno’s response to Kierkegaard,’ 194-195. 
	   69	  
experience of agonising suffering is countered by forces that numb, silence and repress 
pain. 
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Artaud in The Logic of Sense focuses 
on the distorting effects of schizophrenia on the sufferer’s experience of their body and 
mind. Schizophrenia causes an irrevocable and traumatic rupture of self: a painful 
dissolution of the subject’s experience of selfhood.254 In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze expands 
upon psychological understandings of this rupture, through his identification and 
examination of what he terms a deep Spaltung (rupture, deep fissure, or crack) of extreme 
suffering that is exemplified in the schizophrenic experience of Artaud.255  The deep 
Spaltung posited by Deleuze is analogous to the quality of suffering experienced by the 
severely traumatised individual, for whom traumatic events have had a catastrophic effect 
on their subjectivity leading them to feel ruptured and torn asunder. According to Deleuze, 
the schizophrenic experiences their entire being as ruptured to the extent that ‘there is no 
longer any surface…the entire body is no longer anything but depth.’256 Consequently, they 
experience their body as divided and permeable, as a ‘body sieve, fragmented body, and 
dissociated body.’257 Suffering experienced in this specific way—as a profound rupture of 
the self which precludes any sense of surface or wholeness—parallels the condition of the 
scream in which the subject experiences herself or himself both as an uncontained wound 
and as a disintegrated entity.  
Deleuze also demonstrates the way in which the deep Spaltung of schizophrenia 
transforms Artaud’s use of language and speech in his poetry and other writings. Deleuze 
explains that from the horrific depths of his Spaltung, Artaud introduced a new form of 
embodied language, in the form of glossolalia and other non-linguistic speech. According 
to Deleuze, this is the ‘language of schizophrenia,’ which is ‘carved into the depths of 
bodies.’ 258  Deleuze argues that Artaud’s use of glossolalia, and other non-linguistic 
utterances that he terms ‘howls-breaths (cris-soufflés),’ ‘breath-words (mots-soufflés)’ and ‘howl-
words (mots-cris)’ are the physical manifestation of the catastrophic rupture or Spaltung of 
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Artaud’s schizophrenic condition.259 This phenomenon parallels the way in which the 
scream of suffering is not only a primal expression that emerges from a traumatic rupture, 
but is also a physical embodiment and symptom of that rupture. I have explored the 
scream as symptom within the vocal component of my performance-video works through 
frenetic, distorted forms of speech and song as well as cries, grunts and other non-linguistic 
vocalisations that emerge as both expression and symptom of inner pain.  
Although the Spaltung of schizophrenia is primarily evident in Artaud’s 
schizophrenic appropriation of speech, it can also manifest in other ways; conveyed not by 
the physical disintegration of language, but by the form and content of the writing. For 
example, Deleuze has observed a similar Spaltung or crack of suffering permeating the text 
of English novelist Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano and American novelist Scott F. 
Fitzgerald’s The Crack Up, a phenomenon he attributes to their chronic intoxication and 
manic depression.260 Following Deleuze’s line of thinking, the concept of Spaltung can also 
be extended to the plays of Strindberg, in which avatars and alter egos are deployed in 
order to perform the deep Spaltung of Strindberg’s own schizophrenic condition. Strindberg 
creates characters whose speech and actions embody the traumatic suffering and horror 
Strindberg himself experienced. This is a more detached version of the process described 
by Deleuze whereby Strindberg, in direct contrast to Artaud, veils and obfuscates the 
physicality of his own suffering. 
Alongside Spaltung, both Strindberg and Artaud attest to a feeling of profound 
numbness and detachment. Strindberg articulates this paradox as follows; ‘I am as hard as 
ice, and yet so full of feeling that I am almost sentimental.’261 He also refers to a sense of 
surreality, and the loss of awareness of what is real; ‘It seems to me as if I’m walking in my 
sleep; as if my life and writing have got all jumbled up…. I no longer feel as if I am walking 
the earth but floating weightless in an atmosphere not of air but darkness.’262 For Artaud 
on the other hand, intense pain constitutes his experience of himself; statements such as “I 
am there, there means pain’ recur throughout his writings.263 Yet at the same time, Artaud 
constantly makes reference to an internal paralysis and void – he expresses a ‘fundamental 
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despair’ at the ‘sensation of my flesh… abandoned by all possible human feeling.’264 This 
paradoxical state can be elucidated with reference to the US based clinical psychologist 
Louis A. Sass’s study of schizophrenia in Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of 
Modern Art, Literature, and Thought. 265 Sass demonstrates that one of the most significant and 
defining features of Schizophrenia is ‘a heightening rather than dimming of conscious 
awareness, and an alienation not from reason but from the emotions, instincts and body.’266 
This alienation from emotions, instincts and the body constitutes a sensation of extreme 
detachment, numbness, loss of self, and the feeling that one is living dead.267 Sass also 
notes that the schizophrenic condition is characterised by dualities and contradictions, 
especially between extreme detachment and excessive sensitivity. In particular, Sass refers 
to a symptom known as schizothymia, which is described as ‘the propensity to shift between 
hypersensitivity and insensitivity or coldness in one’s reactions to the world.’268 This inner 
discord corresponds to the contradictory condition of the scream: for example in my own 
experience, overwhelming pain and anguish has alternated with sensations of shock, 
numbness and a sense of detachment from outside reality. Moreover, Sass argues that the 
Dionysiac expression of ecstatic highs and horrifying lows that characterises much of 
Artaud’s oeuvre, for example, does not only represent an excess of passion, but can also be 
understood as a struggle to overcome what Artaud describes as a ‘disembodiment of 
reality’ and an ‘inability to feel.’269 Consequently, the savage impulses Artaud invokes in the 
theatre ‘may be better understood not as expressions of a naturally overflowing vitality but 
as defences against the devitalization and derealisation that pervaded his being.’270 This 
point corresponds with the traumatised individual’s struggle to overcome the repression of 
suffering, as well as the numbness and dissociation that occurs as a result of significant 
trauma. In the case of Strindberg, in contrast to Artaud, the sensation of a loss of feeling is 
not overcome through the outburst of emotion on stage; it is instead exhibited in the 
ghost-like and dream-like state of many of his characters.  
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The performance of schizophrenia as an expression of suffering in Strindberg and 
Artaud 
Despite the pervasive effect of schizophrenia on the oeuvres of Strindberg and 
Artaud, it is important to note that a cleavage exists between the condition of 
schizophrenia itself and the theatrical works created.271 Although these works feature the 
performance of schizophrenia, they are not demonstrations of schizophrenic illness nor are 
they therapy. Instead, Strindberg and Artaud consciously aim to develop new forms of 
theatrical expression in order to facilitate the communication of the ineffable pain of their 
conditions. For both dramatists, albeit in contrasting ways, the compulsion to express the 
specific qualities of their suffering necessitates a break with the existing conventions of 
theatrical performance that were prevalent during their respective milieus. Strindberg’s 
innovation in this area was influential on Artaud, who looked to Strindberg’s plays as 
exemplars of the kind of non-conventional theatre he wanted to create and staged a 
production of Strindberg’s A Dream Play in 1928.272 
Between 1895-1897, Strindberg suffered a series of major psychological 
breakdowns and schizophrenic episodes that are commonly referred to as his ‘Inferno 
crisis.’ 273  In his autobiographical novel The Inferno (1897), Strindberg depicts the 
psychological and physical torments he endured during his Inferno crisis, including 
paranoia, anxiety, persecution mania, psychotic attacks, dissociation and hallucinations of 
vampires, ‘unseen powers’ and electrical currents. His symptoms were exacerbated by a 
number of other problems including depression, extreme poverty, alcoholism and his 
recent marital breakdown. 274 While Artaud’s diagnosis of schizophrenia is well established, 
there is some debate within Strindberg scholarship as to whether or not Strindberg can be 
conclusively diagnosed as schizophrenic. Nevertheless there is a general consensus that 
many of his symptoms are at least characteristic of schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
illness. 275  Overall, Strindberg’s psychological experiences are largely analogous to the 
Schizophrenic condition and its devastating effects.276  	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Strindberg’s Inferno crisis precipitated a stylistic change from Naturalism to 
Expressionism in his plays, as well as a significant departure from the traditional rational 
and linear narrative that was predominant in late nineteenth century Swedish drama.277 
Most pertinent to this enquiry is Strindberg’s development of a new, proto-modernist style 
of theatre termed dream play, in which the illogical associations, hallucinatory effects and 
the non-linear course of the dream state provide the underlying structure.278 Strindberg’s 
dream plays not only invoke the surreality, and dream-like symptoms of his schizophrenic 
condition, but also facilitate the performance of schizophrenia and its accompanying 
suffering within the allegorical and phantasmagorical context of the dream.279  
In Strindberg’s dream plays such as To Damascus (1898), A Dream Play (1901), and 
The Ghost Sonata (1907) the experiences of his Inferno crisis are mirrored and transposed 
onto his theatrical characters in an extended process of self-dramatisation.280  However, the 
staging of Strindberg’s schizophrenic condition is most exemplary of the scream of 
suffering in The Ghost Sonata in which the horror of Strindberg’s suffering, as well as its 
detached, dream-like quality is palpable. In this play, Strindberg’s madness is performed 
within the domestic setting of a contemporary bourgeois Swedish house. The characters 
such as The Girl, The Student, The Colonel and The Cook broadly represent the stock 
characters of everyday domestic life.281 In this regard, The Ghost Sonata combines the 
Naturalistic setting of domestic strife in Strindberg’s pre-Inferno plays such as Miss Julie 
and The Father with the dream play style.282 However, in The Ghost Sonata, the domestic 
setting becomes the site where a deep of rupture of suffering and horror, redolent of 
Strindberg’s schizophrenic condition is exposed. The ostensibly respectable domestic 
sphere is unveiled as ‘this madhouse, this prison, this charnel-house,’ and is analogous to 
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the hellish torments that Strindberg portrays in The Inferno.283 Over the course of the play, 
this horrifying reality is slowly revealed to the central protagonist, The Student, Arkenholtz, 
whose illusions about love, beauty and domestic happiness are finally destroyed.  
All characters in The Ghost Sonata display elements of the schizophrenic condition 
and act and behave in ways that are implicitly, or explicitly mad and irrational. Moreover, 
most of the characters act like automatons or ghosts existing in a dream-like state. They are 
described as looking ‘like ghosts,’ and attend a ‘ghost supper’ at a key point in the play—
hence the title of the work.284 Strindberg’s emphasis on the supernatural in The Ghost Sonata 
is influenced by the visions of evil spirits and portents of death he experienced during his 
Inferno crisis, as well as his study of the occult and the mystical theology of Emmanuel 
Swedenborg.285 The terrifying forces such as vampires, furies and demons that torment 
Strindberg during the worst episodes of his schizophrenia are actualised on stage where 
they are personified by characters such as Hummel and The Cook.286 Hummel and The 
Cook are demonic figures who unleash forces of suffering and horror, causing other 
characters to succumb to madness, sickness and death. During the course of the play both 
Hummel and The Cook are exposed and denounced as vampires in human form. The 
significance of these vampiric figures to Strindberg’s scream of suffering is that they 
represent a deep rupture of horror at the core of the domestic setting.  
Hummel and The Cook enact a particular kind of psychical violence that Strindberg 
terms soul murder. Soul murder describes a process in which one individual uses 
psychological abuse to reduce another individual to madness, sickness, paralysis and suicide 
or death.287 During his Inferno crisis, Strindberg believed he was the victim of attempted 
soul murder by his enemies- a fear that was a major component of his persecution mania.288 
Soul murder is an important theme in many of Strindberg’s works including his pre-
Inferno Naturalistic plays such as The Father and Miss Julie, but its portrayal in The Ghost 
Sonata has a stronger relationship with the scream of suffering and its symptoms.289 For 
example, in The Ghost Sonata, the character of The Mummy is the victim of soul murder 	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enacted on her by Hummel. It is revealed to the audience that prior to the events staged in 
the play, Hummel seduced and manipulated The Mummy (while she was married to 
another man) only to abandon her after making her fall pregnant. As a result of the 
suffering and shame she endured, The Mummy descends into a form of madness that is 
both absurd and tragic. The Mummy allows her appearance to degenerate to the extent that 
she looks like an Egyptian ‘mummy.’ Finally she assumes the characteristics of a parrot and 
locks herself in a cupboard for forty years.290 The Mummy cannot speak in a human voice, 
but instead babbles and whistles like a parrot. 291  The Mummy’s overt and highly 
theatricalised demonstration of madness is germane to the scream of suffering because it is 
presented as the only way she has been able to communicate her suffering and grief, as well 
as to enact repentance for what she describes as her sinful infidelity.292  
At the same time, however, The Mummy’s madness is also revealed to be a source 
of insight and truth. At a crucial point in The Ghost Sonata, The Mummy suddenly speaks in 
a normal, human voice and unmasks Hummel, revealing him to be a murderer, a usurer 
and ‘a thief of human souls.’293 It is a characteristic of Strindberg’s dream plays that the 
most overtly mad characters have the ability to reveal truth in moments of lucidity. In this 
regard, Strindberg stages another element of his own experiences of madness and suffering. 
During his Inferno crisis, Strindberg believed that his condition would lead him to 
revelations of truth in the manner of a voyant—a kind of seer and poet that was popular in 
French literary circles in the late nineteenth century. Like The Mummy, the voyant has the 
ability to see past external appearances, in order to uncover the reality lying beneath.294 The 
way in which Strindberg posits madness as a potentially insightful, revelatory condition 
offers a new perspective on the condition of the scream of suffering by demonstrating that 
the performance of madness may facilitate the revelation of truth, and the un-masking of 
the source(s) of horror and suffering. 
In contrast to The Mummy, the character of The Girl exhibits a very different kind 
of madness that exemplifies the loss of feeling that Strindberg also experienced as a result 
of his schizophrenic condition. The Girl exists in a dreamlike, melancholy state and suffers 
from an undisclosed, invisible and ultimately fatal illness. She attributes her sufferings to 
the exhaustion of domestic labour and the actions of the vampire Cook, who she describes 	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as ‘the one who devours me…. It’s as if she sucked with her eyes.’295 The Cook is portrayed 
as a parasitic and fearsome entity that sucks out all the nourishment from The Girl’s food 
and also drains her psychological vitality and health.296 As The Girl’s condition deteriorates, 
suffering, horror and disease are exposed as her inner reality. The Student, for example, 
who was enchanted by The Girl’s beauty at the beginning of the play, realises with horror 
that her beauty was only a mask for the pain and terminal sickness beneath the surface.297 
At the moment of her death, The Girl does not express any emotion or pain, instead she 
orders the servant to bring a Japanese-style ‘death screen’ which is arranged in front of her, 
obscuring the audience’s view of her death.298 Finally, she just ‘droops,’ emitting only ‘faint 
moaning,’ and dies slowly on stage.299 The significance of the suppressed suffering and 
melancholia represented by The Girl to this enquiry is that it also communicates a deep 
rupture of sickness and anguish, but in an internalised, suppressed form that is in direct 
opposition to the externalised madness of the Mummy.300 The Girl represents the scream 
of suffering as it occurs literally underneath the skin—embodied in a subterranean form of 
sickness and horror which is muted and ultimately obscured from view. 
This is in contradistinction to the performances of Artaud in which the viewer is 
confronted with the presentation of the body in an externalised crisis of suffering on stage. 
In order to facilitate this kind of expression, Artaud develops a new concept of theatrical 
performance termed the theatre of cruelty. Artaud’s theatre of cruelty is significant to this 
enquiry, because it is a methodology that enables the catastrophic rupture of Artaud’s 
schizophrenic condition to be staged. Moreover, the theatre of cruelty aims to harnesses 
this kind of suffering as the fundamental force of theatrical expression. Unlike Strindberg, 
whose most extreme schizophrenic episodes were concentrated around the time of his 
Inferno crisis, Artaud’s schizophrenia was acute throughout most of his life.301 Artaud’s 
symptoms included physical attacks of rage, hallucinations, delusions, severe self-
detachment and alienation, chronic delirium, religious fanaticism, anxiety, paranoia, 
persecution mania, graphomania and compulsively uttering gibberish, which he was able to 
utilise in his poetry, writing and performance.302 In conjunction with his schizophrenia 	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Artaud also suffered chronic migraines, gastrointestinal complaints, meningitis and 
hereditary syphilis, which all led to an addiction to opiates.303 In 1937 Artaud’s condition 
degenerated significantly and he spent a period of eight years and eight months in insane 
asylums. During this time he was subjected to poor living conditions, maltreatment, severe 
malnourishment, straightjacketing, and electroshock therapy. 304 Artaud’s experience of an 
almost perpetual state of agony is articulated across his oeuvre in his literary works, letters 
and drawings. However, in contrast to Strindberg who attempted the theatrical 
performance of his madness a number of times, Artaud’s efforts are primarily theoretical 
and are predominantly developed within his writings on the theatre of cruelty. For Artaud, 
the actual theatrical staging of madness is limited to a series of three performance lectures 
in 1933, 1937 and 1947, and a radio play To Have Done With the Judgement of God (1947). 
These performances intend to realise the aims of the theatre of cruelty.305  
In the Theatre and its Double, Artaud sets out the main tenets of the theatre of 
cruelty.306 Overall, the theatre of cruelty entails a decisive rejection of many Western 
traditional theatrical conventions, for example what Artaud regards as an over-dependence 
on text and language, and a preoccupation with Western philosophical and psychological 
concerns.307 In this chapter, however, the focus will be only on those elements that pertain 
to the scream of suffering and reveal the performance of madness as an integral part of 
Artaud’s project. The theatre of cruelty, described by Artaud as a ‘theatre of blood,’ was 
not intended to literally be a theatre of blood, violence and cruelty.308 Rather, the terms 
blood and cruelty are to be understood symbolically.309 For Artaud, the theatre of cruelty 
does not present torture or carnage on stage, it is instead created in ‘the image of this 
carnage…’ in order to unleash, through destruction, the ‘dark powers’ and ‘forces’ that 
Artaud views as the essence of life.310 Within Artaud’s theoretical framework, these forces 
are equivalent to the plague; hence, for Artaud, the theatre of cruelty must invoke the 
plague. As Artaud states: ‘first of all we must recognize that the theatre like the plague, is a 	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delirium and is communicative.’311 Artaud’s concept of the plague is highly significant to 
this study because he defines the plague as analogous to madness—and even more 
specifically to a kinds of madness like his schizophrenia.312 For the purposes of this 
investigation, the plague can be understood as a metaphor for the profound rupture and 
fragmentation caused by Artaud’s schizophrenic condition. Accordingly, the performance 
of madness in Artaud’s theatre of cruelty is realised through the embodiment of the plague 
on stage.  
Artaud describes the plague as a ‘streaming aberration of the mind’ that causes 
frenzy and hallucination, as well as horrific violence and obscenity.313 In the following 
excerpt, Artaud demonstrates how the plague causes madness, unleashing apocalyptic 
conditions: 
 
Then the houses open and the delirious victims, their minds crowded with hideous 
visions, spread howling through the streets. The disease that ferments in their 
viscera and circulates throughout their entire organism discharges itself in 
tremendous cerebral explosions ….The last of the living are in a frenzy: the 
obedient and virtuous son kills his father; the chaste man performs sodomy upon 
his neighbors. The lecher becomes pure.314 
 
This passage reveals some of the correspondences between Artaud’s concept of the plague 
and his schizophrenic illness. Artaud’s description of the plague as a disease that ravages 
both the body and mind - what he terms the ‘entire organism’ - is consonant with his own 
experience of overwhelming physical and mental suffering. 315  Similarly, the endemic 
lechery, disintegration of sexual taboos and sexual violence that Artaud views as 
symptomatic of the plague are paralleled in his own frenetic, and at times obsessive efflux 
of sexual and excremental obscenities in his writing. Furthermore, the raging violence 
associated with the plague corresponds to Artaud’s inner tumult and rage, which he 
describes in similarly apocalyptic terms ‘as the devastating force of all the fires…’316 
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Artaud’s incessant, burning anger is counterpart to the fiery and catastrophic scenes he 
associates with the plague.  
According to Artaud, the plague also unleashes the destructive and evil energies of 
the Ancient of Dionysian rituals of the Mysteries of Eleusis. One of the tasks of the theatre 
of cruelty is to recover and release these Ancient energies.317 Drawing strongly from 
Nietzsche’s depiction of the savage forces of Dionysius in The Birth of Tragedy, Artaud 
advances an equivalent state of violent suffering and laceration as necessary to the theatre 
of cruelty. 318  However, Artaud’s invocation of Dionysian laceration is distinct from 
Nietzsche’s conception, because for Artaud this state does not stimulate renewal, re-
creation, or a state of heightened creativity. Neither does it lead to the transgression, 
ecstasy and transcendence that Bataille attributed to this state. Instead, for Artaud, 
Dionysian laceration is a constant condition of unbearable suffering and destruction.319 
Artaud explains that the theatre of cruelty should ‘manifest and unforgettably root within 
us the idea of a perpetual conflict, a spasm in which life is continually lacerated…’320 As 
such, the performers’ presence on stage must embody the pain and terror of this laceration 
and transmit this sensation to the audience in order to inspire an equivalent paroxysm.321  
 Unlike Nietzsche, who seeks renewal and rebirth through the process of Dionysian 
laceration and destruction, for Artaud the suffering of the lacerated body is affirmed for its 
own sake. As Artaud states: ‘Suffer in order to affirm yourself,/establish your own body all 
alone, without thinking of taking anything away from/that of anyone else/above all not 
through jouissance.’322 For Artaud, the suffering he experiences does not affirm life itself, nor 
does it lead to any form of sublimation, creative renewal or jouissance. In fact, he dismisses 
the very notion of jouissance as naiveté.323 Instead, through the staging and abreaction of his 
suffering, Artaud can realize the full sensorial horror of his suffering and assert himself as a 
fully sensate, suffering being. By affirming his body as a suffering body, Artaud directly 
counters the loss of feeling and numbness caused by his schizophrenic condition.  
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For Artaud, the perpetual laceration generated by the plague is favoured as an 
example of authentic existence and fully embodied presence. Through the theatre of 
cruelty, Artaud aimed for a recuperation of what he terms a metaphysical sensation 
constituted by full presence, authenticity, identity, embodiment and essence.324 For Artaud, 
this metaphysical sensation can only be accessed through the embodied experience of the 
perpetual laceration and crisis signified by the plague. As such, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty 
provides a methodology through which both the performer and audience might acquire the 
full metaphysical sensation that Artaud desires and lacks. The audience was to be shocked 
into sharing this embodied feeling through the manifestation of the plague on stage. 
Consequently, the effects of the plague should be directly transferrable to the audience, 
arousing corresponding feelings of fear, delirium and intoxication. As a result the audience 
will be awakened to what Artuad describes as the dark horrors of real being—a painful, yet 
fully conscious awareness of selfhood as suffering.325 	  
During a performance soirée titled ‘Tête-à-tête par Antonin Artaud,’ held at the 
Théâtre du Vieux-Colombier in Paris in January 1947, Artaud performed a number of his 
poems including The Return of Artaud the Mômo (1947).326 Artaud’s performance of The 
Return of Artaud the Mômo epitomises the theatrical manifestation of the plague. It is also 
exemplary of the scream of suffering because of the way in which Artaud uses text, voice 
and body in order to unleash madness and embody a state of constant laceration. Of 
particular import is the fact that The Return of Artaud the Mômo was the first work Artaud 
presented after his long incarceration in asylums, and thus particularly corresponds to the 
condition of the scream of suffering as an expression of agony that has been silenced and 
repressed. In The Return of Artaud the Mômo Artaud ironically assumes the alter ego of 
Artaud the Mômo or madman—thus consciously inhabiting the role of madness that he is 
publically accused of. From Artaud’s point of view, it is due to the false medical and public 
perception of his madness that he has been unfairly ostracised and incarcerated for nearly 
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nine years in asylums.327 Mômo is an alterego who exhibits the delirium and frenzy of the 
plague, and engages in a histrionic and hysterical diatribe against God, his parents, 
‘respectable’ society, the medical profession, and the electroshock therapy he endured at 
the Rodez asylum.328 Moreover, the Mômo allows Artaud to voice and expose the suffering 
he experienced during his treatment, which was disavowed by his doctors.329 In the role of 
Artaud the Mômo, Artaud affirms the genuine suffering and authenticity of his condition, 
by acting out his own symptoms. 330  For example, Artaud communicates through 
nonsensical forms of speech such as glossolalia and other non-linguistic primal 
vocalizations.331According to those in the audience, Artaud’s performance of this poem 
alternated between declamatory speech and ‘trembling, screaming, humming, singing, 
chanting.’332 
The following excerpt from The Return of Artaud the Mômo illustrates the way in 
which Artaud assumes the persona of Artaud the Mômo in order to stage the horror and 
suffering inherent to his schizophrenic condition:  
 
But what then in the end, you, the madman ? 
 
Me ? 
This tongue between four gums, 
this meat between two knees, 
this piece of hole 
for madmen.333 
 
Artaud addresses himself accusingly as ‘the madman,’ and replies as Artaud the madman, a 
process that underscores the entire poem. Artaud’s self-accusations of madness, followed 
by the brutal disclosure of his madness, is a rhetorical form of self-interrogation which 
exposes the pain and horror of his condition, whilst at the same time asserting his identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
327 Antonin Artaud, Le Retour d’Artaud Le Mômo in Watchfiends & Rack Screams, ed. Eshleman, 93-109; Antonin 
Artaud, letter to Jacques Latrémolière March 25 1943, in Antonin Artaud Selected Writings, 423. 
328 Artaud, Le Retour d’Artaud Le Mômo, 93-109; Allen S. Weiss, Perverse Desire and the Ambiguous Icon, (Albany: 
State University of New York, 1994), 45. 
329 For example, Artaud’s repeated pleas for electroshock therapy to stop were not heeded, see Antonin 
Artaud letter to Jacques Latrémolière January 6 1945 in Antonin Artaud Selected Writings, 437.  
330 Chiesa, “Lacan with Artaud: j’ouïs-sens, jouis-sens, jouis-sans,” 341-342; Antonin Artaud, Van Gogh, the 
man suicided by society, in Antonin Artaud Selected Writings, 485, 487, 492-3. 
331 Artaud, Artaud Le Mômo, Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 88-89, 193. 
332 Susan Sontag and Don Eric Levine, notes to Antonin Artaud Selected Writings, 654. 
333 Artaud, Le Retour d’Artaud Le Mômo, 95-97. 
	   82	  
as the madman. The horror revealed in this excerpt is Artaud’s depiction of himself as an 
obscene rupture or hole equivalent to dismembered and lacerated genitalia: ‘this meat 
between two knees, /this piece of hole for madmen.’ This imagery of a dismembered body 
consisting of obscene orifices is a manifestation of the gruesome effects of the plague’s 
laceration on the body. It is also an image of the obscene ravaging of his body that Artaud 
experiences as a result of his schizophrenic condition.334 Artaud’s self-identification as this 
particularly obscene, punctured and penetrated body is emphasised throughout the poem. 
 
The self-perpetuation of suffering through self-punishment  
 For the traumatised individual, the communication of suffering involves self-
punishment in conjunction with the performance of madness. The body is harmed and/or 
mutilated so that an extreme pain that has been internalised and repressed can be re-
experienced and exposed through the external reality of physical suffering. The scream of 
suffering is therefore literally inscribed onto the body. A corresponding process occurs in 
the theatrical works of Strindberg and Artaud, for whom self-punishment serves to 
externalise endogenous suffering. Although neither Strindberg nor Artaud enact actual 
physical self-mutilation on stage, they do, albeit in contrasting ways, perform symbolic and 
psychological mutilation. Strindberg stages a sublimated form of self-punishment upon a 
variety of ciphers and alter egos; whereas in the case of Artaud, self-punishment is enacted 
directly on his own person. Within the emotional state of the scream of suffering, guilt is 
an additional trigger for actions of self-punishment and self-harm. Moreover, retributive 
rage at the perpetrator of the trauma is repressed and imposed on the self. As such, the 
scream of suffering has a strong correlation with the condition of the shameful scream in 
which self-inflicted rage is used to purge shame from within the self. However, the scream 
of suffering is distinct because self-punishment is not performed in order to purge shame, 
rather it is an attempt to communicate and prolong the condition of suffering itself. For 
Strindberg this is a process of penitence and repentance whereas for Artaud it is an 
extended performance of martyrdom.  
Strindberg’s staging of self-punishment shares some similarities with that of 
Rousseau or Augustine. However, what distinguishes Strindberg’s guilt and self-
punishment is that Strindberg does not express feelings of profound shame and self-
disgust. Rather than exposing himself as inherently reprehensible, Strindberg expresses 
guilt over what he regards as his previous sins and wrongdoings but believes that suffering 	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and punishment are a necessary part of life, through which the individual must pass to 
achieve redemption and atonement.335 Strindberg’s views on guilt, self-punishment and 
redemption were crystallised through his study of the pseudo-mystic philosophy of 
Swedenborg. Strindberg was particularly influenced by Swedenborg’s concept that hell is 
experienced during earthly life, and is a state that must be undergone in order to achieve 
redemption.336 Swedenborg claims that disciplinary spirits, acting on behalf of a divine 
being, punish and torment individuals so that they can atone for their sins and 
consequently achieve spiritual salvation.337 Following these ideas, Strindberg concludes that 
his hallucinatory visions and torments represent God’s punishment, and that he must 
accept his suffering as penitence.338 He likens himself to the biblical figures of Job and 
Jeremiah, believing that God has singled him out for a special trial as an ‘example of a 
righteous man enduring unjust sufferings.’ 339  Overall, the influence of Swedenborg 
precipitates a process of conversion for Strindberg, who abandons his previous atheism 
and converts to a personal, syncretic version of spirituality, which serves to ameliorate his 
experiences of psychological tumult.340  
These ideas are dramatised in To Damascus, Part I, particularly through the 
characterisation of the central protagonist, The Stranger, who is an avatar for Strindberg 
himself. 341 The Stranger undergoes a painful journey of spiritual conversion that not only 
corresponds to Strindberg’s own experiences during his Inferno crisis, but also reflects his 
spiritual beliefs. Self-punishment in To Damascus is affirmed for its value within Strindberg’s 
spiritual framework, through the reference to a number of biblical and heroic figures such 
as Christ, Job, Jeremiah and Hercules. 342  The title, To Damascus refers to the New 
Testament figure Saul of Tarsus’ journey to Damascus, during which he had a vision of 
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Christ and converted to Christianity.343 This creates an allegorical backdrop according to 
which the suffering and punishment of the Stranger is celebrated as parallel to the necessity 
of suffering as a rite of passage within mythological and biblical narratives.344 In To 
Damascus, Strindberg enacts an extended form of self-punishment and symbolic mutilation 
by subjecting The Stranger to a series of torments, humiliations and punishments that echo 
those endured during his Inferno crisis. Through the trials of The Stranger, Strindberg 
exposes his own guilt and seeks atonement. For example, he enacts a process of self-
accusation through the denunciation of The Stranger as a writer of irresponsible books and 
plays, a madman who is pursued by ‘unknown powers’, and a man who deserted his wife 
and child. During his Inferno crisis Strindberg felt misunderstood and vilified for his 
writings, experienced significant remorse over his role in the failure of his marriage to Frida 
Uhl, and due to his hallucinatory experiences, was terrified of the real possibility of 
madness.345  
Strindberg’s theatrical self-punishment is most explicitly performed in the central 
scene in the play, titled The asylum. This scene functions as a courtroom trial scenario: The 
Stranger, who finds himself in what appears to be a lunatic asylum after an episode of 
delirium, is accused of madness and sin by a crowd of uncanny characters. Furthermore, a 
character named The Confessor curses him with a reading from Deuteronomy.346 Overall, 
however, Strindberg’s process of self-punishment is not straightforward. As Diane Filby 
Gillepsie observes, The Stranger ‘vacillates between self-condemnation and self-
justification.’347 The Stranger’s episodes of self-excoriation, in which he confesses to guilt 
and expresses his desire for suffering and further punishment, are tempered with 
statements in which he excuses his behavior, for example by claiming that he is cursed and 
has been unjustifiably punished since his childhood.348 
It is important to note that in To Damascus, the minor characters who accuse and 
punish the Stranger are not individualistic characters in the traditional theatrical sense, but 
represent different aspects of The Stranger, and by extension Strindberg himself. 349 
Moreover the punishments and sufferings endured by the other characters represent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Diane Filby Gillespie, “Strindberg’s To Damascus: Archetypal Autobiography,” Modern Drama 26 (Fall 
1983): 299-300.   
344 Gillespie, “Strindberg’s To Damascus: Archetypal Autobiography,”297-298; Carlson, Strindberg and the 
Poetry of Myth, 93-94. 
345 Strindberg, The Inferno, 8,10,12, 161, Sue Prideaux, Out of Inferno. 
346 August Strindberg, To Damascus, in August Strindberg, The Plays, vol. 2, trans. and with an introduction 
Michael Meyer, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975), 82- 85. 
347 Gillespie, “Strindberg’s To Damascus: Archetypal Autobiography,” 297. 
348 Strindberg, To Damascus, 57,101. 
349 Innes, Avant Garde Theatre, 29. 
	   85	  
different facets of Strindberg’s own suffering.350  Eszter Szalczer has demonstrated that 
attributes of The Stranger are split amongst the more minor characters, a process that is 
evident on stage through the way in which The Stranger recognises aspects of himself 
reflected back from the other characters.351 For example, characters such as The Beggar 
and The Madman torment The Stranger, but at the same time The Stranger is disturbed 
and aware of the uncanny resemblance they have to himself.352 It is also pertinent to note 
that during his Inferno crisis, Strindberg identified himself as an outcast, a beggar and a 
madman. 353  Accordingly, Szalczer argues that To Damascus can be understood as a 
monodrama ‘since the diverse characters seem to embody fragments of a single 
subjectivity: that of the dreamer, the author or the central character.’354 Szalczer’s point is 
important because it elucidates how Strindberg’s presentation of an ensemble of seemingly 
diverse characters who accuse, punish and torment The Stranger is actually an extended 
form of self-punishment. This offers an important insight into the scream of suffering as a 
form of self-punishment that is enacted via multiple personae. For example, I undertake a 
corresponding process in my video-performance works by inhabiting a range of alteregos 
who represent fragmented aspects of my own psyche and enact various forms of self-
punishment. 
In Artaud’s theatrical works and writings, the staging of self-punishment is not 
divided across a number of different characters, but is instead enacted primarily through 
Artaud’s performance as a martyr. Artaud’s martyrdom has a strong correspondence to 
Strindberg’s presentation of himself as a martyr in To Damascus, however in the case of 
Artaud, the martyrdom he performs is violent, visceral and obscene. Like Strindberg, 
Artaud’s self-identification as a martyr is influenced by religious and spiritual practices that 
he explores in an attempt to comprehend his extreme suffering. Artaud engages with 
Gnosticism, Buddhism, the spiritual practices of the Tarahumara Mexican tribe and also 
develops a fervent identification with Christ.355 However, unlike Strindberg, whose Inferno 
crisis results in a conversion to a belief in a divine being, for Artaud, his most severe crisis, 
experienced during his electroshock treatment at Rodez leads to a furious rejection and 
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denunciation of God, Christ and organised religion.356 During this time Artaud develops 
what has been described by France-based literary theorist Adrian Morfee as ‘a rapidly 
mutating, fantastical theoretical framework’ to account for his suffering.357 Artaud blames 
his suffering on a host of parasitic and destructive entities that penetrate his body and 
mind; demon spirits that cannibalize and possess him, corrupt society, his parents, language 
and its structures, the affects of electroshock and ultimately God.358 Paradoxically, despite 
his eventual rejection of Christianity, Artaud strongly identifies with a Christ-like persona 
who undergoes ineffable suffering that is equivalent to Christ’s Passion. In a number of 
poems and writings such as Ci-Gît and Interjections he describes himself as crucified and 
speaks of ‘the crucifying of Artaud on Golgotha.’ 359  Referring to his Electroshock 
treatment, Artaud describes the doctor who administered his treatment as ‘Judas Iscariot 
himself in the olive grove.’360 In The Return of Artaud the Mômo, Artaud claims to have died 
during his electroshock therapy. He announces that ‘the old Artaud is buried’ and 
‘assassinated in the other life’ and that he has returned reincarnated as Artaud the Mômo.361  
Artaud’s anger at his suffering reaches its height after his release from the Rodez 
asylum; the writings, drawings and theatrical performances he created during this time 
represent an unleashing of his raging frenzy against the entities that had tortured him 
during his incarceration.362 In his theatrical performances, Artaud takes on the role of a 
martyr whose raging frenzy precipitates his own Christ-like self-sacrifice and self-
punishment. Artaud effectively stages his own Passion.363 A new insight into the scream of 
suffering can be drawn from Artaud’s appropriation of Christ’s Passion and sacrifice. 
Artaud exemplifies the way in which the performance of self-punishment often 
incorporates a desire to present a spectacle of suffering with equivalent spiritual resonance, 
horror and power as that of a martyr on a sacrificial pyre. This is a form of self-immolation 
in which, in the words of Artaud, individuals are ‘like victims burnt at the stake, signalling 
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through the flames.’364 However, in contrast to the Passion of Christ, the passion of Artaud 
involves extreme obscenity, particularly of a sexual and excremental nature.  
Artaud stages martyrdom and self-punishment in two major ways: firstly through 
engaging in self-vilification, and secondly though the violent projection of his voice. 
Artaud’s self-vilification involves the punitive disclosure of obscene and humiliating 
physical details, in particular exposing his anogenital region as a site of revulsion, filth and 
impotence. Artaud’s explosive outbursts of obscenity relate to the obscene scream, but in 
the case of Artaud, obscenity is more clearly staged as a form of self-punishment that 
involves the severe castigation of his own body. This is particularly evident in The Return of 
Artaud the Mômo. Throughout this work Artaud refers viciously to his balls, his sperm, his 
‘cunt hole,’ ‘that bone/located between anus and sex,’ and reveals that his adversaries ‘suck 
on his clenched ass,/and that Artaud’s ass is good/for pimps in Miserere.’365  The following 
excerpt epitomises the obscene form of martyrdom that is staged in this work:  
 
raped, clipped, completely sucked off 
by all the insolent riff-raff 
of all the turd-buggered 
who had no other grub  
in order to live 
than to gobble 
Artaud 
mômo 
there, where one can fuck sooner 
than me 
and the other get hard higher  
than me366 
 
Here, Artaud re-enacts what he believes to be the obscene penetration, cannibalisation and 
abuse he suffers at the hands of his enemies. What is particularly germane to the scream of 
suffering in this excerpt is that the rage he feels over his maltreatment emerges as a savage 
form of self-emasculation. Artaud reduces himself to a passive Mômo; a martyr figure who 
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is not glorious or ecstatic in his suffering, but is instead ‘raped, clipped, completely sucked 
off’, dispossessed, mad and stripped of volition and potency.  
Nevertheless, in the performance of works such as The Return of Artaud the Mômo, 
Artaud’s voice is not that of a passive victim; it is instead an embodiment of a furious 
energy. Artaud’s actual vocal performance is preserved in the radiophonic recording of To 
Have Done with the Judgement of God.367 In this radio play, Artaud’s rage against God and what 
he views a God’s parasitic domination is expressed through a symbolic process of self-
flagellation in which his voice is literally hurled and thrown in an attempt to purge himself 
of God.368 Artaud’s raving, declamatory style makes violent use of his vocal tract and throat 
from which sounds are produced in a guttural, percussive, and bestial manner. The 
straining of his vocal chords and the exertion of his lungs, throat and breath is evident in 
the recording. Artaud’s vocal production is erratic; he pushes his voice to the extremes of 
his pitch range and alternates between speech, screams, song, sprechstimme, glossolalia, 
shrieking, and spitting out words. At times his voice is redolent of fanatical religious 
preaching, and at other times of a child or a madman or madwoman. The polyphony of 
voices evokes a multiple or split self through which he enacts further self-punishment: for 
example he variously emasculates himself with a high pitched shrieking falsetto,  and 
infantilizes himself with the voice of an infant.369 Artaud also makes farting and roaring 
sounds and lets out a particularly piercing, high-pitched scream around fifteen minutes into 
the recording. Altogether, these vocal techniques comprise a histrionic and theatrical 
staging of self-directed rage. 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Artaud’s post-Rodez drawings 
assists in further understanding the way in which Artaud performs self-punishment and 
martyrdom through the very action of his speech. Derrida’s argument provides the 
important insight that the scream of suffering is a form of expression that is inherently self-
destructive through its own furious articulation. Derrida draws attention to the way in 
which Artaud attacks the surface (or using Artaud’s terminology, the subjectile) of the paper. 
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According to Derrida, this attacking style of mark making embodies Artaud’s 
schizophrenic condition and rage—a process Derrida terms ‘maddening the subjectile.’370 
Derrida uses the word jeteé to describe the way in which Artaud ‘hurls’ or ‘throws’ himself 
on the paper.371 He explains that Artaud’s mark making represents an externalised form of 
self-mutilation and self-destruction that seeks to overcome the resistance of the paper 
itself. Accordingly, Artaud’s rage is inscribed onto and into the paper.372 The violent jeteé 
evident in Artaud’s post-Rodez drawings is equivalent to what occurs during his recitation 
of To Have Done with the Judgement of God where his voice is hurled against itself, in a vocal 
embodiment of rage that seeks the destruction of speech, voice and body.373 
Artaud’s rage also seeks the destruction of language itself, which he rejects as a 
manifestation of God’s domination. This is evident particularly through Artaud’s use of 
passages of glossolalia instead of French. In To Have Done with the Judgement of God Artaud’s 
glossolalia not only embodies madness, as previously discussed, but also embodies a state 
of destructive spiritual frenzy and ecstasy that supports Artaud’s adoption of the role of 
martyr. Allen S. Weiss has noted that Artaud’s use of glossolalia is redolent of the gnostic 
practice of speaking in tongues and argues that in To Have Done with the Judgement of God 
glossolalia is used in its religious and mystical sense as a ‘mode of exorcism’ whereby 
Artaud aims to purge himself not of sin, but of God.374 Indeed, the virulent way glossolalia 
is spat out by Artaud is expressive of a compulsive need for purgation. This point is 
important for elucidating Artaud’s scream of suffering as a performance of a violent 
exorcism enacted upon himself. In To have done with the Judgement of God, Artaud’s self-
punishment also entails a desire to violently detach himself from his physical body. For 
Artaud, the very experience of having a body equates to suffering, hence he rejects and 
rages against his body as a source of what he describes as ‘menacing, never tiring’ pain.375 
From Artaud’s perspective, it is God’s influence and dominion, manifested within the 
internal structure of his body’s organs that is the ultimate cause of this pain. To have done 
with the Judgement of God expresses Artaud’s rage that he is contaminated by God’s presence 
which has infected his voice and body, and from which he desires to be completely free. In 
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order to be completely rid of God’s contamination, he must rid himself of his own body.376 
Artaud’s attempt to exorcise his own physical body exemplifies the scream of suffering as a 
condition in which self-directed punishment and harm is ultimately an attempt to expunge 
all aspects of the psyche and/or body that are in pain, and thus represent the traumatic 
effects of abuse. 
The scream of suffering is both a cry of suffering, and the performative 
embodiment of suffering itself. The comparative study of a selection of theatrical works by 
Strindberg and Artaud undertaken in this chapter has demonstrated that the expression of 
suffering in performance is achieved primarily through the staging of self-punishment and 
madness, in particular the condition of schizophrenia. One of the most significant 
outcomes of this study is the insight that both dramatists require the adoption of masks or 
alter egos in order to express their suffering. While Strindberg’s use of masks and ciphers 
as conduits for his suffering is more overt, Artaud inhabits the personae of a madman and 
martyr in order to do this. Moreover, a strong correlation between madness and 
martyrdom is revealed in the works of both dramatists, which reveals a new perspective on 
the scream of suffering as a condition that is performed primarily through an oscillation 
between these two archetypes.  
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Chapter Five: The scream of silence 
 
From Adorno’s writings after Auschwitz through to contemporary trauma theory, the 
aesthetic representation of trauma is often associated with silence.377 Although this chapter 
acknowledges and draws from these ideas, its focus is on an embodied state of profound 
psychological silence that occurs as a consequence of trauma. In this condition, the subject 
is stripped of their humanity and agency. The scream of silence is elucidated through a 
discussion of Adorno’s commentary on silence in the post-Holocaust, hermetic poetry of 
Paul Celan. Adorno’s notion that Celan’s poems ‘reconstruct… the trajectory from horror 
to silence’ and ‘want to speak of the most extreme horror through silence’ is used as the 
starting point for this enquiry.378 Celan’s poetry evokes a metaphysical silence beyond 
death, a kind of loss of being. A similar state of un-being is demonstrated in the 
contemporary paradigm of the post-traumatic subject: a zombie-like figure of silence and 
stasis. The dehumanised post-traumatic subject has its visual counterparts in Edvard 
Munch’s Scream and Francis Bacon’s Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X. A 
comparison of these paintings reveals that each artist, albeit in contrasting ways, portrays a 
subject who embodies the symptoms of the scream of silence.  
 
The trajectory from horror to silence 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno argues that Celan’s hermetic poems ‘reconstruct’ what 
he describes as ‘the trajectory from horror to silence.’ 379 For Adorno, poems such as 
Engführung (1958) speak of horror through silence due to their symbolist, obscure and 
cryptic hermetic elements, and purposefully elliptical language.380 The opening lines of 
Engführung typify Celan’s use of language: ‘Driven into the/ terrain/ with the infallible 
trace: / Grass, written asunder. The stones, white, / with the shadows of grassblades.’381 
According to Adorno, Celan’s non-representational, and non-expressive use of language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 De Capra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 65; 
Cathy Caruth, “Introduction to Section II-Recapturing the Past” in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 152-153. 
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such as this mirrors the affective silence that occurs as a result of extreme horror and 
suffering: 
 
His poetry is permeated by the shame of art in the face of suffering that escapes 
both experience and sublimation. Celan’s poems want to speak of the most 
extreme horror through silence. Their truth content itself becomes negative. They 
imitate a language beneath the helpless language of human beings, indeed beneath 
all organic language: It is that of the dead speaking of stones and stars…The 
language of the lifeless becomes the last possible comfort for a death that is 
deprived of its meaning. The passage into the inorganic is to be followed not only 
in thematic motifs; rather, the trajectory from horror to silence is to be 
reconstructed in the hermetic works. Celan transposes into linguistic processes the 
increasing abstraction of landscape, progressively approximating it to the 
inorganic.382 
 
Although Adorno’s argument is specifically related to the ethical dilemma of art and poetry 
after the Holocaust, it nevertheless assists this argument by illuminating the movement 
from an experience of severe trauma and horror to a condition of silence, stasis or 
deathliness and loss of subjectivity. This movement from horror to silence occurs both 
psychologically, and also in the realm of linguistic and aesthetic expression. According to 
Adorno, Celan’s poems embody silence through the mimesis of the ‘language of the 
lifeless:’ the silence inherent what is inorganic, non-living and dead.383 As explained by 
American philosopher J.M. Bernstein, Celan’s ‘language of the lifeless’ operates on two 
levels: it is ‘thematic in the disintegration of organic nature into inorganic nature; formal in 
the disintegration of ‘organic” language, language infused with intended meaning into 
linguistic remnants- the latter accomplished through syntactic and semantic 
decomposition.’384 Celan’s silence thus takes on a poetic form that is not only evocative of 
the silent victims’ inability to speak due to its fractured sounds and imagery, but also 
renounces any artistic aspiration to meaning or sublimation by providing the reader with 
fragments and traces of suffering.385 The symbolism of the stones/inorganic nature also 
corresponds to the dehumanised nature of the scream of silence. 	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Adorno argues that to directly represent, to create aesthetically beautiful artworks 
about, and/or to ascribe meaning to the Holocaust is obscene—claiming that ‘poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric’386 and that the ‘name of the catastrophe is to be spoken only in 
silence.’ 387 For Adorno, it is not the case that no art or poetry, or expression is possible 
after Auschwitz, but rather that it cannot exist as it did prior to Auschwitz, and its very 
existence is called into question. 388  Any art that transforms suffering into beauty or 
meaning would create pleasure in the viewer, and thus be a further violation of the 
victim.389 Moreover, because art and language is not autonomous from the very culture that 
produced such horror and oppression, it is in danger of becoming complicit in, or 
perpetuating this very process. 390  However, at the same time, Adorno asserts the 
importance of remembering the victims and survivors: ‘extreme suffering tolerates no 
forgetting. This suffering demands the continued existence of the very art it forbids. It 
scarcely finds a voice anywhere else.’ 391  For Adorno, poetry such as Celan’s can 
appropriately deal with these events because instead of speaking directly of the horror, it 
expresses the very inability to speak of such horror. Following Adorno, French 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard encapsulates this point in his discussion on art after 
Auschwitz. Lyotard states that such art ‘does not say the unsayable, but says it cannot say 
it.’392 This theme is pertinent to many of my performance-video works in which my mouth 
is symbolically gagged and I act out scenarios which draw attention to my inability to speak.  
In the case of the traumatised subject, a ‘trajectory from horror to silence,’ is 
experienced in the aftermath of the traumatic event(s). Furthermore, there is an even more 
immediate silencing that occurs during a traumatic event itself. In parallel with Celan’s 
poetic silence, the scream of silence says that ‘it cannot say,’ and draws attention to the 	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unspeakable through an embodiment of silence, inaction and disengagement. However, the 
scream of silence differs from what is described by Adorno because in Celan’s case, the 
poet has incorporated the horror of the Holocaust into himself and his writing, whereas in 
the case of the scream of silence, silence is also caused by the subject’s personal shame, and 
self-disgust in relation to traumatic events, and their strong fear of retribution if they speak 
out. 
 
Silence and the post-traumatic subject 
The scream of silence also involves the self-denial of the psyche’s drive for life. 
This particular condition is a state beyond major depression, and as such, has a strong 
correspondence to the recent paradigm of the post-traumatic subject. Post-traumatic 
subjects, described by French philosopher Catherine Malabou as the ‘new wounded,’ are 
emblematic of the silent mode of the scream. In The New Wounded: From Neurosis to Brain 
Damage, Malabou argues that psychoanalysis does not properly account for a range of 
‘psychic wounds’ that have only more recently begun to be understood by psychology, 
psychiatry and neurology: for example individuals suffering from PTSD and other trauma 
disorders, victims of natural disasters, and those with brain diseases such as Alzheimer’s.393 
According to Freud and Lacan, external traumas and shocks activate the subject’s latent, 
endogenous sexual disturbances. It is the awakening of what is already latent in the subject 
that causes the subject’s suffering.394 However Malabou shows that the suffering of the 
post-traumatic subject is not attributable to any pre-existing psychic disposition. 395 
Following Malabou, Žižek likewise notes that a psychoanalytical approach can even be 
considered perverse in the face of events such as the holocaust: 396  
 
It would obviously be obscene to link, say, the psychic devastation of a 
“Muselmann” in a Nazi camp to his masochistic tendencies, death drive or guilt 
feelings. He (like the victim of multiple rape, torture and so on) is not devastated by 
unconscious anxieties, but by a “meaningless” external shock which can in no way 
be hermeneutically appropriated or integrated…397 	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For Malabou, the way in which these traumatic experiences elude hermeneutic and 
psychoanalytical explanation, as well as meaning, necessitates a new approach to trauma 
that recognises that trauma of all kinds – endogenous, exogenous, psychological etc. – 
causes radical and destructive changes to the brain and ‘impacts neuronal organisation, 
particularly the sites of emotional inductors.’398 Malabou observes ‘striking resemblances’ 
between the state of profound disengagement and loss of humanity demonstrated by 
victims of interpersonal violence, war trauma victims, victims of disasters and accidents, 
and those suffering from brain lesions, brain diseases and disorders such as autism.399 In all 
cases, while the causes may differ a similar effect of complete psychic devastation or severe 
damage to the psyche is the outcome.400 Of particular significance to this investigation is 
that the damages caused by both psychic and physical traumas lead to a mode of existence 
equivalent to the scream of silence: Malabou describes a destructive metamorphosis of the 
self that leads to a living-dead state characterised by indifference, disaffection, 
dehumanisation, and a lack of drive—symptoms which correspond to the silent mode of 
the scream.401  
For Žižek, the dehumanisation of the post-traumatic subject is epitomised in the 
figure of the Muselmann.402 Italian Holocaust survivor and writer Primo Levi describes the 
Muselmann as existing in zombie-like state beyond any comprehensible pain and horror: as 
‘drowned,’ ‘non-men’ who have lost their human subjectivity.403 Žižek argues that a similar 
state of living-death is shared by victims of both ‘exogenous violence-related trauma’, and 
the ‘endogenous trauma’ of the ‘autistic and disengaged subject’.404 Žižek notes that the 
effect of these kinds of traumas is not something that can be either repressed, or recovered 
from, but leads to a situation in which the individual becomes a ‘persistently traumatised 
subject,’ who is ‘irrevocably changed.’ 405  This kind of victim, whose subjectivity is 
completely shattered, is left in a zombie-like state and ‘survives its own death, the death (or 
erasure) of its symbolic identity.’406 What is particularly significant to this investigation is 
that the irrevocable change Žižek identifies involves a kind of silencing (described by Žižek 	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as ‘death’) of the subject’s psyche and individual volition, and its replacement with an 
absence:  
 
In the new form of subjectivity (autistic, indifferent, deprived of affective 
engagement), the old personality is not “sublated” or replaced by a compensatory 
formation, but thoroughly destroyed- destruction itself acquires a form, becomes a 
(relatively stable) “form of life”- what we have is not simply the absence of form, 
but the form of (the) absence (of the erasure of the previous personality). More 
precisely, the new form is less a form of life than a form of death- not an expression 
of the Freudian death drive, but, more directly, the death of the drive.407 
 
Žižek argues that this erasure of the contents of self and identity does not result in 
nothingness; rather, destruction reveals ‘the pure form of subjectivity, a form which must 
have already been there.’ For the purposes of this investigation, this ‘death of the drive’ 
elucidates the scream of silence as a catastrophic silencing of the subject- a reduction of life 
to a state of silent, un-dead being. However, for Žižek, this ‘pure form of subjectivity’ has 
further philosophical implications for the Cartesian subject. According to Žižek, the post-
traumatic subject represents the cogito at its ‘degree zero’—a form of existence which he 
likens to that of ‘an autistic “monster.”’408 While the silent form of the scream relates 
strongly to Žižek’s ‘degree zero’ of subjectivity—in that it also involves a suppression of 
the subjective ‘I’ and personal volition—it differs somewhat because an awareness of pain 
still exists despite psychic devastation. Moreover, in the case of the scream of silence, 
silence is maintained as a covert embodiment of pain. This silent holding of pain is an 
attempt to resist the total numbness and psychic annihilation that accompanies severe 
trauma. 
 In contrast to Žižek who relates the post-traumatic subject to Descartes, Malabou 
offers an alternative version of this post-traumatised subject, which acknowledges the 
possibility of a communication of pain, paradoxically through the very destruction and 
silencing of the subject. Malabou writes in relation to neurological studies on the plasticity 
of the brain, and argues that although the brain is susceptible to destructive forces of 
trauma which can devastate, maim and annihilate, this devastation involves the creation of 
a new form which may be capable of communicating suffering:  	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We have to think of a form created by destruction, the form of a new person, 
which is not the transcendental subject, but what undermines it, as the threat of its 
explosion. The plasticity of contingency has the power to bestow its own form on 
the subjects that it shocks. A subject that burns, and which urges us to see, at long 
last, that it is really burning.409 
 
Significant to the scream of silence here, is that this new ‘form created by destruction,’ this 
‘subject that burns,’ expresses profound pain through its very destruction and subsequent 
re-formation as a subject of silence and stasis.410 Moreover, Malabou’s notion of the 
creation of a new subject capable of expressing and communicating suffering following 
catastrophic destruction is incipient in the writings of Nietzsche and Artaud respectively 
(as discussed in chapters three and four of this thesis). A further point to be mentioned 
here in regard to Malabou’s argument is that if the brain and psyche is plastic, and can be 
destroyed and re-formed, there might also be the possibility of a movement in the other 
direction: from a state of silence and devastation, to a state of functionality and 
recuperation. This suggests the potential for survival and recuperation of victims of 
psychological traumas. Rather then the ‘trajectory from horror to silence,’ being the 
endpoint of a traumatised subject, there might be the possibility of a trajectory not just 
from horror to silence, but from horror, through silence, to re-construction and re-
formation. 411 
 
Silence and the painted screams of Munch and Bacon 
In the realm of visual art, the scream of silence is epitomised in Edvard Munch’s 
Scream c.1893, and Francis Bacon’s Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1953. 
The general consensus among theorists and art historians is that both paintings represent 
silent, muted screams. This is not because painting is in itself silent, but because these 
paintings are considered to be visually representative of psychological states in which the 
scream is inaudible.412 However, each painting has more specific correspondences to the 	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particular emotional condition discussed in this chapter. What is particularly germane to 
the scream of silence is that both paintings evoke an emotional state of profound and 
unspeakable psychic horror, yet remain silent about the cause or meaning of this horror, 
which remains unrepresentable. Moreover, both Munch and Bacon alike depict screaming 
subjects who do not seem fully human: these de-humanised figures are representative of 
the zombie-like nature of the post-traumatic subject. 
In Bacon’s Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, a spectral pope is seated 
rigidly on a chair with his jaw wide open emitting a powerful, yet silent scream. Deleuze’s 
analysis of Bacon’s series screaming pope paintings in Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 
offers further insights into the silence of the traumatised subject and their inability to name 
or represent the horror. For Deleuze, the effective communication of horror is 
strengthened through the artist’s refusal to name or depict horror. Bacon’s paintings 
successfully convey the emotional state of horror due to the very fact of their silence on 
the source of that horror. Deleuze argues that Bacon paints the ‘scream more than the 
horror,’ or, in other words, that Bacon depicts the violent emotional sensation of horror, 
but not the violence that causes the scream. 413 According to Deleuze, any attempt to 
portray the horror will fail and cancel out the emotional and sensory power of the image. 
Horrific events cannot be described, but may be evoked through the visual representation 
of the subject’s sensation of horror. Moreover, for Deleuze, ‘the horror is multiplied 
because it is inferred from the scream, and not the reverse.’414 Deleuze’s point here to a 
certain extent corresponds to Adorno’s proscription of the direct representation of horrific 
events, however Deleuze is more concerned with the affective power of the work, rather 
than its ethical dimension. For Deleuze, as soon as a narrative, or cause of the scream is 
made known to the viewer, the intensity and horror of the scream subsides.415 Bacon’s 
screaming pope paintings reveal the way in which a portrayal of the ‘violence of sensation’ 
has a far more powerful affect on the viewer than the ‘representation of violence.’416 
Drawing from Deleuze’s argument, the insight here in terms of the scream of silence is that 
works of art that silently embody the psychological sensation of horror, have an enhanced 
capacity to reveal and demonstrate the destructive and violent effects of that horror on the 
individual. As Deleuze notes, Bacon’s embodiment of the ‘violence of sensation’ reveals 	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the cruel and destructive forces of horror on the body and psyche.417  
Bacon’s screaming pope also pertains to the scream of silence in another way. For 
the traumatised subject, the concealment of suffering and horror through social isolation 
and the literal refusal to allow oneself to be visible is a further strategy of self-silencing. In 
Bacon’s Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, the pope screams silently behind a 
curtain, which is suggestive of a private, hidden space, and forms a barrier between the 
pope’s pain and horror and the external world. Deleuze however, interprets this curtain in 
a different way, which provides a new perspective on this condition of silence. For 
Deleuze, the curtain represents not only the pope’s refusal to let himself be seen, but also 
his inability to see. Deleuze demonstrates that the causes of the horror are not only 
unspeakable, but are also invisible. For Deleuze, the traumatic and violent events that cause 
a scream lie beyond sense and cognition, and are in themselves invisible to the subject: ‘If 
we scream, it is always as victims of invisible and insensible forces that scramble every 
spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling.’418 This is why, for Deleuze, the 
horrific events that cause Bacon’s pope to scream remain invisible to the viewer. For the 
purposes of this argument, the invisibility of horror in Bacon’s painting is equivalent to a 
verbal silence about horror. Deleuze argues that the pope ‘screams behind the curtain not 
only as someone who can no longer be seen, but as someone who cannot see, who has 
nothing left to see, whose only remaining function is to render visible these invisible forces 
that are making him scream, these powers of the future.’419 What Deleuze suggests here is 
that unlike blindness, this is an inability and unwillingness to see caused by fear and horror. 
The sensation of overwhelming horror that precludes sight is germane to the scream of 
silence. However, for Deleuze, the invisible horror that causes a scream is not so much 
related to overwhelming past or present traumatic events that cannot be cognitively 
processed, visualised or represented, but to the unseen ‘powers’ that lie in the future. This 
type of fear or horror related to the unseen and unknown future is a kind of existential 
dread or angst.  Although this sensation of horror at the future differs from that of 
traumatised individual in the sense that it is not caused by specific event/series of events, it 
is relatable in its psychological content. This is because, in the condition of the scream of 
silence, horror is not only caused by prior experiences, but also by the individual’s fear that 
traumatic events could recur in the future.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, 45. Deleuze refers here to Artuad’s notion of cruelty 
and finds a parallel with Bacon’s focus on the violence of sensation in his paintings.  
418 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith, (London: Continuum 2003), 60. 
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In contrast to Bacon’s painting, in which the figure of the pope is static, in Munch’s 
Scream the unspeakable nature of horror, and the silence of the subject, is embodied 
through the figure’s convulsed and bent posture. As Žižek’s analysis of this painting 
demonstrates, it is the very repression of sound that generates the distortion of the figure. 
Žižek argues that the suppressed scream in Munch’s painting ‘finds an outlet…in the 
anamorphic distortion of the body in its unnatural serpentine windings…’420 Thus although 
Munch’s screaming figure is mute, its contorted body registers the explosive and 
overwhelming experience of horror and terror. This corresponds to the plight of the 
traumatised subject, whose silenced scream takes an embodied, physical form: frozen into 
distortion due to unbearable psychic tension and pain. Žižek provides a further insight into 
this condition of silence in Munch’s Scream, by demonstrating that the painting’s muted 
scream pertains to Lacan’s understanding of anxiety as something which cannot enter into 
subjectivity. Žižek establishes that the extreme anguish of the screaming figure in Munch’s 
painting, like Lacanian anxiety, is literally ‘stuck in the throat’ and cannot be embodied in 
sound.421 According to Žižek, this causes a situation of paralysis in which the voice cannot 
‘burst out and enter subjectivity.’422 The paralysis and failure of the voice of the anxious 
subject as elucidated by Žižek, strongly corresponds to the paralysis and gagging of the 
voice that is experienced by the traumatised subject.   
In a further parallel to the scream of silence, Munch’s and Bacon’s respective 
screaming figures have a strong resonance with the zombie-like qualities of the post-
traumatic subject. Munch’s Scream prefigures the destructive metamorphosis of the post-
traumatic subject discussed by Malabou, through its depiction of a figure that is atrophied 
and stripped of most identifiable human characteristics. Munch’s screaming figure is 
defaced and almost completely reduced to a formless mass. Moreover, the figure’s 
physiognomy is completely absent of any defining features – including any that signify 
gender – and is instead dominated by the gaping hole of the mouth and the sunken white 
circles place of eyes. The figure has no hair, lacks a proper nose, and has a strange and 
anatomically impossible skull structure that is appropriately described by Žižek as a  
‘desperate homunculus’ head.’423 Munch’s erasure of any identifiable subjectivity and the 
transformation of the figure into a strange uncanny amorphous shape suggests a 
catastrophic loss of identity, selfhood and humanity that is reminiscent of the figure of the 	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Muselmann, for example. In contrast to Munch’s fleshy, amorphous entity, Bacon’s 
screaming pope evokes a state of living death in a different way. Bacon’s pope is a spectral 
figure: transparent, ghostlike, skeletal and seemingly lacking of flesh and blood. Deleuze 
has described this aspect of the scream in Bacon’s work as demonstrating the way in which 
‘the entire body escapes the through the screaming mouth.’424 For Deleuze, the scream in 
Bacon’s work is like a portal for the subject to exit, leaving an empty shell where existence 
was. This is point is particularly apposite to the scream of silence, which is experienced as a 
devastating loss of subjectivity.  
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Chapter Six: A Woman’s Scream 
 
A woman’s scream is a woman’s revolt against her body, sexuality and expected feminine 
gender roles. It is a response to severe trauma occurring in interpersonal and domestic 
situations in which a woman and/or girl develops a fraught and violent attitude towards 
her female body. This condition is not simply a violent fury turned inward due to the 
suppression that may occur as a result of abuse. Instead, it is a very specific drive to 
annihilate and erase attributes that are representative of the female sex. Masochism is a 
prevalent theme throughout both Sylvia Plath and Elfriede Jelinek’s oeuvres respectively 
and has been discussed at length in the scholarship on these writers. However, the 
particular type of female self-harm and masochism that is portrayed at certain points in 
their works is beyond normative psychoanalytical, literary and popular understandings of 
masochism. In these moments each writer depicts a woman’s drive to destroy, negate, 
mutilate, and/or quash the signs and symptoms of their own female biology, femininity 
and sexuality. These actions/depictions exemplify the condition of the scream in relation to 
a woman’s suffering and experience of trauma. This condition is most evident in Plath’s 
autobiographical novel The Bell Jar (1963) and Jelinek’s novel The Piano Teacher (1983). 
Although other works by Plath, in particular the poems Daddy and Lady Lazarus (1965) 
resonate with the women’s scream and famously express rage and masochism, the 
particular condition focused on in this chapter is more clearly demonstrated in The Bell Jar. 
Similarly, Jelinek also deals with themes of masochism and violence in her other novels 
such as Lust (1989), and Greed (2000), but in the interests of clarity The Piano Teacher will be 
the focus of this chapter. Plath and Jelinek respectively provide further insights into a 
woman’s scream by showing that gender roles further the entrapment and suffering of the 
female subject in situations of familial trauma. Moreover they reveal these domestic and 
interpersonal situations as symptomatic of patriarchal, (potentially) fascist and capitalist 
power structures.  
 
Masochism and a woman’s scream  
It is necessary to give a brief overview of masochism in order to understand how a 
woman’s scream, as it is expressed in the works of Jelinek and Plath, is a particularly 
intense form of masochism that is related to—but also departs from—psychoanalytical 
understandings of masochism, in particular those established by Sigmund Freud. Freudian 
understandings of masochism, as well as psychoanalysis more broadly, permeate their texts. 
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In The Bell Jar this is done in earnest as Plath tries to make sense of her condition, while in 
the case of Jelinek her adoption of Freudian (and also Lacanian) ideas on masochism is 
satiric.425  
The concept of masochism was initially described as a sexual perversion by 
nineteenth century psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who named the condition after 
Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. Sacher-Masoch’s autobiographical novel Venus in Furs (1870) 
famously portrays the erotic pleasure the male protagonist derives from being dominated, 
whipped and humiliated by women.426 Krafft-Ebing conceived of masochism as a perverse 
sexual practice involving a male’s submission to a dominant, cruel female other who would 
inflict a predetermined series of actions: ‘receiving pain; relinquishing control through 
bondage, rules, commands or other means’ and ‘embarrassment or humiliation’ for sexual 
stimulation and pleasure.427 In regard to female masochism, Krafft-Ebing considered the 
desire for submission, self-denial of subjectivity and pain as natural in women, and a 
perversion in men (i.e. a male masochist is ‘feminine’ and not natural).428 After Krafft-
Ebing, Freud developed Krafft-Ebing’s theories further. Freud extended the understanding 
of masochism beyond the sexual, and defined three major categories of masochism: 
erotogenic, moral and feminine.429 Erotogenic masochism is the fundamental desire for 
‘pleasure in pain’, moral masochism ‘where the subject, as a result of unconscious guilt, 
seeks out the position of victim without any sexual pleasure being directly involved,’ and 
feminine masochism which ‘constitutes the masochistic perversion in men who fantasize 
being placed in a female situation’ such as ‘of being castrated, being copulated with, or 
giving birth...’430 All three of these Freudian categories of masochism are mined in The Bell 
Jar and The Piano Teacher respectively. 
From the late nineteenth century onwards, masochism was associated with 
femininity.431 Like Krafft-Ebing, Freud also linked masochism with femininity and females 
however he is careful to note the prevalence of masochism in males.432  	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The suppression of women’s aggressiveness which is prescribed for them 
constitutionally and imposed on them socially favours the development of 
powerful masochistic impulses, which succeed, as we know in binding erotically the 
destructive trends that have been diverted inwards. Thus masochism, as people say, 
is truly feminine. But if, as happens so often, you meet with masochism in men, 
what is left to you but to say that these men exhibit very feminine traits.433  
 
What is important here is the idea of masochism being suppressed aggression turned 
inward, becomes pervasive in psychoanalysis and theory, and due to the repressed nature 
of the scream has a particular link to this thesis.434 However, it is important to reiterate that 
the aggression turned in on itself described by Freud is distinct from the scream, which is 
comprised of rage, resentment and self–revulsion, violently and explosively directed back 
onto the subject with the aim of complete self-annihilation and erasure.  
 For Freud, masochism posed a problem to his theory of the pleasure principle, and 
eventually became important to his theory of the death drive.435 According to Freud, the 
human is divided between eros—the desire to reproduce—and thanatos which is the desire 
for self-destruction and entails not so much a desire for death itself, but a desire for a 
return to an original state of formless, undefined matter which is a state of decomposition 
even beyond simply dying.436 What is pertinent here, particularly to The Bell Jar, is the way in 
which this state is similar to the detached, formless, pre-birth state that Plath’s protagonist 
seeks to return to. 
More recently, psychoanalysts have theorised that masochism occurs as a result of 
dissociation in response to traumatic experience: in particular abuse, abandonment and/or 
rejection of children by their primary caregivers.437 New York based psychologist Peter 
Lessem argues that when a child is confronted with trauma enacted by a caregiver they 
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dissociate as a survival mechanism.438As attachment to a primary caregiver is necessary for 
a child’s development and survival, the child must dissociate in order to maintain this 
bond. Lessem explains that the consequence of this is that: 
 
the masochist’s painful sense of self as rejected and/or abused and/or abandoned 
stemming from the original experience of rejection or abuse is dissociated along 
with his reactive angry-healthily entitled sense of self. These self states are 
dissociated in the service of maintaining a crucial attachment. Usually, what 
becomes the masochistic person’s dominant self state is a devalued, self-blaming 
one… 439  
 
This leads to a ‘masochistic pattern’ repeated by the victim in which the apparent desire to 
suffer is in fact, according to Post-Freudian theorist Bernard Berliner, ‘motivated primarily 
by the need to cling to a vitally needed love object, to keep intact a crucial attachment.’440 
The maintenance of the crucial love bond attachment with the abusive/abandoning or 
rejecting parent Lessem mentions also ties in with the type of masochism presented in 
Plath and Jelinek’s novels, which portray characters with these characteristics.  
Zizek also articulates an important aspect of the masochism that is relevant here in 
relation to the woman’s scream in The Bell Jar and The Piano Teacher respectively. 
 
… masochism is the necessary first step toward liberation. When we are subjected 
to a power mechanism, this subjection is always and by definition sustained by 
some libidinal investment: the subjection itself generates a surplus enjoyment of its 
own. This subjection is embodied in a network of “material” bodily practices, and, 
for this reason, we cannot get rid of our subjection through a merely intellectual 
reflection—our liberation has to be staged in some kind of bodily performance, 
and furthermore, this performance has to be of an apparently “masochistic” nature, 
it has to stage the painful process of hitting back at oneself.…This hysterical knot 
of libidinal investment of one’s own victimization can never be undone…The 
reason this “untying of the knot” doesn’t work is that the only true awareness of our 
subjection is the awareness of the obscene excessive pleasure (surplus enjoyment) we get from it. 
This is why the first gesture of liberation is not to get rid of this excessive pleasure, 	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but to assume it actively……violence should primarily be conceived as self-
violence, as a violent reformation of the very substance of a subject’s being.’441  
 
Zizek’s analysis lucidly articulates the psychological workings that underlie the self-
harming, self-violent acts of Plath and Jelinek’s personae, through which they try to achieve 
‘liberation’ through assuming acts of violence towards themselves. The particular nature of 
what they have suffered as it pertains to their female bodies and gender roles is reflected in 
the kinds of violence they enact upon themselves (for example Erika’s cutting). However, 
neither Plath’s Ester Greenwood or Jelinek’s Erika Kohut ‘escape’ their victimisation, and 
both ‘return’ symbolically to abusive environments and show that liberation, and ‘violent 
reformation’ although attempted and desired is not possible. Moreover the violence of the 
woman’s scream towards herself goes beyond what Zizek describes—it is not of the 
liberating kind, but instead is a furious self-mutilating violence involving a compulsion for 
suicide and death that is obscene, almost inhuman and at times grotesque. Thus the 
liberation suggested by Zizek in this psychoanalytical schema is not achievable in the 
scenarios depicted in either The Bell Jar or The Piano Teacher. 	  
Self-destruction of the female and the feminine in The Bel l  Jar and The Piano 
Teacher 
The Bell Jar is pervaded by recurring imagery of self-harm, self-destruction and 
suicide. However, what is germane to the woman’s scream is its heroine’s intense drive to 
extinguish herself as a woman, daughter and potential mother. This compulsion for erasure 
of her female body, as well as the depictions of suicide attempts and self-harm reflects 
Plath’s real life self-harm and series of suicide attempts. Plath suffered severe manic 
depression with schizoid characteristics, which finally lead to her suicide in 1963.442 Her 
precarious mental health was exacerbated by traumatic family events and difficult 
interpersonal relationships: the death of her oppressive father whom she nevertheless 
idolised when she was eight, a difficult relationship with her domineering mother, and an 
abusive marriage to poet Ted Hughes, who had an affair.443  	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The Bell Jar is loosely based on the events leading to Plath’s major breakdown and 
recovery when she was twenty. The novel’s protagonist, Esther Greenwood, is a thinly 
veiled avatar for Plath herself.444 The Bell Jar traces Esther Greenwood’s psychological 
deterioration as she explores, with growing unhappiness and disgust, her burgeoning 
sexuality and sense of womanhood, and the conflict between her intellectual ambitions and 
the social and cultural expectations placed upon white, middle-class women like herself in 
1950s United States. Esther’s increasing inner turmoil coincides with her growing 
awareness and fear of womanhood and female desire, which in turn corresponds with her 
series of attempted suicides and self-harm. Her most serious suicide attempt leads to 
hospitalisation and Electric Shock Therapy. This is followed by her symbolic rebirth: 
treatment, recovery, and newfound self-determination.445  
Plath’s desire to achieve annihilation through death and then purified rebirth is 
linked to strong feelings of self-disgust and self-revulsion over her female body as well as 
the accoutrements of femininity in the 1950s. The Bell Jar for example features pervasive 
themes of disgust and extreme ennui which are announced in the very first pages of the 
novel in which she expresses her disgust and obsessional preoccupation with the well-
publicised executions of the Rosenbergs and her self-disgust at her extravagant spending 
on clothes.446 
 
The idea of being electrocuted makes me sick…I knew something was wrong with 
me that summer, because all I could think about was the Rosenbergs and how 
stupid I'd been to buy all those uncomfortable, expensive clothes, hanging limp as 
fish in my closet…’ 447 
 
Esther/Sylvia’s form of disgust encompasses not only self-disgust but a disgust at her 
cultural and social milieu- a litany of external sources are described in terms of disgust, as 
things that ‘make me sick’:  wealthy, materialistic, fashionable girls her own age,  ‘dirty’ 
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New York, men, men’s bodies, doctors, nurses, other patients, children, her mother, the 
suburbs.448 These external sources of disgust, however are, over the course of the novel, 
gradually more and more internalised into a disgust over her own female body, genitalia 
and sexuality, which she tries to rid of contamination from the outside world first through 
purification and purgation rituals (bathing, water, cutting herself) and then through her 
series of suicide attempts (drowning, strangling, taking pills).449 What is pertinent to the 
woman’s scream here, is this is not just any generalised revulsion and desire for purgation, 
but one especially equated with the need to expel her female biology (themes that are 
shared in Jelinek’s work). American literary critic John Romano similarly argues that Plath’s 
work demonstrates ‘The recurring desire for cleanliness and purity…[which] is really the 
desire not to have a body at all, and manifests itself in disgust with all bodily functions, 
especially sex.’450 In The Bell Jar, for example, Esther bathes to ease feelings of disgust over 
seeing her friend Doreen kissing and fondling a guy:  
 
I lay in that tub on the seventeenth floor of this hotel for-women-only, high up 
over the jazz and push of New York, for near onto an hour, and I felt myself 
growing pure again. I don't believe in baptism or the waters of Jordan or anything 
like that, but I guess I feel about a hot bath the way those religious people feel 
about holy water. I said to myself: “Doreen is dissolving, Lenny Shepherd is 
dissolving, Frankie is dissolving, New York is dissolving, they are all dissolving 
away and none of them matter any more. I don't know them, I have never known 
them and I am very pure. All that liquor and those sticky kisses I saw and the dirt 
that settled on my skin on the way back is turning into something pure.” The 
longer I lay there in the clear hot water the purer I felt, and when I stepped out at 
last and wrapped myself in one of the big, soft white hotel bath towels I felt pure 
and sweet as a new baby.451 
 
Here water is seen as ritual purification, linked to religious ritual, and becoming innocent 
like a baby again. These themes of self-disgust and the desire to be ‘pure as a baby,’452 and 
the threat to her purity by the outside world and especially sexual contact are continued in 	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Ariel poems such as Fever 103°. For example: ‘Water, water make me retch./I am too pure 
for you or anyone. …’453 It is symbolic that Esther’s first sexual intercourse is discussed in 
terms of abjection, and trauma, and the actions of a careless male. Esther experiences a rare 
haemorrhage requiring surgery, and whilst it is dealt with in the novel with an element of 
detachment humour, it underscores the symbolic and metaphoric association of fear, pain 
and horror and danger ascribed to her female genitals and the sexual act. 454  
The narrative structure of The Bell Jar is arranged on this theme: a belief in the 
possibility regeneration through what she articulates as a ritual of rebirth following self-
annihilation. The trope of ritualised death and rebirth – in particular a woman’s ritualised 
death/return to the womb and rebirth recurs throughout her work.455 This is a theme that 
recalls Nietzsche’s notion of creation through destruction (whom Plath read). Whilst skiing 
with a boyfriend (who has given her poor skiing instruction) Esther indulges in an almost 
ecstatic impulse for destruction as she pushes herself down the hill: 
 
…into a flight I knew I couldn't stop by skill or any belated access of will…People 
and trees receded on either hand like the dark sides of a tunnel as I hurtled on to 
the still, bright point at the end of it, the pebble at the bottom of the well, the white 
sweet baby cradled in its mother's belly.456 
 
Unlike Nietzschean renewal however, Esther’s rebirth is not to a greater sense of life, but 
to the darkness and stillness of a baby in a womb. 
Plath describes Esther’s subsequent attempt to overdose on pills and hide herself in 
the cellar, as a peaceful self-annihilation, resembling a withdrawal to a state reminiscent of a 
mother’s womb: ‘The silence drew off, baring the pebbles and shells and all the tatty 
wreckage of my life. Then, at the rim of vision, it gathered itself, and in one sweeping tide, 
rushed me to sleep.’ 457  After Esther is discovered, Plath describes her return to 
consciousness in hospital with imagery symbolic of birth as she moves from ‘the thick, 
warm, furry dark’ into light: ‘a ragged gap of light appeared, like the hole in a wall.’458 Her 
emergence from the bell jar of the work’s title, which symbolises the constricting, stifling 
and oppressive entrapment of her illness, and her final release from hospital is described as 	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a rebirth: ‘There ought…to a be a ritual for being born twice -- patched, retreaded and 
approved for the road.’459 
In The Bell Jar, the desire to return to the mother is countered by her strong feelings 
of rejection of, and rage directed at the mother figure.460 Self-annihilation is posited as an 
attempt to return to the mythical, ideal and nurturing mother and womb; Plath uses 
symbols such as the ocean, earth, womb to express this: for example the suicides in the Bell 
Jar, where she hides under the house, dark like a womb, when she attempts to drown 
herself in water, first in the bath tub, and second in the ocean.  
Like Plath, Jelinek suffered from mental illness and experienced her first 
breakdown at the similarly young age of eighteen. Jelinek also suffered from agoraphobia, 
anxiety, and has admitted to her masochistic behaviour. In a parallel with Plath, Jelinek’s 
father was absent (he was sent to an mental asylum) and her mother was also overbearing 
and controlling. The Piano Teacher centres on the masochistic practices and sexual 
perversions of Erika Kohut, the piano teacher of the novel’s title, who, despite been in her 
late thirties still lives with, and shares a bed with her mother. Jelinek’s choice of name 
‘Kohut’ foregrounds the theme of masochism in the text because it refers to the Austrian 
psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, who specialised in masochistic trauma.461 Erika has self-
harmed since adolescence, and in the novel these practices continue, but are exacerbated by 
her growing frustration with her situation and thwarted desires for sexual intimacy and 
escape. She begins a romantic liaison with one of her piano students, Walter Klemmer but 
he transpires to be a violent and abusive misogynist who does her further harm. After she 
expresses her masochistic desires, he rapes and beats her. She then stabs herself with a 
knife originally meant for Klemmer, only to return home to her mother’s web. Through 
this horrific, yet melodramatic narrative, Jelinek elucidates some particular qualities of 
masochism, which are germane to the woman’s scream and its symptoms. 
In The Piano Teacher, in contrast to The Bell Jar shame and disgust are more explicitly 
linked to Erika’s female genitalia and sexual function.462 Her genital region is described in 
imagery of decay, filth and disease and contamination:  
 
Rot between her legs, an unfeeling soft mass. Decay, putrescent lumps of organic 
material… 	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Striding along, Erika hates that porous, rancid fruit that marks the bottom of her 
abdomen. Only art promises endless sweetness. Soon the decay will progress, 
encroaching upon larger parts of her body. Then she will die in torment. Dismayed, 
Erika pictures herself as a numb hole, six feet of space, disintegrating in the earth. 
The hole that she despised and neglected has now taken full possession of her. She 
is nothing. And there is nothing left for her. 463 
 
For Erika, the disgust and shame felt over her genitals is combined with her fear that she is 
not in control of this part of her body, and it will eventually cause her destruction.  
One of the most disturbing images/scenarios of this desire for female annihilation 
depicted in The Piano Teacher is the scene in which Erika mutilates her vagina with a razor 
blade.464 Unlike Plath’s almost detached and cold, aestheticised, descriptions of self-harm, 
Jelinek’s depiction of female self- mutilation in this text is abject, graphic and very difficult 
to read.  Cutting and self-harm is often considered by psychologists and theorists as a 
desire for control, a desire to feel and bring oneself into reality from a dissociated/numb 
state, an expression of suffering, and/or a form of silent scream. 465  While these 
psychological explanations of self-harm are at play in this scene, it contains some specific 
qualities, which differentiate it other forms of self-harm. For the purposes of this chapter, 
this scene is a literal and horrific embodiment of the women’s scream because the part of 
the body targeted is specifically the female genitalia, and the way in which this is done in 
the text: using her father’s razor blade, is symbolic of male violence against women. 
Moreover Erika enacts a form of the female circumcision and/or castration, which 
suggests the desire to annihilate, and thus escape, her female biology, but also punish 
herself by destroying that which might give her pleasure. In particularly targeting her 
genitals, she also wants to purge herself of all that reminds her of, links her with, and what 
she shares biologically with her mother—namely her female sex. Here Jelinek reveals 
Erika’s form of masochism is also derived from a relationship of antipathy to the mother. 
This compounds Erika’s own self-hatred of the female/feminine within her.466 
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Erika also screams against her inability to separate herself from the oppressive 
domination of her mother. Similarly to Esther, Erika struggles to separate psychological 
ties from the mother, and on a more literal level, as she is shown to be basically 
housebound by her mother aside from her music teaching and concerts.467 As Barbara 
Kosta argues, ‘Erika…finds few avenues of exploration outside of the maternal realm. As a 
result, she cuts or gouges herself in reaction to her inability to separate and as an 
expression of wishing to penetrate the cast that encases her. …Erika consequently 
punishes and negates herself as daughter and symbolically severs the umbilical cord in an 
effort to control her life…..468 However, this effort to control her life is seen to be futile. In 
another echo of Esther Greenwood, Erika also exhibits an ambivalent desire to both 
escape from her mother and return to the womb. Erika cannot break the bond with her 
mother. Even at the very end of the novel after she stabs herself, she is compelled to return 
home to her mother: ‘Erika knows the direction she has to take. She heads home...’469  
 
The woman’s scream against patriarchal, fascist and capitalist power structures 
 
In The Bell Jar and The Piano Teacher respectively, the woman’s scream not only 
exposes interpersonal violence, but also implicates patriarchal, capitalist and fascist and 
power structures. Plath is particularly concerned with the restrictions and expectations 
upon females in the rigid, conservative and consumerist environment of predominantly 
white, upper middle class United States of the 1950s. Jelinek, on the other hand, aims to 
elucidate the intertwined mechanics of patriarchy, capitalism and fascism and their 
detrimental effects on women’s psychology and women’s bodies and sexuality. Jelinek 
exposes disturbing residues of Nazism and fascism in contemporary Viennese society, and 
reveals abusive familial and interpersonal relationships such as those suffered by Erika 
Kohut to be the result of patriarchal and fascist power relations played out in the domestic 
sphere.470 
In The Bell Jar, the central metaphor of the eponymous bell jar is used to 
encapsulate both Esther’s mental illness and the stultifying conditions experienced by 
women in 1950s America: 
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To the person in the bell jar, blank and stopped as a dead baby, the world itself is 
the bad dream…. 
What was there about us, in Belsize, so different from the girls playing bridge and 
gossiping and studying in the college to which I would return? Those girls, too, sat 
under bell jars of a sort.471 
 
For Esther the bell jar of her illness is a source of dissociation, paralysis, the desire to 
negate herself as a woman, and what she describes as ‘stifling distortions.’472 However, what 
Plath slowly reveals in the text here, is that these characteristics are not just personal 
symptoms, but in fact exemplify the female condition itself in 1950’s America. The Bell Jar 
makes it clear that Esther struggles against the very restrictive social roles ascribed to 
women of her time. The novel discusses the painful realities for women during this time: 
for example that even educated women such as Plath were expected to rescind the notion 
of a career and take up the role of housewife. Meanwhile women were subjected to a 
plethora of expectations about how they should look, dress, eat and act which Esther also 
struggles with in the text. Moreover although contraception was becoming more widely 
available for women, women’s sexuality was largely disregarded. 473 The implication here is 
that while Esther may medically recover from her illness, she will still have to combat the 
bell jar of her constraining environment—for Esther the subjectivity and autonomy lost 
during her illness is just a more extreme and debilitating version restrictions placed upon 
women within her patriarchal society. Hence Esther’s desire for female self-annihilation, 
her disgust at her female sexuality and her rejection of aspects of femininity (for example in 
the scene where she throws all her expensive clothes out of the window) are all reactions to 
her fears of restrictive implications her female biology will have on her future. 474 For 
example, she is told that when she is married she would not write poems anymore. Having 
to give up writing would be devastating for Esther (and Plath): 
 
I also remembered Buddy Willard saying in a sinister, knowing way that after I had 
children I would feel differently, I wouldn't want to write poems any more. So I 
began to think maybe it was true that when you were married and had children it 
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was like being brainwashed, and afterward you went about numb as a slave in some 
private, totalitarian state.475 
 
Thus Esther describes the situation of married women as a similarly controlling, ‘numb’ 
and restrictive condition as her illness. The English feminist literary critic Mary Evans has 
argued that The Bell Jar represents a woman’s struggle to articulate an autonomous self: 
‘What The Bell Jar thus offers to us is a thesis about the virtual impossibility—for women—
of articulating a self which is not formed, affected and distorted by immensely influential 
pressures.’476 Indeed the woman’s scream in Plath’s The Bell Jar can be seen as an attempt to 
forge and express an autonomous self in spite of these pressures and restrictions of 1950s 
society. Esther attempts to achieve an autonomous self through suicidal self-destruction 
and rebirth, due to the lack of any other less drastic methods available.  
In The Piano Teacher, Jelinek echoes Plath in comparing the stifling mother-daughter 
relationship in the domestic sphere to a bell jar: 
 
They are enclosed together in a bell jar: Erika, her fine protective hulls her mama. 
The jar can be lifted only if an outsider grabs the glass knob on top and pulls it up. 
Erika is an insect encased in amber, timeless ageless.477 
 
However, unlike Plath, Jelinek makes it overt that both mother and daughter are confined 
in the bell jar. Moreover, Erika’s paralysis and inability to grow and develop in the bell jar is 
made even more clear and disquieting in the image of Erika ‘encased in amber.’ In The 
Piano Teacher, the bell jar is revealed as place of violence, torture, rape and obscenity, hence 
the image of Erika literally stuck in this environment is chilling. Again mirroring Plath, 
Jelinek’s bell jar in The Piano Teacher is symbolic of a larger, social violence. Jelinek shows 
that Erika’s masochistic attacks on her body and genitalia are not only related to the abuse 
and domination she receives from her mother, but are emblematic of the systemic violence 
of the patriarchal, capitalist and fascist culture of contemporary Austria, where women’s 
sexuality and agency is denied and women’s bodies are violated.478  
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For Jelinek, as with a number of German and Austrian feminist writers working 
after WW2, violence against women is symptomatic of fascism, whilst gender inequality 
itself is seen to perpetuate fascism in covert form.479 Jelinek in particular follows the ideas 
of Post World War II Austrian writer Ingeborg Bachmann who saw fascism and warfare at 
the core of interpersonal, heterosexual relationships.480 As Jelinek writes in her essay “Der 
Krieg mit anderen Mitteln” (War by other means), intimate relationships, and marriage 
between men and women result in a woman’s annihilation and loss of subjectivity: 
 
[On love's] battlefield takes place the bloody, sometimes blood­less annihilation 
of the feminine, which can never become a subject, but forever must remain an 
object, subjugated to employment contracts not recognized by society, called 
marriage. 481 
 
Marriage is seen as a form of fascist victimisation as well as unpaid employment that is not 
recognised or valued by capitalist power structures. At the same time, the institution of 
motherhood is revealed to be an active agent in perpetuating this violence against 
daughters. Jelinek depicts the complicity of mothers through satire, melodrama and dark 
humour. For example, Erika’s mother is portrayed as a monstrous feminine persona who 
devours Erika. A number of critics such as Barabara Kosta argue that Erika and her 
mother are depicted by Jelinek as excessive caricatures that transgress the ‘boundaries of 
realism.’482 However, rather than this being fantasy or hypperealism, Jelinek in fact exposes 
the reality of violence, obscenity and horror in the domestic space, especially in the context 
of what Jelinek regards as contemporary Austria’s unacknowledged and obscene 
relationship with its fascist history.483  As Žižek argues, ‘mercilessly, she has brought to light 
obscene fantasies that underlie the Middle European respectability….484 The institution of 
motherhood itself is literally raged against in Jelinek’s text: Erika’s mother is seen as 
colluding in this obscene violence against women.485 Thus Erika’s disturbing self-mutilation 
is linked to her mother’s own complicity. Jelinek shows that for Erika, it is both male 	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violence and her mother’s perpetuation of this violence that causes the shame and disgust 
she feels over her body, and leads to her masochistic behaviours and desire for annihilation 
of her female sex.486 
In particular, Erika’s self-revulsion of her female sex is seen to be directly linked to 
her mother—who during Erika’s childhood and development censured Erika from 
sexuality, set it off-limits, and regarded her body as shameful:487 
 
The adolescent girl lives in a sanctuary, where no one is allowed to bother her. She 
is shielded from influences, and never exposed to temptations. This hands-off 
policy applies only to pleasure, not work. Mother and grandmother, the female 
brigade, stand guard, rifle in hand, to protect Erika against the male hunter lurking 
outside.488 
 
Thus in The Piano Teacher, mother figures are seen to be a further source of oppression of 
female sexuality, and are complicit in actively imparting misogynistic prohibitions and body 
shame. Erika’s sexuality and body is considered impure in contrast to the purported purity 
of music: ‘If Mother is not beckoning with the ladder of success, which goes upward, then 
she depicts the horror of the primrose path, which leads downward. Better the peak of art 
than the slough of sex.’ 489 
American literary scholar and activist Tobe Levin has insightfully demonstrated the 
particular horror of this type of violence, perpetuated by mothers on daughters when it is 
turned back onto the self:  
 
… For although the hyperbole can be read as satire, the nothingness to which 
women is consigned both reflects and enacts a gynocidal threat turned in against 
the female self….Jelinek, therefore, unveils the quisling mother, the one who 
colludes in her daughter’s mutilation in millions of literal cases each year. 
But…excision is a shared oppression, for in Jelinek’s texts, a clitoris or a vagina, 
when literally and metonymically erased, snuffs out and thereby paradoxically 
creates a female caste based on somatophobia and misogyny. Those identified as 
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women, wherever they inhabit patriarchal space, have been divided even unto our 
most intimate bonds.’490 
 
Levin here identifies the horrific violence Erika enacts on her female body as symptomatic 
of the broader issue of the oppression of women and women’s bodies by other women, as 
well as men. Patriarchal violence against women when taken to its horrific conclusion is the 
erasure, mutilation and destruction of the female genitalia either symbolically or literally. 
And, as Levin demonstrates, and is shown in the Jelinek’s The Piano Teacher, this violence is 
intergenerational. Erika’s particular form of masochistic behaviour, by literally embodying 
this violence is the only way she can achieve some sort of agency and control in the context 
of being trapped in a web of violence transmitted from mother to daughter. This is shown 
in the disturbing scene where Erika cuts at her genitals:  
 
She is entirely at her own mercy, which is still better than being at someone else's 
mercy. It's still in her hands, and a hand has feelings too. She knows precisely how 
often and how deep.491 
 
Erika’s acts of self-harm not only embody the violence and disgust of the abuser upon 
herself, but enacts a further violence—i.e. one that is not only mirroring the violence of the 
male/abuser, but is also of her own devising. For example, she can control  ‘how often and 
how deep.’ This is a form of appropriating violence or enacting counter-violence, that 
rather than being directed outwardly, is enacted on the self.492   	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 Tobe Levin, “Feminist (and “Womanist”) as Public Intellectuals: Elfriede Jelinek and Alice Walker,” in 
Ethan Goffman, Daniel Morris (eds.), The New York Public Intellectuals and Beyond: Exploring Liberal Humanism 
(Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009), 253-255. 
491 Jelinek, The Piano Teacher, 47. 
492 Hanssen, “Jelinek's Language of Violence,” 100-104. 
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Conclusion  
 
The fact would seem to be, if in my situation one may speak of facts, not only that 
I shall have to speak of things of which I cannot speak, but also, which is even 
more interesting, but also that I, which is if possible even more interesting, that I 
shall have to, I forget, no matter. And at the same time I am obliged to speak. I 
shall never be silent. Never. 
—Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable  
 
The above excerpt from Samuel Beckett’s novel The Unnamable (1953) encapsulates some 
of the key qualities of the scream and reflects the struggles faced in writing this thesis. The 
scream relates to traumatic events about which I cannot speak. Yet, like Beckett’s narrator 
in The Unnamable, I am compelled to speak about them, and refuse to be silent. The quote 
also captures the way in which the scream is repressed, and yet constantly rises up, seeking 
expression. A further point of connection is that in The Unnamable, the latent rage and 
distress of Beckett’s narrator results from an undisclosed horror and trauma, which 
constantly torments him, and which he repeatedly struggles to comprehend. 493  This 
scenario is shared in the condition of the scream and demonstrated in the case studies 
discussed in this thesis.  
For a long time I was unable to verbalise any aspects of my traumatic experiences. 
However, I sought out other forms of expression that resonated with my tumultuous inner 
state. For example, prior to the undertaking of this PhD and my focus on visual art, I 
studied the cello. As a child I identified with this instrument because of the melancholy and 
grief it is capable of expressing. As a child I also took to drawing and painting, through 
which I unconsciously expressed aspects of the scream and its symptoms. More recently—
particularly in the performance video artworks created as part of this PhD project—I have 
found stronger ways to express this condition. One of the outcomes this project is that I 
have begun to be able to speak and write about the events that I experienced and my 
resulting psychological state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 A number of theorists have discussed trauma in relation to Beckett’s trilogy Molloy, Malone and the 
Unnamable. See Angela Moorjani, “Molloy, Molone Dies, The Unnamable: The Novel Reshaped,” in Dirk van 
Hulle, Ed., The New Cambridge Companion to Samuel Beckett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 23-
25. 
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This thesis has established the scream as a very specific psychological condition 
resulting from severe trauma. It is characterised by an explosive and violent energy 
comprised of rage, anguish, resentment, despair and self-revulsion that wells up, but is 
suppressed and turns back in on the traumatised individual, causing further psychic 
devastation. The thesis has demonstrated the symbiotic link between this condition and the 
way in which it is expressed in the aesthetic realm: the case studies discussed are not only 
expressive of the scream, but are also symptomatic of this condition. Each writer or artist 
discussed here shares a compulsion to express something that cannot be fully articulated 
because it is too horrific, painful or shameful, and this difficulty is imbued in the very fabric 
of their works. At the same time, the self-destructive aspect of the scream is evident in 
works that enact or perform the author’s own self-directed rage, self-punishment and self-
mutilation. 
Each of the case studies examined in this thesis shares in the essential 
characteristics of the scream while at the same time providing varied perspectives on this 
condition. The interdisciplinary approach of this thesis has assisted in elucidating the 
specific nuances and contrasts of the scream: the six chapters are symbolic of the different 
existential states or moods that co-exist within this condition, and the contrasting ways in 
which it can be expressed in literary, dramatic, philosophical and artistic works. An 
important outcome of this research has been to show that this condition is not limited any 
one particular type of trauma, but can emerge from a broad range of traumatic experiences. 
For example the scream may be a response to interpersonal violence, catastrophic events, 
and even endogenous causes such as severe physical or psychological illness. At the same 
time the case studies reveal the scream to have a broader aesthetic, philosophical and 
psychological significance beyond individual pathography or autobiography.  
One of the insights provided by this investigation is that the scream is both 
transversal—in the sense that it is found in cultural works ranging from Antiquity to the 
contemporary era—yet at the same time highly dependent on its specific historical context 
in terms of the aesthetic form it takes, and its relationship to the writer’s or artist’s milieu. 
In fact, for the majority of case studies discussed the expression of the scream is not only 
personal but is also used allegorically to address social and/or political concerns. For 
example, Bataille’s obscene scream is also a rage against Fascism, and Jelinek’s scream 
functions as a strident critique of patriarchal and capitalist power structures. Although the 
scream is a very personal experience, it is not isolated from the subject’s cultural and 
historical context, and can be used as a way in which to articulate resistance and critique. 
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In contrast to many existing studies on trauma—which are typically based on 
themes of memory, mourning and melancholy—this thesis examines a particular condition 
of trauma that is violent, disquieting and at times obscene. The scream also involves 
elements that are at odds with commonplace notions of forgiveness and healing, such as 
implacable rage, madness, the desire for violent revenge, self-punishment and the desire for 
self-annihilation. Furthermore, one of the insights provided by the case studies (most 
clearly demonstrated in the works of Artaud) is that the kind of severe trauma that 
generates the scream precludes catharsis or resolution. 
This PhD project has been a personal and troubled exploration. It has not achieved 
catharsis, purgation or redemption. However, like a camera slowly coming into focus, many 
things about this condition are clearer. This is not full clarification or enlightenment, but I 
now have greater perspective on what I am dealing with, and have gathered strength to go 
on. 
The intensity of the artwork provides a benchmark I intend to develop further in 
mime, vaudeville, grand guignol, and the doll. The performative abreaction and displacement 
of personal traumatic experiences into scenarios that recall but do not re-enact these 
experiences lends itself particularly to further exploration in these areas that are broadly 
grouped together under the rubric of the mask. Moreover, as the condition of the scream 
entails an explosive, yet repressed, state—and thus a significant dissonance between inner 
experience and outside appearances—the theme of the mask seems particularly apt for 
future creative investigation. A further area of interest lies in the relationship of both the 
physical and symbolic mask to the expression of extreme emotion and the subjectivity of 
the artist within the aesthetic realm. The concept of the mask includes not only the face 
mask or makeup worn by the performer, but the costume, mise-en-scène and the entire 
aesthetic artifice set up by the artist/performer. This expanded concept of the mask is 
aligned with the work Artaud and Strindberg who demonstrate that the consciously 
constructed artificiality of the entire mise-en-scène is essential to the communicative power 
and successful affect of any performative-based artwork. The mask allows the artist to 
stage, objectify and formalise the work. It also allows the artist to explore and inhabit 
multiple personae and perform actions that are not normally accessible, including the 
violent, obscene and irrational. The mask is therefore an important strategy for 
performative-based visual art practices such as my own that aim to explore inner, hidden or 
taboo psychological states and tensions. The displacement of outward identity allows the 
subject to inhabit alternative and often transgressive modes of behaviour, for example as 
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manifest in the scream. Future theoretical research will explore the ways in which 
allegorical, highly artificial and stylized modes of expression can be paradoxically more 
revealing of these inner states of being than realistic or naturalistic forms of expression.  
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Figure 1: Edvard Munch, The Scream, 1893, tempera and crayon on cardboard, 91x73.5 cm. 
 
 
 
Figure Two: Francis Bacon, Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1953, Oil on Canvas, 153x118 cm. 
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